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Chapter 1. Formal description of the SIER Game
This chapter contains:
Section 1. History and purpose of the SIER Game. Its formal structure.
Section 2. Outline of the remaining chapters.
Section 3. On purpose and method.
Section 1. History and purpose of the SIER Game. Its formal structure
Several years ago, Professor P.van Veen, chairman of the International
Economics Section of the Economics Department of Tilburg University. pro-
posed the idea of creating a 'role-play game' between countries. The pur-
pose of such a game would be to provide a didactic tool to teach students
some aspects of standard international macro-economics. I was assigned to
guide this project. Very soon it was decided that the game should take the
form of a computer game, named the Simulation of International Economic
Relations (SIER) Game.
From the outset it was clear that the SIER Game should first of all serve
didactic purposes. It should help a teacher to clarify various basic ma-
cro-economic relationships and the way they can function over time in an
interrelated world economy. Moreover. the game should show players how
hard it is to reach certain goals of economic policy in such a world, even
if all relationships are relatively simple and known and the number of
instruments simultaneously available is sufficient.
To this end a dynamic non-linear four-country model was developed1 con-
taining in total 452 "global" endogenous variables. The policy instruments
per player group (i.e., per country, see below) are: the level of material
government expenditures, the number of civil servants, the tax rate on
labour income, the tax rate on profits and interest proceeds. 3 import
tariffs, wage policy, the salary of civil servants, the income per unem-
ployed. exchange rate policy or (alternatively) a system of flexible ex-
change rates. If a monetary sector is included (see below), extra instru-
ments are: open market policy and the extent to which the government defi-
cit is financed through bonds.
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As the number of relationships to be explained is rather large. the SIER
Game consists of a series of games ranging from relatively simple to ra-
ther complex. where ideally students play games incorporating several
successive levels of complexity. All levels have a large number of behavi-
oural and technical relationships in common. Moreover. their formal struc-
ture (i.e., the method of playing) is identical. In each game four player
groups are formed, each representing the government of a country and try-
ing to maximize 'welfare' in its country.2 The choice of four countries
is not completely arbitrary. It facilitates trade and exchange rate
blocks.3 Moreover. although the computer uses a symmetric four-country
model. if two or three countries cooperate, the 'world'. in fact, becomes
asymmetric.
A complete game consists of the following stages:
1. chOOSing the version
2. an introductory lecture
3. the game
4. evaluation.
ad 1. The version
The game leader (read: teacher) sets the current level of complexity by
choosing between alternative assumptions regarding the economic model to
be played with. He does so by answering the questions on his terminal
screen. The options regard:
- the production function (complementarity between factors of production
vs. perfect substitutability);
- the investment function (investments determined by lagged profits or by
a calculated expected rate of return);
- a lagged vs. immediate impact of relative prices on the ratio of im-
ported vs. 'home produced' consumer products;
- a game with or without an explicit monetary block;
- if a monetary sector is included: with or without international mobility
of capital;
- at the outset world-wide fixed but adjustable or flexible rates of ex-
4change .
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By choosing between these alternatives, the game leader actually sets the
values of a row of O/l-coefficients. His choice also determines the in-
struments available to players. A full list of instruments is provided in
Appendix 1.1. Moreover, the game leader has the option to change the coef-
ficients in the model. In this way he can, for example, include immediate
or lagged influences of consumer prices, labour productivity and/or the
rate of unemployment on the nominal wage rate. Or he can introduce a posi-
tive or negative rate of growth in the labour force. Since all of these
alternatives can be combined, a large number of games results.5
ad 2. The introductory lecture
Before the game starts, the game leader explains to the players the rela-
tionships within the model, including the welfare function (see below). To
this end he can use the hand-outs that have been developed for the main
varieties of the game. Each hand-out contains the assignment, the welfare
function, the essential features of the current model (including an arrow
scheme of the economy concerned), the initial starting pOSition, a list of
instruments and a list of symbols. To detect the dynamic behaviour of the
model following impulses, the game leader can use the 'iebtest' program.
With the help of this program, the game leader can calculate the outcomes
of any combination of impulses by any of the four groups (or by several or
all of them) for every desired number of periods (up to 1500) using only
one terminal.6 Moreove;, he divides the total group of students into
subgroups of 3 to 4 people, where every subgroup is supposed to represent
the government of a country. Since the model in the computer is a four-
country model, a maximum of 4 subgroups (governments) can play each
game.7 Thirdly, he assigns a task to all governments, which may be one of
the following:
1. make sure that at the end of the game welfare in your country is higher
than welfare in the other countries, or
2. make sure that at the end of the game welfare in your country is as
high as possible.
"Welfare" is a figure based on the five goals of economic policy accepted
in many western countries. If, as a hypothesis, governments strive for
maximal chances of re-election, and those chances grow with increases in
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"welfare". their economic policy should be directed at task 2 above. A
disadvantage of that assignment. however. is that possibly no winner can
be determined. which might demotivate students. In practice. assignment 1
was chosen as a compromise making it a precondition that a country could
only be a winner if its welfare was not lower than it would have been
without policy interventions (in all countries).8
In the basic version of the game. each country starts out with 100
"points" of welfare. This level is increased every period
1. if real private absorption of goods and services9 increases. where
the number of services is assumed to equal the number of civil ser-
vants: each civil servant is assumed to produce one (free) service
per period.10
2. if the rate of unemployment is less than 3%. The lower unemployment.
the higher the welfare increase. If unemployment exceeds the 3% le-
vel. welfare drops (the higher unemployment. the larger this drop).ll
3· if price changes are smaller than 4%. The lower the price change (in
absolute terms). the higher the rise in welfare. If prices change by
more than plus or minus 4%. welfare drops (the higher the price
change in absolute terms. the larger this drop).
4. if the surplus on the balance of payments is between 3 and 5 units of
gold. If it equals 4. welfare rises maximally. If smaller than 3 or
larger than 5. welfare drops. The further this surplus is removed
from 4. the smaller the increase (or the larger the decrease) in
welfare.
The main argument to let players strive for a surplus in this respect
is of a didactic nature: in a closed four-country world as assumed in
the game it is of course impossible that the balance of payments of
all countries would be in surplus. As a result this fourth deter-
minant of welfare will increase competition between the player
groups.
5.a) if a monetary sector is included: if the rate of interest is below
10%; or. alternatively.
b) if no monetary sector is included: if the surplus on the government
account as a ratio of national (firm) output is between -1% and
5
+1%.12 The optimum here is zero percent: a balanced government bud-
get. The concrete specification of the welfare function (see below)
implies that welfare is unaffected by the total of the current item
and item 4, if cet. par. F is raised from 0 to a level between 0 and
4.13 The savings by the government will (cet. par.) cause an equal
surplus on the current account.
In the basic version of the game, all of these welfare items have an ar-
bitrary equal weight: if an item scores maximally, welfare is raised by
0.25 points. Using these coefficients, in summary, the welfare function
reads as
w W_1 + 0.25(~(c+m) + Alg) + 0.25(1-u/3)
+ 0.25(1-100!P!/4) + 0.25 x (1-!BB-4!)
+ either: 0.25(0.1-r) x 100
or 0.25(1 - ~ x 100) (1.1)
where14
c real private consumption of goods produced in the home country
m private consumption of imported goods in real terms
19 number of services consumed
u rate of unemployment (u ~ 0)
P rate of change in consumer price index
BB surplus on balance of payments in gold
r (nominal) rate of interest
F surplus on government account
Y value of firm output
However, like all coefficients of the economic model, the coefficients in
the welfare function, including those weights, can be changed by the game
leader. This option reflects the fact that in the SIER Game 'welfare' only
functions as a datum given by political institutions to be 'maximized' by
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players. The fact that the determinants of welfare are possibly intertwi-
ned is therefore irrelevant.
Although 'welfare' plays a minor role in the 81m Game as the game is
primarily intended to help in teaching economics, the game leader has the
option to switch to a slightly different version of the welfare equa-
tion.15 The standard welfare function presumes that voters are in a cer-
tain respect shortsighted: the current level of final private absorption
determines the current level of welfare,16 regardless of, for example,
real private consumption of home produced goods in the past. As an alter-
native, the game leader can choose a welfare function where current wel-
fare is a weighted average of the levels of welfare experienced in the
past17 as measured by the welfare equation given above. In the remainder
of this dissertation, however, equation (1.1) is used.
Many variations on welfare equations are possible. One could, for example,
make players maximize one or two determinants out of the welfare equation
given certain restrictions on the other, or give each group a different
welfare equation. As such, these and other variations are interesting. The
main point here, however, is that to make the Game a game, one needs a
criterion to determine a winner. In this sense, any welfare equation would
suffice as long as it motivates players to actively participate in the
game.
ad. 3. The game
Five terminals are needed to play the gam.e:one for the game leader and
one for each of the four player groups. Ideally, the players' terminals
are located in separate rooms to faCilitate undisturbed and free discus-
sions within each of them.18 This does not mean that contacts between the
groups would not be allowed. If one of the groups decided that internatio-
nal cooperation is desirable, in the sense of coordination of policies or,
for example, if it wants to raise a customs union, "diplomats" of the
country concerned could "travel" to other countries.19
When the game leader starts the game, the outcomes for period 1 appear on
the four player screens. These outcomes are calculated by the computer on
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the basis of lagged values for both the endogenous variables and the para-
meters, including the instruments (or rather the exogenous variables). The
standard levels of those lagged endogenous and exogenous variables are
filed in the computer but can be changed by the game leader when starting
the game.
The outcomes for period one are at the same time the starting values for
'round' two, which is the first round where players can intervene in their
economies by manipulating one or more instruments of economic policy.
Their decision making process, in which they can use several types of
information (see below), should be finished within a time limit specified
by the game leader.20 The computer starts calculating the results for this
period as soon as all groups have typed in their desired economic policies
or, if that is earlier, if the time limit has passed. In the latter case
the calculations are based on the assumption that those countries that
have not typed in their (complete) set of policies do not intervene in the
current period.
Regularly, a few seconds after the computer starts calculating, the out-
comes for this period (two) are shown to the players. At the same time,
these values are the starting values for the next round (three). This
procedure is repeated until the game leader decides that the game is
over.21 The country with the highest level of welfare at that point has
won the game. The number of rounds to be played can be announced before-
hand by the game leader ("elections will be held after period 8" for
example). Alternatively, to prevent policies that are only beneficial in
the short run, it can be kept secret.
During each round the player groups are given information to help them
make their decisions. Two types of information are produced on their ter-
minals22
1. information shown automatically
2. extra information available on request.
The first type of information concerns for both the present and the previ-
ous period
8
- a "welfare screen" containing the welfare levels in all four countries
as well as the direct determinants of "welfare" in the country concerned
- the "main variables" of the country concerned.
The extra information concerns (on separate screens)
"remaining real variables", for the present and the previous period
- the monetary variables, again for the present and the previous period
- impulses up to the current period
- with all screens: a separate list explaining the symbols used.
This extra information relates to economic variables in the home country.
Moreover, all the above information is also available for any other previ-
ous period and for any other country. Groups can acquire the 'extra infor-
mation' by answering 'Y' to the question concerned.23
The role of the game leader in technically running the game is limited to
typing in the preferred version and the respective time limits. For op-
timal use of the game, however, it appeared crucial that he is available
for players to provide sufficient feed-back on the economics of the model
used during the computer session. As stated above, the SIER Game was not
developed to serve as a substitute for a teacher. but only to provide a
didactic tool.
ad 4. The evaluation
A game is closed by an evaluation based on a computer printout of all
interventions and the developments in the main economic variables. This
printout is available to every player immediately after the computer ses-
sion.
The evaluation can take several forms. If time was short. a brief session
immediately following the computer session was held g1V1flgthe groups the
opportunity to explain the policies they pursued and to ask clarification
on certain developments that they did not understand. Moreover, such a
session gives the game leader the opportunity to summarize the main de-
velopments over time and pose critical questions to the groups. And. most
importantly, it gives him/her the opportunity to check (albeit superfici-
ally) whether the goals of the SIER Game were achieved or not, and whether
the version played was accurate or not.
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More satisfying, however, was the evaluation form used most often, where
each of the player groups had to write a short paper featuring:
- the welfare equation
- main lines of intended policies and expected results
- per period: actual policies, including reactions to interventions by
other countries
- per period: outcomes and explanations
- an evaluation of intended and pursued policies
- an evaluation of the usefulness of the present version of the SIER Game.
This paper was distributed to all other players and was presented to and
defended before the whole group and the game leader.
With this procedure, students are not only trained in writing a paper and
actively participating in a group, but were also forced to analyse and
discuss the economic relationships in detail. Although it does not suffice
as a scientific proof, the formal and informal reactions of the partici-
pants so far indicate that a game such as the SIER Game, especially when
combined with the latter kind of evaluation, could serve as a valuable
didactic tool in teaching elements of international macro-economics.
Section 2. Outline of remaining chapters
In the remaining chapters the macro-economic models used in the SIER Game
are described, as well as possible alternative applications of the SIER
framework. As a starting point, in Chapter 2 the relationships common to
all of the SIER models models are explained. These common features are
combined with one of two available investment equations and one of two
available production functions. The alternative production functions are
characterized by the relationship between the factors of production that
are distinguished, labour and capital. In the SIER Game they are either
complementary or perfectly substitutable. The way expectations with regard
to net profits (the determinant of net investments) are formed can be
either more or less traditional (expected net profits are supposed to
equal last period's net profits) or more sophisticated: on the basis of
extrapolations of a few variables, other variables, as expected output
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prices and production, are calculated. And on the basis of the latter,
expected profits are "Calculated".24
Combined with the common relationships explained in Chapter 2, this leads
to four main models:
Chapter 3 assuming complementary factors of production and investments
determined by lagged profits
Chapter 4 assuming complementary factors of production and investments
determined by "calculated" expected profits
Chapter 5 assuming substitutable factors of production and investments
determined by lagged profits
Chapter 6 assuming substitutable factors of production and investments
determined by "calculated" expected profits.
The models embodied in the SIER Game are described in these respective
chapters that function as a guide for future game leaders. In short, Chap-




lagged profits calculated expected
labour and profits
capital are ,J.
complementary Chapter 3 Chapter 4
substitutable Chapter 4 Chapter 6
Diagram 1.1
The way these models behave under different shocks is illustrated with the
help of "tables,,25 in as far as the models concerned can be regarded as
reflecting standard macro-economic theories.26 In those tables the effects
over time are depicted of certain impulses or of combinations of impulses
(policy interventions) as calculated by the computer. In general, we will
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discuss the impact of fiscal policy (demand policy), supply-side policy
(lowering the profit tax rate) and wage rate policy. If applicable, we
will do so with and without an explicit monetary sector and with flexible
and 'fixed but adjustable' rates of exchange. If a monetary sector is
included, we will also discuss the effects of monetary policy.
The conclusions of the simulations regarding fiscal and monetary policy,
are compared to those of standard economic literature on international
macro-economics in Chapter 7 (Section 1).
As the Game only intends to present elements of standard macro-economics,
we will not give any overview of literature or include recent contribu-
tions. In the final chapter, Chapter 7, however, we will argue that the
SIER Game can also be used as a powerful framework for research, for exam-
ple to study those recent publications on international macro-economics.
That chapter illustrates that the model developed here can be used in this
context in at least three different respects:
1. to discuss the impact of alternative (combinations of) economic poli-
cies in alternative settings. To illustrate this, some of the results
found in the tables of Chapters 3 to 6 are summarized and compared;
2. to check whether or not the policy recommendations found in existing
literature still hold if the economic model on which they are based is
replaced by one (or more) of the SIER models;
3. to discover the effects of a basically different behavioural assumption
by inserting that assumption into the SIER framework.27
By no means is the project presented in this dissertation finished. As far
as Chapters 2 to 6 are concerned, they give the specifications of the
equations as they currently are, and, of course, all of these specifica-
tions can be developed further. Chapter 7 gives examples of how the frame-
work built could be used as a research tool. These examples should be
elaborated before completion. The dissertation merely presents a framework
that could be used as a basis for both educational and research purposes.
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Section 3. On purpose and method
In 1976, Lucas criticized models entailing fixed decision rules of econo-
mic agents.28 Models using fixed parameters would lead to incorrect pre-
dictions of the impact of policy measures, especially in the longer run,
as over time and due to the policy measures themselves parameters (i.e.,
decision rules) change. In his words, "given that the structure of an
econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents,
and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the
structures of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any
change of policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric
models" (p.41).
As Chari describes,29 one way to circumvent the problem that the effects
of policies are dependent on the way current policies affect expected
future policies and thus current decisions, is to start from the subjects'
objective functions and maximize them given expected values for future
policies. The latter expectations are known in circumstances where the
government in the current period chooses an entire sequence of policies
for this and the subsequent periods (a policy regime) and people believe
those policies are indeed followed in future. This brings up the issue of
the time consistency of policy: if a certain policy regime is optimal in
period t, will it still be optimal for periods> t? If not, i.e., if the
policy is 'time inconsistent', one could assume that people will not be-
lieve the announced policy regime, will therefore act differently than
supposed when designing the optimal policy, and will thus make that policy
suboptimal. See Chari.
When developing a series of models basically for educational purposes, one
has to leave out economic insights, sometimes even important ones. Inclu-
sion of everything would lead to such a large and complex model, that
students would only be left with unsolved puzzles. To assume changes in
expected policies and thus in decision rules (as opposed to decisions) as
soon as current policies are changed, could result in this kind of puzzle.
Another inference of the Lucas' critique mentioned above, however, al-
though complicating the model, is covered to a certain extent in the
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model(s) to be presented: if the economic environment changes (for in-
stance due to policy), some of the decision rules change.
A few examples may illustrate this point.
In all models the economy may endogenously switch between an economy pro-
ducing at full capacity and one producing at less than full capacity. The
way output prices and production are set, adapts simultaneously. In Chap-
ters 4 and 6, investments depend on (among other things) expected future
output prices and (in Chapter 6) on expected future output. To this end,
those expected values are calculated in an 'expected future product mar-
ket' structured along the same lines as the market for current products.
Independently from the 'regime' on the latter, this expected market is
characterized as a full capacity market or a below-full-capacity market.
If one of the determinants of (current and/or expected) demand and/or
(current and/or expected) supply is affected, actual and expected output
and output prices are influenced with its subsequent impact on investment
decisions and (in Chapter 7) on consumer decisions. 30
If labour and capital are complementary, a possibly expected shortage on
the labour market (which is determined simultaneously with the 'expected
product market' above) will keep entrepreneurs from net investments -even
if they would be profitable if sufficient labour would be available- as
they do not expect to be able to hire the extra labour. Again, if the
government by its action influences the expected availability of labour
(for instance by currently hiring extra civil servants) this policy in-
fluences current investment decisions.
The examples so far necessitate discontinuous decision rules. This does
not hold for the following example.
In Chapter 6 an asymmetric investment decision rule is developed (and
examined in Chapter 7) where the utility of expected extra profits resul-
ting from a considered expansion of the capital stock depends on the cur-
rent situation of 'the firm'. As a consequence, the current investment
decision depends on all factors (like current or past governmental policy)
that determine expected profitability of investments, or the current
situation of firms, or both. This decision rule replaces the more conven-
tional one where net investments are directly linked to the 'gap' between
the actual stock of capital and the one that is expected to minimize pro-
duction costs.
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These examples may illustrate that although the models will be described
below do not embody a direct influence of policy changes on decision
rules, they do to a certain extent meet another inference of the 'Lucas-
critique' that decision rules should not be fixed, but should depend on
circumstances relevant to the decision maker. This does not imply, how-
ever, that no further research should be required in this field. To the
same extent, the models' predictions about the efficay of the various
policies should be modified.
As discussed above, in the Game players try to maximize 'welfare'. The
algoritm in the computer model is, however, not designed to calculate
'optimal policies'. What the computer does, is calculate the effects of
policy measures chosen by players under specified assumptions. By the same
token, the algoritm is not developed to investigate the possible time
consistency of policy.
15
Appendix 1.1 Lay-out of the Game
In every period the lay-out on the players' screen is alike.
When starting the game (period 1) it looks as follows.
Results (welf.- variables) for country 1 (actual and last period's values)




























Results ( main variables) for country 1 (actual and last period's values)
period 1. a I period 1. a I period 1. a-------------------------+--------------------------+-------------------------welfare/model distribution of income U1 2.982107 2.98211------------------------ ------------------------ KOPTl 100.0000 100.000WELF1 99.7530 100.252 YL1N 80.00000 80.0000 IDl 0.000000 0.00000WELF2 99.7530 100.252 YRl N -.000000 0.00000 ------------------------WELF3 99.7530 100.252 ------------------------ other main variablesWELF4 99.7530 100.252 wages and prices ------------------------MODELl 1.000000 1.00000 ------------------------ F1 -6.00000 -5.8824------------------------ PLl 0.800000 0.80000 R1 0.100000 0.10000national income WBl 0.608000 0.60800 81 N -.000000 0.00000------------------------ PLC81 0.800000 0.80000 BB1 -.000000 0.00000Yl N 100.0000 100.000 PLUl 0.640000 0.64000 ER12 1.000000 1.00000Y1 100.0000 100.000 Pl 1.000000 1.00000 ER13 1.000000 1.00000Cal 60.00000 60.0000 PY1 1.000000 1.00000 ER14 1.000000 1.00000
11 10.00000 10.0000 ------------------------ CKl 1.000000 1.00000
G1 14.00000 14.0000 factors of production CK2 1.000000 1.00000EX1 16.00000 16.0000 ------------------------ CK3 1.000000 1.00000M1 16.00000 16.0000 Kl 100.0000 100.000 CK4 1.000000 1.00000LM1 100.0000 100.000
LG1 22.00000 22.0000
Do you want to see an explanation of these symbols ?: 31n
Do you want to see the other real variables for this country?: y32
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Results (other real variables) for country 1 (a.ctual and last period's values)
period 1. 0 I period 1. 0 1 period 1. 0-------------------------.--------------------------+-------------------------
expenditures prices government account
------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------
COl N 60.00000 60.0000 W1 0.800000 0.80000 BL1 24.00000 24.0000., N 16.00000 16.0000 ?V1 E 1.000000 1.00000 BR1 9·000000 9·00000
.,2 N 5.333333 5.33333 PKl E 0.200000 0.20000 BTl 0.000000 0.00000
"3 N 5.333333 5.33333 PL1 E 0.800000 0.80000 TRF1 20.00000 20.0000
.,4 N 5·333333 5.33333 ------------------------ TL1 0.240000 0.24000
.,2 5.333333 5.33333 supply TRl 0.600000 0.60000
"3 5.333333 5.33333 ------------------------ ------------------------.,4 5.333333 5.33333 CAP1 102.9889 102.989 price of gold
01 N 14.00000 14.0000 VS1 100.0000 100. ODD ------------------------
11 N 10.00000 10.0000 V1 E 100.0000 100.000 ER1 1.000000 1.0oaOO
EX1 N 16.00000 16.0000 ------------------------ ------------------------
EX12 5.333333 5.33333 labour reserves
EX13 5·333333 5.33333 ------------------------ ------------------------
EX14 5·333333 5.33333 LVl 122.0000 122.000 RES1 100.0000 100.000
LAl 125·7500 125.750
LU1 3·750000 3.75000
Do you want to see an explanation of these symbols 1: n
Do you want to see the monetary variables for this country?: y
Results (monetary variables) for country 1 (actual and last period's values)
period 1. 0 I period 1, 0 I period 1. 0-------------------------+--------------------------+-------------------------
interest rate demand for bonds interest payments
------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------
R1 0.100000 0.10000 OVDll 61.20000 60.0000 OP1 11.00000 10.0000------------------------ OVD21 30.60000 30.0000 001 5·000000 4.70588
supply of bonds OVD31 30.60000 30.0000 ------------------------------------------------ OVD41 30.60000 30.0000 wealth
MPl 3.000000 2.94118 OVDRl1 30.60000 30.0000 ------------------------
01 17·30000 16.0000 OVDR12 15·30000 15·0000 Vl 306.0000 300.000
OV1 173.0000 160.000 OVDR13 15.30000 15·0000 VR1 153.0000 150.000
011 6.120000 6.00000 OVDR14 15.30000 15.0000 ------------------------
012 3.060000 3·00000 ------------------------ balance of payments
013 3.060000 3.00000 interest proceeds ------------------------
014 3.060000 3.00000 ------------------------ KOBI -.000000 0.00000
ORll 3.060000 3_00000 B1 1.000000 0.00000 KAB1 -.000000 0.00000
OR12 1.530000 1.50000 001 15·00000 14.7059 BBl -.000000 0.00000
OR13 1.530000 1.50000 OORI 7.500000 1.35294
OR14 1.530000 1.50000 00C1 7.500000 1.35294
Do you want to see an explanation of these symbols ?: n
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Do you want to see impulses given by some group up to this period ?: y
Type country number : 1
Impulses by group 1 up to now ( in % )
round 1 round 0
TL1 A 0.00 % 0.00 %
TR1 A 0.00 % 0.00 %T12A 0.00 % 0.00 %T13A 0.00 % 0.00 %T14 A 0.00 % 0.00 %GlA 0.00 % 0.00 %LGl A 0.00 % 0.00 %PL1 A 0.00 % 0.00 %PLCS1 A 0.00 % 0.00 %PLU1 A 0.00 % 0.00 %
ALFAll A 50.00 % 50.00 %
MP1A 0.00 % 0.00 %
ER1 A 0.00 % 0.00 %
Press <RETURN> to continue :
Do you want to see an explanation of these impulse symbols 7: n
Do you want information on some (other) country on some time period ?: n33
This is the input part of impulses for country 1 at round 2
Do you want to give impulses this round ?: y
Do you want to change tax rates or import tariffs? y
Type in new values ( in brackets the values are shown,
that will be valid if you push the <RETURN>-key ) .
The change ( in %-points ) of TL
=change in labour tax rate (in %-points) :[ 0.00] 2
The change ( in %-points ) of TR
=change in profit tax rate (in %-points) :[ 0.00] -5
The import tariff (in %) on imports from country 2:[ 0.00]
The import tariff (in %) on imports from country 3:[ 0.00]
The import tariff (in %) on imports from country 4:[ 0.00]
Are these the rates that you wanted 7: 34y
Do you want to change government purchases or the number of civil servants ?:y
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Type in new values ( in brackets the values are shown,
that will be valid if you push the <RETURN>-key ) .
The change ( in % )in real level of government purchases :[ 0.00] 2
The change ( in % ) in the number of workers
employed by the government :[ 0.00] 2
Did you type the right change in total government expenditures 7: y
Do you want an exogenous change in a wage rate 7: y
Type in new values ( in brackets the values are shown,
that will be valid if you push the <RETURN>-key ) .
With regard to the wage rate in the private sector,
what is the desired increase
(as a % of last period's value)? :[ 0.00] -1
With regard to the wage rate in the government sector,
what is the desired increase
(as a % of the trend in private wages) 7 :[ 0.00]
With regard to the income of the unemployed,
what is the desired increase
(as a % of the trend in private wages) 7 :[ 0.00] -1
Did you type the right changes in wage rates 7: y
Do you want to change your monetary policy 7: y
Type in new values ( in brackets the values are shown,
that will be valid if you push the <RETURN>-key ) .
To what extent do you want to finance your
government deficit by monetary means 7
Please, type in the desired percentage,
where 0% means no monetary financing
and 100% means full monetary financing. :[ 50.00J 40
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Apart from possible monetary financing of the
government deficit,
what percentage of last period's number of bonds
do you want your Central Bank to buy
(thereby increasing the money supply) ? :[ 0.00] 1
Did you type the right impulses concerning the money supply?: y
Do you want to alter the exchange rate system
and switch to floating as opposed to
fixed exchange rates, or vice versa ?: n 35
Do you want to devalue or revalue your currency ?:y
Type in new values ( in brackets the values are shown,
that will be valid if you push the <RETURN>-key )
Type in the desired percentage of de- or revaluation
(where a positive number indicates a devaluation) :[ 0.00] 0
The impulses are
2.00 % for TL1 A
-5·00 % for TRl A
0.00 % for T12 A
0.00 % for T13 A
0.00 % for T14 A
2.00 % for G1 A
2.00 % for LG1 A
-1.00 % for PL1 A
0.00 % for PLCS1 A
-1.00 % for PLU1 A
40.00 % for ALFAll A
1.00 % for MP1 A
0.00 % for ER1A
change (in %-points) in labour tax rate
change (in %-points) in profit tax rate
tariff on imports out of country 2
tariff on imports out of country 3
tariff on imports out of country 4
additional government purchases
additional civil servants
autonomous increase in private wages
increase in income per Civil servant rel. to trend
increase in income per unemployed relative to trend
monetary financing of government deficit
autonomous increase in money supply
percentage of devaluation
Before definitely deciding upon imp~~ses
do you need further information? n
Did you type the right impulses ?: y 37
End of input of group 1 for period 2 Please wait for the results.
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NOTES (Chapter 1)
1 Each period a player group is allowed to manipulate all available
instruments (see below) and is informed on the outcomes of previous
actions (by the group itself or by other players). As a consequence, the
model is necessarily dynamic and all equations are formulated explicitly.
2 'Welfare' is defined below in this chapter.
3 Possible consequences of import tariffs and customs unions are
discussed in Chapter 4.
4 If applicable, during the game a group of players can decide to switch
from flexible rates of exchange to fixed but adjustable rates or viceversa.
5 It will be illustrated in Chapters 3 and 5, however, that it would be
undesirable to combine an investment behaviour determined by lagged pro-
fits with the monetary block incorporated in the model.
6 As opposed to five in an actual game (see below).
entails the possibility of halting the calculation
new stationary equilibrium is reached. This 'iebtest'
produce all tables in this dissertation regarding the
tion.
The program also
process as soon as a
program was used to
results of interven-
7 It is possible to have fewer player groups. In that case the game lea-
der decides upon the policy actions of the countries "without government".
8 Variations on assignment 1 were also used, for instance: welfare in
countries 1 and 2 together should be higher than its counterpart in 3 and
4 (and vice versa). Another variation concerned the starting position:
instead of identical starting positions in all countries, one of the coun-
tries started with a relatively large government deficit as a consequence
of relatively high government expenditures (USA), a second started with
import barriers (Japan) and the remaining two countries were joined in an
exchange rate arrangement (Europe).
9 Note that absorption (as opposed to production) is included in welfare
and that only final private absorption is taken into account: voters will
not feel "richer" merely because of enhanced public consumption or of
increased investments. Only if these extra investments lead to more em-
ployment, for example, will they feel better and the chances of re-elec-
tion grow.
10 This productivity m.m. equals labour productivity in the private sec-
tor if complementary factors of production are assumed and equals the ini-
tial private labour productivity if possibilities of substitution between
those factors are assumed.
11 In the model, unemployment cannot be negative.
12 Items 5a and 5b are not jointly taken into consideration because of
the too obvious correlation between them.
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13 If national firm output is at its initial level of 100.
14 A full list of symbols is provided in the back of this dissertation.
15 By giving coefficient c3861 a value different from its standard level
of zero.
16 If W is welfare, c = real private absorption of home produced goods,
m = rea~ private absorption of imported prod~~ts and&*g = real6~onsumPtion
of serv1ces, W = f(c,l ,m...) leads to dW = r- dc + ro- dl + r- dm + ••• ,g 6W 6W 6W oC M. g omwhere for convenience £,c = ~ = 6m and thus to tfiefirst part of the
gwelfare equation above.
17 Welfare is then calculated along lines which are also used with other
averages in the game (see under "expectations", Chapter 2): a weighted
average over the past ~ years (9 = life span) where the most recent
year(s) get(s) the highest weight(s).
18 Especially for occasions when separate rooms are not available, the
program entails the option of secret passwords for each player group. Such
passwords prevent the deliberate or undeliberate use of terminals of other
groups.
19 In the current version of the program groups cannot yet send messages
to other participants via the network. As a consequence, if in future the
game is to be played between groups in different towns, such cooperative
actions could only be undertaken after telephone consultations unless the
program is modified at this point.
20 The remaining time for the current period is "broadcasted" by the
computer as soon as one extra minute has passed.
21 Per round the game leader sets a time limit. He can make that time
limit dependent on the time effectively needed in the previous round(s).
In an alternative setting, where each round lasts a week, for example, the
game leader works with "iebtest" (see above), where no time limit is set.
We will not discuss those alternative settings here.
22 To get an impression of the lay-out, see Appendix 1.1, where all
questions and answers for one of the versions of the games are listed in
chronological order.
23 Players do not need to know anything about computers to be able to play
the SIER Game: following the "menu-shape" the only 'answers' they have to
give during the game are Y (for yes), N (for no), < RETURN > (pushing the
enter key) or a figure.
24 This hypothesis works out differently under the respective production
functions.
25 To save space, tables illustrating an intervention equal in all four
countries of the symmetric "SIER world" only give the outcomes for country
one. Developments in the other three countries are identical. If only one
country intervenes, we will assume only country 1 intervenes and the
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tables will only list the results in countries 1 and 2. The developments
in countries 3 and 4 are identical to those in country 2.
For convenience. the tables are bundled separately. For those who want to
study the dissertation in detail. they are available on request with the
author.
26 In Chapter 6 two alternative investment functions are described as they
are both available in the SIER Game. a symmetric one and an asymmetric
one. As the latter cannot be regarded as 'standard', the illustrations of
the model's behaviour in Ctiapter6 use the former investment equation.
Discussion of its behaviour when the asymmetric investment equation is
included is postponed to Chapter 7, regarding this equation as an
extension of the basic SIER framework.
27 Several master's theses were written at the Economics Department of
Tilburg University using the SIER framework in de 2nd or 3rd sense given
here.
28 R.E.Lucas, Jr .• 'Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique', in 'The
Phillips Curve and Labor Markets' by K.Brunner and A.Meltzer (eds.),
North-Holland, 1976.
29 V.V.Chari, 'Time Consistency and Optimal Policy Design', in Quarterly
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Fall 1988, pp. 17 - 31.
30 The way expectations are formed is dealth with more extensively in
Chapter 2, Section 2.1.7. and in Chapters 4 and 6.
31 After each screen containing variables, the computer asks this
question. A positive answer (yes) is followed by a list of symbols
concerning those variables. After each list the computer reproduces the
screen this list relates to.
32 If the answer is 'no' here. the next screen is left out. This procedure
also applies for the other screens to follow.
33 If the answer is "Y" here, the computer asks 'which country and which
time period?', and then produces all above screens for the desired country
and period.
34 If the answer is negative here, the question section concerned is
reproduced. This procedure also applies with all similar questions to
follow.
35 If the answer is "Y", the player is told to contact the game leader so
that (s)he can type in the proper exchange rate system.
36 If the player wants more information. the computer reproduces the first
screen and starts the current period allover again.
37 If the answer is "N" here, the session returns to the beginning of the
"impulse-part" •
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Chapter 2 Description of common features
Many relations are common to all the models described in Chapters 3 to 6.
Those relations which concern the real sector of the economy are described
in Section 1. Those associated with the monetary sector are described in
Section 2. Description of relations whose specifications depend on the
assumed investment behaviour or production function are given in later
chapters. Descriptions of too obvious relations have been left out.
As stated in Chapter 1, the SIER model is a symmetric model. As a conse-
quence, this chapter only describes the equations that apply to country 1.
Those regarding the other countries are analogous.
Section 1. Common features of the real sector
In all models, analytically speaking, entrepreneurs are distinguished from
suppliers of labour as well as from suppliers of financial capital
('wealth holders'). Suppliers of labour immediately spend their whole
income on consumer goods; they are the only private consumers. Wealth
holders do nothing but invest their wealth in home currency or in bonds,
issued at home or in other countries (if international capital mobility is
assumed), see Section 2. Finally, entrepreneurs supply 'entrepreneurship'
by combining under perfect competition two homogeneous factors of produc-
tion, labour and physical capital, in order to manufacture one kind of
(homogeneous) product per country. Their goal is profit maximization. The
product they manufacture is a "less than perfect" substitute for the goods
produced in the other three countries. International competition is based
on price competition. Entrepreneurs are the owners of fixed capital after
buying the amount they wish to employ. In contrast to labour, the amount
of capital is fixed in the short run.
We will start the description of 'our' economy by describing the
factor labour, its reward and its spending behaviour (2.1.1). The next
subsection will be devoted to the factor physical capital (2.1.2). From
2.1.1 and 2.1.2 consumer expenditure and demand for in,estment products
are 'known'. If added to government demand and exports (subject of Subsec-
tion 2.1.3), total demand can be derived. Intersection with the supply
curve results in prices, output and employment, Subsection 2.1.4. In 2.1.5
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some technical relations are given, while 2.1.6 presents the exchange rate
equations. Subsection 2.1.7 concludes Section 1 giving the basic structure
of the formation of expectations.
2.1.1. Labour/households
a. Some technical relations
1Total supply of labour, ls' grows exogenously at a rate IT set by the
game leader:
(2.1)
Labour and physical capital are both assumed to be homogeneous in nature
as well as internationally immobile.
Suppliers of labour can be divided into three categories:
a. those working in the private sector (lm in number)
b. those working in the government sector (lg in number)
c. the unemployed (lu in number).
Total demand for labour, ld' is calculated by adding up the first two:
(2.2)
The absolute difference between ls and ld equals the number of unemployed,
lu:
(2.3)
while their relative difference after multiplying by 100% indicates the
percentage unemployed, u:
l -l




The government offers an income to categories b and c, the civil servants
and the unemployed. Civil servants are paid PLCS' while the unemployed get
PLU· Both PLCS and PLU are connected to the wage rate in the market sec-
tor, PL, using a 'trend-index':
(2.6)
where
relative change in the price of labour in the market sector
autonomous relative change in the income of civil servants (policy
instrument)
PLU autonomous relative change in the income of unemployed (policy
instrument)
The trend index is represented by the factor (1 + PL) in both equations
(2.5) and (2.6). If the government wants the salary per civil servant
(respectively per unemployed) to be raised at this percentage, PLCS (res-
pectively PLU) is zero. If not, PLCS (respectively PLU) is unequal to
zero.
Total payments to civil servants (tg) and unemployed (tu) are labelled'transfers' (TRF):
(2.7)
where the second term disappears if tu is smaller than or equal to O.
As indicated above, tm represents the number of workers in the private
sector. It also includes the number employers in that sector. As a reward
for their labour input, they are paid the private wage rate PL. Hence,
total labour income earned in the private sector, YL, is calculated as
(2.8)
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Total gross household income equals TRF + YL. If import tariffs are zero,
net household income is derived by subtracting tax on labour income. Total
labour tax revenue equals BL
(2.9)
where TL• the tax rate on labour income. is the third policy instrument.
All labourers2 immediately spend their whole disposable income earned in
a certain period on consumer goods produced in the home country (C) or
abroad (M).
Imports consist of final private consumer goods only and are
charged with possibly discriminatory import tariffs (~O).
country 1 can levY three different import tariffs t12•
imports out of countries 2, 3. and 4. respectively. Total
revenue for country 1 amounts to BTl' where
For instance.
t13' and t14 on
import tariff
(2.10)
In (2.10), Mij represents the value3 of imports in i out of country j
before import tariffs; those imports are charged by the percentage tij, a
fourth policy instrument, where i=1•..••4 and j=l•..., i ~ j. Since ta-
riffs can be levied discriminatively. this creates the possibility of
preferential trading clubs. free trade areas and customs unions.
b. Spending behaviour
Private consumer behaviour is expressed as
(2.11)
where C private consumption of goods produced in the home market
M value of (total) imports before tariffs.4
If foreign products, denoted in home currency and after import duties,
fall in price. consumers will decide to import more at the expense of








price of imports in i out of j in currency i after tariffs
price level of a product produced in i in currency i
(see 2.13 below)
£ the ratio between the amount of money spent on home produ-
ced goods (c.P = C) and the amount spent on imports out
~ Yi
of j(m..P ). £ is a constant implying an elasticity of
~J mij
substitution equal to one,
and
(2.13)
in which ERij represents the exchange rate between i and j's currency: the
price of one unit of currency j in currency i.
The game leader can assume a lagged price factor in (2.12). If so, this
may result in the "J-curve": the volume of imports reacts slowly to a
devaluation, while prices of imports go up immediately.
As a consequence, the immediate impact of a depreciation on the demand for
foreign exchange by importers is positive (rather than negative). In this
circumstance the exchange rate may not restore the balance on the trade
account. This point is elaborated in Chapter 3.6 As a result, the alter-
native in general offered to players to choose flexible exchange rates is
ruled out once the game leader chooses a lagged impact of relative prices
on the import/consumption ratio.
If, on the contrary. an immediate impact is assumed, it can be shown that
as long as nominal net household income is unchanged, and with all prices
initially at one, an import price increase leads to a proportionate fall
in imports leaving consumption of home produced goods unaffected (see
Appendix 2.2). The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for an increase in the
price of home produced goods.
This feature is explained by a positive substitution effect on the demand
for the "other" product which is exactly offset by a negative real income
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effect. Consequently, elasticity conditions are fulfilled for an improve-
ment in the balance of payments following a depreciation of the currency
and players are offered the possibility to choose flexible rates of ex-
change.7
c. The private wage rate, PL
In its most extensive form,8 PL is determined by
1. the price of final private absorption, P, to the extent that wages are
indexed
2. the development of labour productivity in the market sector9
3. the rate of unemployment, u
4. wage policy, the fifth instrument of economic policy.
The first three factors may be (partly or fully) lagged which leads to the
following expression for private wages:
(2.14)
ad 1. The price of final private absorption is calculated as
C. 4 Mij(1+tij)P. l. P + PC.+M.+BT. r C.+M.+BT.l. Yi j:1 mijl. l. l. l. l. l.
j,t!
(2.15)
ad 2. Applying the Dutch procedure here, the growth in average -as opposed
to marginal- productivity is taken as a determinant of wage increa-
10ses.
~ If A1 and/or A2 are taken positive, the situation on the labour
market has an impact on wages. In that case the 'strong' Phillips
mechanism11 is supposed to work. For the sake of simplicity, a sym-
metric system is assumed here: a certain percentage unemployment has
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a wage-mitigating effect equal (in absolute terms) to the wage in-
creasing influence of the same percentage overemployment.
The definition of over- and unemployment is less traditional. It is
assumed that as long as u < Q (a constant), a certain tension is
felt in the labour market and therefore the influence on wages is
positive. So, overemployment is defined as u < Q. On the other hand,
unemployment is defined as u > Q: a negative influence on wages.
ad 4. By pursuing wage policy in the game, the government enhances the
wage rate in the private sector relative to the outcome that would
have resulted with no intervention. PL is defined as a percentage of
the wage rate of the last period.
Unless otherwise indicated, in Chapters 3 to 6 nominal wage rigidity is
assumed, except for a possible wage policy (the fourth determinant).
Consequences of alternative forms of indexation are analysed in Chapter 7.
2.1.2 Physical capital
Since physical capital goods (say machines) were assumed to be homogeneous
in nature, their productivity is independent of the date of construction
and depreciation is based on technical grounds only.12 Each machine lasts
for a fixed number of periods: e, the life span equal to i ,where b equals
the depreciation percentage per year (see below). An installation lag of
one period is assumed to facilitate an easy differentiation between the
demand effect and the capacity effect of investments. Hence, the total









stock of physical capital
volume of gross investments.13
Entrepreneurial investment decisions are based on expected profits. In the
subsequent chapters we will make alternative assumptions regarding the
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ways "expected profits" are calculated, depending, amongst other items, on
the respective production functions.
2.1.3. Government behaviour and exports
The demand for home products by the government equals
g (2.17)
In (2.17)
g material government expenditures in real terms
g percentage autonomous increase in g relative to last period's
level of g (i.e., g-1)
~ coefficient indicating the amount of extra material govern-
ment consumption (g) per extra civil servant
19 number of civil servants, where
(2.18)
In (2.18) Ig indicates the percentage autonomous increase in 19 relative
to the level of 19 in the last period. When hired, each civil servant is
'complemented' by ~ products. From then on (until fired), each civil ser-
vant produces one (free) service a period (see Chapter 1).
In (2.17) and (2.18) g and 1 represent the sixth and seventh policy in-
14 gstrument respectively.
Little need be said on the fourth category in demand. Since the total
world economy consists of the four 'player-countries', exports by country
i (Xi) are calculated by summing up the imports by the other three coun-









2.1.4. Equilibrium in the goods market
Total demand can be derived from the previous three Subsections as:
1. demand by consumers in the home country
2. demand by the government of the home country
3. demand by investors in the home country
4. demand by consumers abroad, exports.
So,
Y C + I + G + X (2.20)
where Y represents nominal demand for goods produced by firms in i.
Intersection with the supply curve results in equilibrium output, prices
and employment.
The specification of the supply curve depends on the assumptions
with regard to the production function. With complementary factors of
production, the curve either runs horizontally or vertically (See Chapters
3 and 4). If possibilities of substitution between the two factors are
assumed, it either slopes upward or is vertical (see Chapters 5 and 6).
As long as output is below full capacity, prices, in the short
run, equal marginal costs - the specification of the latter being depen-
dent on the production function chosen. If output is at full capacity,
prices are set at such a level that demand does not exceed maximum supply.
In both cases they equilibrate total nominal demand and nominal supply.
2.1.5. Some technical relations
The balance on the government account, represented by F, can be calculated
as
- TRF - °g (2.21)
where 0g represents the interest to be paid by the government (see Section
2). This term disappears if no monetary sector is included.




In (2.22) the coefficient TR refers to the (uniform) tax rate on profits
and interest proceeds, the next device of economic policy.
The time lag in the first term at the right hand side is due to
the fact that company profits are 'received' at the end of a period. As a
consequence, taxes are not paid before the next period.
00 represents total private interest earnings in the home country (see
below).
YR is calculated as
(2.23)
where (Op- B) refers to firm interest payments minus firm interest re-
ceipts (see Section 2) and 6kPy symbolizes depreciation charges. Deprecia-
tion is based on replacement value. The final terms in (2.22) and (2.23)
disappear if the game leader does not assume a monetary sector. In that
case we assume an interest rate of zero percent for simplicity's sake.
If a monetary sector is included, investments are financed by
issuing irredeemable bonds (whereas depreciation charges are invested in
bonds) (see Section 2). Although the loans are never to be repaid, not
only interest charges but also depreciation charges should be taken into
account when calculating profits. Otherwise, after e years a one-machine
company would own nothing but an eternal debt.
2.1.6. The exchange rate system
The price of one unit of gold, ERi' is determined for each country. Divi-
ding the respective ERi's results in the rates of exchange between the
currencies. Various exchange rate systems can be chosen. The two extremes
are world-wide 'fixed but adjustable rates' and world-wide freely floating
rates.
If exchange rates float freely, the respective prices of gold follow from
o (2.24)
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where BBi stands for the balance of payments of country i. Since in a four
country world BBi = 0 for i= I, 2, 3 implies BB4 = 0, one of the four
equations in (2.24) is dependent. Therefore in this case, ER4 is chosen as
the numeraire of the system. As a consequence, a depreciation of currency
4 is treated in the model as an appreciation to the same extent of the
other three currencies.15
In the case of freely floating rates, the prices of gold are set at such a
level that in terms of gold, the value of incoming payments equals the
value of the outflow. If capital is internationally immobile, these res-
pective flows are calculated as follows.16






r: m ..j=l J1
j;ii
(2.25a)
while the outflow out of i to j is calculated as
4
r: m ••j=l 1J
j;ii
(2.25b)





r: m ..j=l 1J
j;ii
(2.25)
With fixed but adjustable exchange rates worldwide, the respective prices
of gold are an instrument of economic policy:
ER.
1




where ERiA is the percentage increase in the price of gold in terms of
currency i.17If ER.A > 0, the currency concerned devalues. If ER.A < 0, it~ ~
revalues.
A country can independently decide to let its currency float. Its gold
price will then be determined by (2.25). The price of gold in the other
three currencies will then be determined by (2.26) (unless one of them
wants its currency to float, as well). If three currencies are floating,
the fourth country's balance of payments must be zero, as well. Conse-
quently, if three or more countries want their currencies to float, (2.25)
determines the prices of gold. If two or less currencies float, (2.26)
comes into play.
2.1.7. Expectations
In a game like this it would be rather heroic to assume perfect foresight.
For one thing, players in group one do not know the policy actions in the
other countries in the current period, let alone in future periods. And if
players (that is governments) do not have a perfect foreSight, neither
will private economic agents have it.
In order to determine investments in Chapters 4 and 6, information is
needed with regard to expected output, expected prices, etc. For their
decisions, investors are assumed to apply the part of the SIER-model that
relates to the goods market (to this extent a weak form of rational expec-
tations is applied). They expect this structure to hold also in future.
Subjects have limited information regarding the factors that are exogenous
to that 'expected' market (future labour supply, number of civil servants,
wage rate, nominal demand and macro-economic investments18). They expect
the future values of these factors to be extrapolations of their current
values, using their weighted average growth rate over the past e years
(including the current period, 'bounded memory') as the extrapolation
factor where the most recent year gets the highest weight. Applying this
procedure, for four countries expected prices and output are calculated
for t+l and t+2,19 influencing current decisions.20
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Although complicating the game, simple extrapolations for expected output
prices and expected production would be incorrect, as the model is non-
linear and especially as the supply function is 'kinked' (where the ex-
pected branch may differ from the present one, see Chapters 3 to 6).
For simplicity, this year's expected rate of depreciation of the respec-
tive currencies is calculated on the basis of their depreciations in the
past e years. Consequently, a depreciation is expected to be followed by a
further depreciation. Expected interest rates, however, equal this pe-
riod's level.
As far as expectations are extrapolative, they are of a destabilizing
nature. For instance, a wage increase in t implies an even higher expected
wage level in t+l. But as soon as e years have passed. the expected wage
level for t+e+l is no longer influenced by the impulse in period t. If a
long run equilibrium is found, expectations equal the actual values of the
variable concerned. Ideally, the learning process would be determined by
the size of the forecasting error (See De Jong21). To simplify, in our
model this process is mechanic.
2. The monetary sector
Introduction
This section describes the assumed features of the monetary sector, provi-
ded the game leader decides that inclusion of such a sector would be use-
ful.
To make the influences on interest rates, international interest payments,
etc., as clear as possible, the bond market is explicitly described in the
model, leaving the money market implicit.
The quality of all four bonds traded in the world is equal: per country
one quality of gilt-edged bonds is traded, issued by the local government
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or by firms. Hence, per country only one interest rate will be esta-
blished: the rate that equalizes demand for and supply of the bond concer-
ned.
The assumed bonds are of the 'consol' type: irredeemable bonds with a
return of one (local) currency unit a period, payable after one period;
therefore, the price of such a bond equals the reciprocal of the market
interest rate.22 Besides the elegance of their price formula, choosing
'consols' as the form of bonds has two main advantages:
1. possibly the future redemption of other (redeemable) bonds affects
present wealth; this problem is circumvented by assuming (irredeemable)
consols;23
2. the number of outstanding bonds equals next period's interest payments
(after multiplication by one unit of the currency concerned).
In this section, we will discuss the demand for bonds (Subsection 2.2.1),
the supply of bonds (Subsection 2.2.2), the equilibrium (Subsection 2.2.3)
and some technical relations (subsection 2.2.4).
2.2.1. Demand for bonds
Bonds are demanded by three categories:
1. "wealth owners" (wealth holders)
2. entrepreneurs
3. the Central Bank; this category is dealt with in the next subsection.
Moreover, depreciation allowances are invested in bonds - see Subsection
2.2·3.
ad 1. Wealth owners
These people have built up wealth during the past. Their only economic
activity is to invest this wealth, including its returns, in speculative
cash balances (local currency) or in bonds or both. Their consumption
equals zero.
The behaviour of wealth owners follows lines based on Frankel.24
The demand for bonds issued in the home country (OVDii) as a
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ratio of total portfolio ("wealth", Vi) is determined by the difference
between the home interest rate (ri) on the one hand and outside interest
rates (r., j#i) plus expected depreciation of the home currency, on the
25Jother.
The demand for bonds issued elsewhere (OVDij) equals OVDjj after allowing
for differences in the respective portfolios (Vi versus V
j
), multiplied by
0·5 to follow Frankel's "preferred local habitat" hypothesis. The latter
implies that since, apart from possible differences in profitability, all
bonds are equally attractive except for their currency denomination, the
exchange rate risk on holdings of foreign bonds will make them (cet. par.)
less attractive than home issued bonds. This hypothesis is followed in the
SIER model in the sense that -in the starting position- in each country
twice as many home issued bonds are kept in the portfolio than bonds is-
sued in each of the foreign countries. As there are 3 foreign countries,
in the starting position in total more foreign than home bonds are found
in the portfolios. Obviously, changes in the determinants of the respec-
tive bond holdings may alter this ratio during a game.
ad. 2. Entrepreneurs
As far as their behaviour with regard to bond demand is concerned, the
specification equals the one for 'wealth owners'. The reason they are
treated separately is that the definition of their 'wealth' differs. Apart
from adding net interest receipts to this portfolio as above, they also
add net profits (see below).
Summarizing, private demand -in value- by non-firms for bonds issued in i
and j respectively, and in currency i and j respectively, is represented
by
4
- I: ~..j=l l.J
j#i
(2.27)
and for not equal to i:
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OVDjj vi0.5 x -V-.- x ER ..
J 1.J
(2.28)
Given the chosen values for the parameters ~ .. and ~ .., (2.27) and (2.28)
1.1. 1.J
have the following properties:
- an increase in 'wealth' leads to a proportionate increase in all portfo-
lio assets
- cet. par. (i.e., with unchanged exchange rate expectations, for example)
an increase in ri leads to an increase in the demand by investors in all
countries for bonds issued in i, at the expense of money holdings as
well as at the expense of holdings of other bonds
- a comparable increase in all interest rates cet. par. causes the demand
for all bonds to rise at the expense of the demand for cash26
due to the preferred local habitat feature, the (absolute) increase in
the demand for home issued bonds is cet. par. larger than the increase
in the demand for those bonds in each of the outside countries, if their
(relative) growth is equal
- a devaluation of the home currency (ER .. in (2.28) rises) at givenlJ
wealth causes a decline in the demand for foreign bonds. (For the impact
on wealth, see eq. 2.29.) By the same token, demand for i-bonds by coun-
tries j goes up. In other words, cet. par. a devaluation causes a sur-
plus on the capital balance. Since portfolio equilibrium is restored
instantaneously, cet. par. the next period the capital balance equili-
brium is restored.27
For obvious reasons, (2.28) as well as the final term in brackets in
(2.27) disappears if international mobility of capital is excluded.
In fact, (2.27) and (2.28) only determine the desirability of home
and foreign bonds. If interest rates are high enough, the total desired
stock of bonds by citizens of country one, for example, could exceed the
value of their total wealth. In the computer model a mechanism is built in
to prevent this. If in country one the desired bond holdings, as calcula-
ted by (2.27) and (2.28), would amount to 110% of wealth, for example, all
stocks desired by country one's citizens are cut by 10% when calculating
their actual demand for bonds: no more than 100% of wealth can be invested
in bonds.
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A similar mechanism is built in to prevent an extremely low or even nega-
tive bond demand: at least 2% (1%) of wealth is supposed to be invested in
home (respectively in each of the foreign) bonds.
Net interest earnings, of both wealth owners and entrepreneurs, as
well as last period's net profits of entrepreneurs are added to the asset
portfolio, Vi' Consequently, this portfolio is calculated as
V.
1
V. +00.(1-TR)1_1 1 i
O ..
{1 T)Y (ER --'S!.) (ER )+ - R. R + [ •. r. -1 ij-rj1 -1 j 1J J
-1
(2.29)
where the final term relates to the exchange rate induced wealth effect as
well as to the interest induced wealth effect.28 The former is defined as
the change in (existing) wealth caused by changes in exchange rates. If
wealth owners in country 1, for example, own bonds issued in country 2, at
given market prices in country 2 (that is at given r2) these bonds in-
crease in value measured in currency 1, if currency 2 appreciates.29 This
effect on Vi equals
O •.
( ER --'S!.) ER
iJ' iJ'rj (2.30)
The interest induced wealth effect is measured analogously as
ER .. O'j
_{ 1J 1} ( )r
J
.rj {2.31}
The terms in brackets in {2.30} and {2.31} are lagged in (2.29) indicating
that a second order effect is neglected.












where O. . {number of bonds issued in j held in i in the previous period}
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2.2.2. Supply of bonds
Bonds are supplied by
1. the government, to finance (part of) its deficit
2. entrepreneurs, to finance their investments
3. the Central Bank.
ad 1 and 3 Supply by government/Central Bank
Technically, a government deficit is first financed for 100% through the
issuance of bonds. But in the same period, a player group can decide to
finance a fraction of the same deficit with monetary means. If so, the
Central Bank buys bonds issued by the government of that country to the
extent ~1 - defined as a percentage of the current deficit. The remainder,
(1-~1)' is financed through an increase in the bond SUpply.31
~1' the percentage of the government deficit financed with monetary means,
is the first extra policy instrument available to players if a monetary
sector is included. The second pertains to open market operations carried
out irrespective of the government deficit, MP.
The total expansion of the money supply due to open market operations, MP,
equals
MP ~1 (-F) + 1r (2.34)
where MP is defined as the percentage of last period's number of bonds the
central bank wants to bUy.32 We assume open market operations are carried
out only with local holders of government bonds.
As we consider the Central Bank to be a part of the government, on balance
the government only pays interest on bonds which the public held in the





where F is the government budget surplus.33
ad 2 Supply by investors
Entrepreneurs finance their investments externally by issuing bonds to the
t . PhI f investment.34ex ent 1 x y' t e va ue 0
Consequently, interest payments by firms are calculated as
(2.36)
The total stock of bonds held by the public and issued in i -either by the
government or by firms- equals 0i' where
0. + r(-F + i x Py - MP)1_1 (2.37)
(2.37) states that the increase in the number of bonds issued in country i
equals the government deficit plus the value of investments corrected for
both the part of the government deficit not financed through bonds and the
open market operations. To get numbers of bonds, this amount of money is
adjusted for the price of consols, the inverse of the rate of interest.
2.2.3. The equilibrium
The interest rate adjusts to equilibrate demand for bonds issued in i and
supply of these bonds. The stock of bonds desired by non-firms as cal-
culated by (2.27) and (2.28) should be summed with demand for bonds by
firms, TT. Firms are assumed to invest depreciation allowances in local
bonds.35 The value of bonds held by firms equals
(2.38)
These holdings as well as their interest revenues, labelled B, are treated
separately in the model from holdings and earnings by entrepreneurs (and
wealth owners). In a stationary economy, firm interest payments, 0P' and





l. r OVD.. + TTi
j Jl.
(2.39)
2.2.4. Some technical relations
If the game leader decides to allow for international capital mobility, in
the definition of the balance of payments, besides the trade balance (la-
belled SN), one should consider the capital as well as the debt service
account. To start with the former, the balance on the capital account in
home currency, KAB, equals the increase in foreign holdings of 'our' bonds
minus the increase of 'our' holdings of foreign bonds, both in home cur-
rency. So,
4 dO .. 4 dO ..







If the balance on capital account in terms of gold is needed, as in the
welfare function (see Chapter 1), KABi is divided by the price of gold,
ERi·
The balance on the service account, again in home currency, KOB, equals
the difference in last year's 'home' holdings of foreign bonds corrected
for the exchange rate concerned, on the one hand, and last year's foreign




r (0.j x ERij - OJ. )
j=1 l. -1 l._1
j,d
(2.41)
Again, if the KOB in terms of gold is needed, KOB is divided by the price
of gold.
In case of flexible exchange rates and international capital mobi-
lity, the prices of gold in three out of the four countries are deduced by
equalling all incoming and outgoing flows of money.
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The incoming flows in terms of gold are derived from (2.25)a,
(2.40) and (2.41), where the latter two should be adjusted for the price
of gold in country i, ERi.











while outgoing flows equal
dO 0 ..
1 ij 1 Jl._1(m •. P ffi + -- -- + --)l.J Yj j rj ERj ERi (2.42)b
ERi should be such that (2.42)a equals (2.42)b, hence:
4 dOjir (P mji + O .. )j=1 Yi r. Jl._1l.
j;o!i
ER.l. 4 dO ..
m ..P 1 l.J 1 O'j 1L -+ -r-.- ffi. ER
jj=l l.J Yj ER. l. -1J J Jj;o!i
(2.42)
If fixed exchange rates are assumed, exchange rates are determined in the
same way as without a monetary sector. The balance of payments definition
- in gold - then reads
BB (SN + KAB + KOB)/ER (2.43)
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Appendix 2.1 Summary of equations/expressionsof Chapter 2
(2.1) l = l (1+;)s s_l
(2.2) ld = lm + 19




Yi(2.12) mij = e -p- ci or mijm ..
~J
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(2.15) p = Ci P + i Mij(l+tij) pi Ci+Mi+BTi Yi j=l Ci+Mi+BTi mij
j.d








x. = [m ..
l. j=l Jl.
j,d
(2.20) y = C + I + G + X
(2.21) F = BL + BR + BT - G - TRF - 0g
(2.25)
(2.26) ERi (1 + ERiA) (ERi )
-1
(2.27) 4 • eOVD .. = V. x (:~<l.' rl.' - [~ .. x (r
J
. + ERl.'J')
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V j ERij
(2.29) °ijV. = V. + 00. (l-TR ) + (l-TH. )YR + [(ER .. -) 1 (ERiJ·-rj)1 1_1 1 i 1 -1 j 1J rj-
-1
°i'(2.30) (ER . _J ) ER..
iJ rj 1J
(2.31) _(ERij °ij) r.
rj J
(2.32) 00. = 0 .. + [ (Oij_1 x ERij)1 11_1 j
i;o!j
(2.33) °ij = r. x OVDijJ
(2.34) MP = ~l(-F) 1 { MP 0_1+- r
(2.35) ° =0 +r1x (-F_1-MP_1)g g-l -
(2.36) Op = Op + r_1 " (i_1" Py )-1 -1
(2.37)
(2.38)
O. = 0. + r{-F + i x P - MP)
1 1_1 y
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(2.43) BB (SN + KAB + KOB}/ER
Appendix 2.2 The effects of price changes on consumption
If
(I) A fixed nominal consumer spending






Py price of home produced goods
m import in real terms
c consumption of home produced goods in real terms
cP mP





m y ce;Pm •
initially Py
following (2.12)
Pm = 1 (= P)
then (7) ~mP £ cP in (6)m y + _1_ P 1~p .s; P (e;pm+py)1+£ m I+e; y I+E
~dP 1 (e;dPm+dP) (9)I+e;
(I) • (8) ~ dm + dc = d(~} ~ dc -A dP - dmP
Since A = (1+e ) cPy'
this leads to
dc = -(l+E) C dP- dm (lO)
P
(7), (8) ~ dm e;dc + EC d(...l} e;dc + €c(dPy-dPm} (11)Pm
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(11) and (9) in (10):
(12)
where the first term on the right hand side shows that an increase in Pm
has two compensating effects on c: an income effect and a substitution
effect, respectively. Consequently,
c = -Py (13)
Furthermore, (13) and (9) in (10) leads to
m = -Pm (14)
Appendix 2.3 The price of consols
The price of consols is based on the net present value of future interest
returns. If citizens of country i pay taxes on their interest proceeds in
country i, the rate of time preference equals the net market interest rate
and TR is the tax rate on interest earnings, this present value equals
[ 1
1
+ 1 + •••• +
for n ~ ~ (irredeemable bonds).
This can be rewritten as:
1 - TR
( 1 + (1 - TR) ri
(1 - TR)




This derivation does not hold if the TR in the numerator is not the same
as the one in the denominator, see Chapter 4, Section 4c.
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NOTES (Chapter 2)
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all symbols used indicate absolute magnitu-
des and refer to country i where i = I,•..,4 and to the present period, t.
Dashes on top of symbols refer to exogenuity. They are predetermined by
the game leader. just as coefficients in the model, or can be fixed by
players. Dotted variables symbolize relative changes. The subscripts 't-1'
or '-1' indicate a time lag of one period. The equations are summarized inAppendix 2.1.
2 'Labourers' is defined as working and non-working people. unless
otherwise indicated.
3 Upper case symbols indicate values. lower case indicate real terms(volumes)•
4 An alternative to this more or less traditional consumption function
would be consumption based on a so-called life cycle model as discussed by
Mervyn King in "The economics of savings, a survey of recent contribu-
tions", 1985 in "Frontiers of Economics" by K. Arrow and S. Houkapojah
(eds.). A modest attempt to include one element of this kind of theory is
made in Chapter 7. where, following Van Wijnbergen, consumer behaviour is
influenced by considerations of intertemporal substitution.
5 We disregard transport costs and the like.
6 See Chapter 3, Section 3A, under heading ,a'. when a unilateral
government expenditure increase is discussed
7 The validity of this argument is enhanced if international mobility of
capital is assumed. See Section 2.
8 If wished, the game leader can skip one or more of the determinantsmentioned here.
9 By definition this determinant disappears in case of complementarity
between the factors of production.
10 See Van Schaik, 'Naar Een Empirische Macro-Economie', Stenfert Kroese,
Leiden, 1981, p.63.
11 See Van Schaik. same reference. p.64.
12 This contrasts with the assumption of a heterogeneous capital stock as
in 'Vintaf', one of the models of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB)
in 'Investeringen, Lonen, Prijzen en Arbeidsplaatsen', Occasional Papers,
aug. 1974. CPB. The Hague.
13 Suppose 0 = 10. Investments in t-l0, installed in t-9 are the oldest
machines in operation in period t. In t+l they will be out of operation.
Hence. equation (2.16) results.
14 Strictly speaking, to treat both the number of civil servants as well
as their salary as exogenous policy variables may lead to contradictory
situations. With a homogeneous labour market, in reality a government
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paying a lower wage rate than the private sector, will in general not be
able to hire extra labour if full employment exists. For convenience, we
disregard this problem here.
15 With ER4=I, the three equations would, however, be sufficient to deter-
mine the relative prices of gold (i.e. the exchange rates between the
currencies). But since the balance of payments in terms of gold has to be
taken into account while determining welfare, we need the respective (ab-
solute) prices of gold as well.
16 For the prices of gold with international capital mobility, the reader
is referred to the next section.
17 ERiA is the devaluation percentage. The 'A' (autonomous) is added here
to facilitate a clear distinction between this policy variable (the
devaluation percentage) and the left hand side (the exchange rate).
18 The latter factor is only needed in as far as expectations are formed
with regard to period t+2. See Chapters 4 and 6. When analyzing indexation
in Chapter 7, expected wage rates are no longer based on extrapolation.
19 For the precise ways, see Chapters 4 and 6.
20 In Chapter 7, on the basis of the same information, consumer decisions
are formed. Here 12 interrelated goods markets are calculated simulta-
neously.
21 Eelke de Jong, 'Expectation Formation: Criteria and an Assessment' ,in
De Economist, 1988, nr 4, vol 136, pp. 435-467.
22 Assuming taxes on interest earnings in country i are paid in that same
country and that the price of bonds is based on the net present value of
future interest returns. See Appendix 2.3.
23 See Barro, "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?" in Journal of
Economy, 1974, pp. 1095-1117. The possibility of a negative
wealth of (capita-lized) future tax increases necessary to




24 Jeffrey A. Frankel, 'Monetary and Portfolio-Balance Models of Exchange
Rate Determination', in 'Economic Interdependence and Flexible Exchange
Rates' by J. Bhandari and B. Putnam (eds.), 1983, pp.85-115.
25 This formulation ignores a second order effect equal to the expected
rate of depreciation times the foreign interest rate. Since re = r (see
above). changes in the price of bonds are not expected. Therefore. an
expected financial gain (or loss) caused by expected price increases (or
decreases) is not included as a determinant of the demand for bonds.
26 This positive effect of a rise in interest rates on the share of total
assets invested in bonds is in compliance with H. Visser, 'Monetaire
Theorie', Stenfert Kroese, Leiden. 1980, p. 101/102, who states that the
positive substitution effect normally outweighs the possibly negative
income effect here.
-51-
27 We disregard for the moment the expected further devaluation in the
next period, giving rise to a capital flight. as well as the fact that a
devaluation of say 2% increases the value of wealth in home currency by a
fraction smaller than 2%. Both effects are dealt with below.
28 For the latter, the reader is referred to H. Visser, same reference,p.169.
29 Of course, this effect is only included in (2.29) if international
capital mobility is assumed.
30 Equations (2.27), (2.28), (2.29), (2.32) and (2.33) determine OVDii,
OVDij, V, 00 and 0ij respectively. For players' convenience, in the model
actually used in the game these totals are split up between wealth owners
and entrepreneurs.
31 Since labourers consume their complete net income, we postulate they
only possess transaction cash balances, no speculative ones, while wealth
owners and entrepreneurs only hold speculative cash.
If demand for transaction balances changes, as a result of economic
growth for example, monetary authorities respond to this demand, thus
leaving the interest rate unaffected. They accomodate the transactions
demand for money. To simplify, the open market operations needed to
achieve this are left out. This behaviour implies sterilization of the
monetary consequences of a possible trade balance disequilibrium, where in
the remainder of the dissertation it is assumed that in this respect
enough international reserves are available.
32 In the game, ~1 is constant each period unless players want to change
it, whereas MP falls back to zero after an intervention. This feature is
used in Chapter 4, Section 4B, to differentiate between a one time and a
continuous monetary expansion.
33 To the extent (1-~1) a pOSitive surplus on the




34 The possibility of internal finanCing could only be usefully incorpora-
ted if the net interest rate paid by debtors could differ from the net
interest rate received by creditors, which is assumed not to be the case.
If those interest rates are equal. internal and external finanCing result
in an equal net profitability of investments and no straightforward
decision rule between the two alternatives is available. Therefore, we
simply assume that firms finance their investments externally and at the
same time invest their depreciation allowances in local bonds. If the
latter is for the moment regarded as the purchase of a firm's own bonds, a
solvency problem need not arise.
35 This way, in a stationary economy. once a machine is fully depreciated
a firm owns bonds to an amount equal to the external debt incurred to buy
the machine concerned.
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Chapter 3 Complementary factors of production, investments determined by
lagged profits
This chapter contains three sections:
Section 1: Introduction. Discussion of the production function and the
assumed investment behaviour.
Section 2: Patterns of adjustment
Section 3: Illustrating the model: simulations
Section 1. Introduction
Two basiC assumptions differentiating this chapter from the ones to follow
relate to
1. the macro economic production function, characterized by complementary
factors of production and
2. the assumed investment behaviour.
ad 1 Complementarity between factors of production implies that firms,
regardless of their output, need a fixed amount of labour per unit of
output (~). as well as a fixed amount of caPital1(K). Denoting the output




where kv equals the amount of capital actually in use.






























Since we assume that both c< and K equal one, the three "dot-isoquants" in
Diagram 3.1 depict output volumes of 1,2, and 3 respectively.
The dot-feature implies that at given output levels, inputs of labour and
capital are fixed and do not depend on their relative prices. This con-
trasts with a production function reflecting possibilities of substitution
between the factors of production, as will be assumed in Chapters 5 and 6.
A second distinction between the alternative production functions
(complementarity vs. perfect substitution) is that in the event of substi-
tution, the fixed factor (capital) will always be fully employed while at
given output levels, labour costs will be minimized. Capital costs are
incurred anyhow and cost minimization in the former case boils down to
minimization of the cost of labour. With complementary factors of produc-
tion, however, underutilization of fixed capital is obtained if output is
smaller than could be produced if all capital were to be employed. That
is, if
y < ~ k
K (3.3)
where k represents the stock of capital available.
ad 2 As described by Kopcke,2 in general 5 alternative investment
functions can be distinguished
1. The accelerator model, with investment depending on output; although in
principle suited especially for models assuming complementary factors of
production, it is less appropriate for models where capital may be under-
utilized3 as the SIER model
2. The neo-classical model where investments depend on output, output
prices and relative capital costs. This approach is used in the SIER model
if factors of production are substitutable (i.e. Chapter 6)
3. Tobin's Q; this approach is not suitable in our model as we do not
distinguish equity.
4. Autoregressive approach where investments are determined by past in-
vestments. As students will not learn much from such an investment equa-
tion, it is not suitable for our game.
5. Cash flows. Literature provides various reasons to include cash flow as
a determinant for investments. Kopcke argues that the cash flow is "the
preeminent and most convenient source of financing (investments)" (po 24)
and "because cash flow at once measures profitability and the capacity for
attracting external financing, the size of the capital budget depends on
the available cash flow." (p.24). Scotland4 states "cash flows can affect
corporate investment in two ways. First, increased cash flow suggests to
the firm greater profitability in the future. In seeking to meet its ob-
jective of maximizing its own net worth, the firm increases its demand for
capital. Second, increased cash flow permits greater use of internal funds
as a financing source compared to equity or debt issues."{p. 6/7)
As 'cash flow' as a determinant produces a rather simple investment equa-
tion, which is didactically interesting, we will follow this approach in
Chapters 3 and 5.
If share holders are not distinguished, as in the SIER model, the cash
flow equals net profits and depreCiation allowances.
We assume that net investments depend on lagged net profits, and that
replacement (c.q. autonomous) investments equal depreciation.5
Regarding net investments, the lag is defended in two ways. First, as
discussed in the previous chapter, profits are received at the end of a
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period and cannot be spent before the next period. Second, for computa-
tional reasons a time lag is needed between a decision to invest and the
actual investment (i.e., the purchase of the machine). If the first (deci-
sion to invest) depends on actual net profits, the second (the investment)
depends on lagged profits.6
As far as replacement investment is concerned, we follow the usual as-
sumption (see Jorgenson, Scotland7) that they equal depreciation.8





i + I)k (3.6)
Nevertheless, this equation has a drawback. It implies that if last year's
capital stock (and prices of final products, and prices of labour and
capital, and so on) led to net profits, entrepreneurs will decide to en-
large the capital stock. But positive profits in the past do not neces-
sarily imply positive net returns on new machines. Expected profitability
should play a role here.
The alternative to equation (3.6), investments determined by expected
profitability of those investments, will be used in chapters to follow.
For a comparison of the two with complementary factors of production, the
reader is referred to Chapter 4.
If the game leader decides to choose 'complementary factors of production'
in combination with 'investments determined by lagged profits', the equa-
tions given in Chapter 2 are complemented with equations (3.1), (3.2) and
(3.6) .
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Besides the production function and the investment function, firm output
prices (Py) and firm output (y) need to be specified. In other words, the
point of intersection between the supply curve, Ys' and the demand curve,










With complementary factors of production, the supply curve (i.e., the
marginal cost curve) has two branches. Starting at the point of zero out-
put, provided physical capital is available and labour can be acquired,
the first products are manufactured by hiring labour at the given price
PL' Since the labour coefficient ~ is constant and assumed 1, the first
branch runs horizontally at the level PL' In this part of the supply cur-
ve, the output price equals marginal (=average) labour costs (YL/y PL)
and the volume of production is determined by demand. Therefore, the
'demand range' is said to apply, which is indicated by the computer by the
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value '0' for the endogenous variable 'model'. Point C in Diagram 3.2
serves as an example.
All extra products are supplied this way, until no extra production capa-
city is available: the point where 'cap' is
is the minimum of the production capacity of
1labour, '" Lts - tg)' where ts and tg are exogenous
and (2.18)- and the factor (t - t) represents thes g
people that can be hired by firms. If nominal demand rises beyond this
pOint, say to Yd1' the rise is only reflected in price increases. Real
output is unaffected as the short run maximum production capacity is
fixed. In that situation, point A is obtained, where the short term supply
reached in the diagram. 'Cap'




curve runs vertically and real output is determined by supply factors
only. Here the 'supply model' is said to apply, and the variable 'model'
gets the value 1.
The computer must be 'guided' in choosing the correct point of intersec-
tion in each case, because each demand curve intersects twice with the
supply curve: in a relevant part and in a irrelevant part.10 Yd1 in Dia-
gram 3.2 intersects in A and in B, where the computer should choose A, and
Yd2 intersects in C and in D, where it should choose C. In both cases the
maximum of the respective values obtained for Py and the minimum of those
for y are relevant. As a consequence, we can summarize the equilibrium in
the goods market by equations (3.7) - (3.9):
P
y
Y YLmaximum of and -cap y (3.7)







where Y indicates nominal demand, see equation (2.20). Obviously, if
'model' = 0, y and cap coincide.
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Section 2. Patterns of adjustment
Patterns of adjustment implied by this modelll can be clarified with the








To analyse the patterns of adjustment. a distinction is made between two
cases: one where production capacity is limited by the amount of physical
capital available. and one where capacity is limited by the number of
people firms can attract. We will start with the former.
For didactic reasons a stationary starting position is preferable. Suppose
the starting position is at B in Diagram 3.3. where the actual price Py
equals average production costs (AC). At B. production is at full capacity
and profits are zero. This implies that net investments are zero (see
equation (3.6) above). Therefore. other things being equal.l2 point B
resembles such a stationary equilibrium.
If demand falls back to Yd (because of a decline in government expen-
1
diture. for example). supply drops to the level indicated by C. Py (equal
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to marginal costs -i.e., labour costs- as capital is fixed in the short
run) falls short of the average production costs. The demand model is
obtained and a loss is incurred. This will lead to net disinvestments.
Consequently, production capacity will go down at given demand,13 ultima-
tely up to the point where D is reached. A new long run equilibrium is
established, and the supply model applies again.
What will the adjustment process look like if the demand impulse is posi-
tive, assuming that capacity is still restricted by the amount of physical










B is the same starting position as in Diagram 3.3. Unemployment equals Q.
Suppose demand is raised from Yd to Yd . Prices go up from AC to OE in
o 1
order to clear the goods market, thereby causing positive profits. This
invokes net investments and, after a delay of two periods, an increase in
production capacity, causing prices to fall back to the point where they
again equal average production costs at cap'. The new equilibrium is found
at G.14
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If labour rather than physical capital is the bottleneck for production
expansion and the Phillips mechanism is left out of equation (2.14), a
stationary situation (i.e., a long run equilibrium) can only exist if the
sales value exceeds the sum of labour cost and the cost of machines ac-
tually in use. In other words, Py should exceed the value it had in Dia-
gram 3.4 where capital was the bottleneck. The reason is that if profits
should be zero, the cost of capital not actually used is to be covered by
the sales revenue, as well.
If prices fall short of this equilibrium level, say because of lower de-
mand, losses are incurred and the stock of capital shrinks. It may even
shrink to the extent that it determines 'cap' again (as above). If so, the
adjustment process described above applies, and changes in real output are
possible.
If prices exceed their equilibrium value, for example as a result of in-
creased demand, following equation (3.6) net investments are obtained,
which causes a growth in the stock of capital (although capital was al-
ready 'under-utilized') until losses (due to the growing underutilization)
compensate the initial profits (that were caused by higher output prices).
No changes in real output are obtained. It can be calculated that under
our assumptions (see Section 3 below), if Py equals 1.1, the stationary
stock of capital would be about 141. This implies a production capacity of
capital (if labour would be available) of 141 goods, which is overwhelming
if compared with the production capacity of labour (103). This implies
that the investment behaviour of entrepreneurs is rather rigid: they con-
tinuously expand the production capacity of machines, while the production
capacity of labour has already been greatly exceeded.1S
It can be concluded that without a Phillips mechanism a stationary star-
ting position characterized by labour as the bottleneck for production
expansion, although theoretically possible, seems rather unrealistic. Few
entrepreneurs will regard underutilization of capital to be a real long
term position.
If the Phillips mechanism is included, a situation characterized
by full employment cannot be a long term equilibrium, not even in theory.
Wages will rise each period, causing changes in demand and production
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costs. For a long run equilibrium to be established, employment should be
Q less than 100% . In other words, a stationary starting position is then
obtained only if production capacity is determined by the availability of
physical capital.
The following conclusions can be drawn from this section.
1. If physical capital is the bottleneck for production expansion, the
long term equilibrium is characterized by the equality between goods
prices and average costs.16 If a positive or negative impulse on demand
is effectuated, prices in the short run will deviate from average pro-
duction costs, where the minimum price level equals marginal production
costs. In the short run changes in output will only occur if goods
prices are at this minimum.
In the longer run, however, if due to decreased demand, prices fall
below average costs (implying net losses), net disinvestments are ob-
tained, adapting supply to (decreased) demand, thereby leading to
higher prices. If goods prices exceed average costs, production capa-
city will increase (through positive net investments), reducing prices
again and, also in this case, adapting supply to (increased) demand.
Hence, demand shocks will in the short run merely cause price changes,
whereas in the long run supply in real terms will completely adapt to
changed demand.
2. An initial starting position characterized by a production capacity
limited by the availability of labour is not suitable. As such a situa-
tion can be obtained during a game, however, the model should be able
to cope with it.
3. A demand model with prices equal to marginal costs cannot imply a long
run equilibrium. In such a situation, losses are incurred causing di-
vestments. The consequent smaller capital stock will result in higher
output prices until the supply model is obtained.
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Section 3 Illustrating the model: simulations
Introduction
We will begin this section by describing the starting position in
Section 3A. Given an initially stationary economy,17 all deviations from
the starting values can be attributed to the use of instruments in the
home country or abroad. Moreover, again for didactic reasons, we tried to
create a starting position applicable to as many varieties of the model as
possible. In the tables to follow, the values in period t 1 resemble
this starting position.
Next, in the same section, we will turn to the description of some
main effects of various impulses in the current model when only a real
sector is included. Out of the numerous possible combinations of impulses,
we have for reasons of clarity chosen to describe effects over time of a
few contrasting individual impulses in period t = 2.
While analyzing these effects we will concentrate on the main ones
in periods two and three (and four, if necessary) as well as on the long
effects.18
Finally, in Section 3B, we will list some reasons why combining
the present real sector with a monetary block as described in Chapter 2
would be undesirable. As a consequence, discussion of the starting posi-
tions in the monetary sphere is postponed to the next chapter (Chapter 4).
Section 3A Impulses without a monetary sector
The starting position
The starting position is based on point B in Diagram 3.3 above, with phy-
sical capital fully employed and the percentage of unemployed, u, equal to
Q (in order to get stationary wages if a Phillips mechanism would have
been included).
To avoid net (dis)investments , profits (YR) should equal zero.
This must mean that the government does not run a deficit.19 Hence YR = F
= O.
63
We assume initial prices of goods and prices of gold (and as a
consequence exchange rates) to equal one. Since with substitution we as-
sume a macro-economic Cobb Douglas production function
y = ~O t! k~-~ with ~ equal to 0.8, the price of capital
amount to 0.2. Since Pk = (r+6)py and for simplicity r = 0
sector is assumed, the rate of depreciation, 6, must equal 0.2, implying
that 0, the life span of a machine, equals 5.
With lm and kv equal to 100, to get private production of 100
goods with substitution (~0=1) as well as with complementary factors of
production (~=1 and x=l), a '6' of 0.2 must be 'accompanied' by gross
investments of 20 for k to be stationary. Since tm = 100 and PL = 0.8,YL must equal 80.
If the government




buys 4 goods (0=4), if its transfer payments
its budget deficit is zero and if its import
tariff revenue is zero because tariffs on imports are initially assumed
zero, the labour tax rate should be 24% (on total household income of
100) .
Consequently, net household income equals 76, equal to consumption
of home produced goods (C) and imported goods (M), where C = 60 and M =
16.20 This implies, M .. = 5-3
1. E equals 0.08889.
~J 21'TRF 20' implies tg.08 + lu' 0.64 20. Assuming tg 22
implies tu equals 3.75. Consequently, ts equals (tg + tm (=100) + tu =)
125.75. So, u = 3.75/125.75 = 2.982107355.
In order to get stationary wages even with a Phillips effect. this
should also be the magnitude of Q.
Summarizing, the national accounts initially show the following picture if
no monetary sector is included:
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firms households
YL = 100 ~ 0.8 = 80 c 60 c 60 YL
bk P =0.2~100~1= 20 G 4 M 16 TRFy
YR 0 I 20 BT 0






BR 0 YR 0 G 4 BL 24
TRF 20 BR 0
F 0 BT 0
0 0
24 24
where goods prices and exchange rates equal one, wages equal 0.8, un-
employment benefits are at 80% of wages (= 0.64). while the following
values are taken as coefficients
ex 1, It 1, b 0.2. £ 0.08889. y 0.1. IT 0, Q 2.982107355
and initially
O. ER o
the rate of unemployment equals Q and a system of fixed but adjustable
exchange rates applies.
Finally. employment in firms (i.e.• companies owned by entrepre-
neurs) is 100. while the amount of fixed capital available in the short
run (100) is the bottleneck for production expansion: production capacity
equals 100.
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What happens to 'welfare' if no impulses are carried through, that is, if
none of the players groups uses one or more tools of economic policy?
As stated earlier, in this model with no monetary sector, all economic
variables will be constant over time. This is shown by Table 3a.1, where
the main endogenous factors are listed if no policies are pursued.22 The
sole item changing is welfare, declining each year by about 0.25. Since
private final absorption does not change and unemployment stays at 3 per-
cent, these two factors cannot be a cause of that decline in welfare. The
latter can, however, be attributed to the following factors:
1. inflation equals zero; this causes welfare to increase by + 0.25 each
period,
2. the government budget balances; this leads to a further increase in
welfare of + 0.25 each year,
3· the balance of payments is in equilibrium; since the optimal value of
this surplus is 4, this will cause welfare to increase by
0.25 x (1- 1-41) = -0.75.
Hence, total welfare will go down by 0.25 each round.
What will be the main effects if one Or more countries manipulate their
tools of economic policy?
We will successively describe the consequences of
a. a government expenditure increase (g), fiscal policy;
b. a change in wages (PL), wage policy;
c. a change in profit tax rates (TR), supply-side policy.
We will analyze these impulses by subsequently assuming a multilateral
action, and a unilateral action. In the latter case this analysis will
first be done with a lagged influence of relative prices on the ratio
between imports and consumption at home, then with an immediate dependency
in this respect (both with fixed exchange rates) and finally combined with
freely floating exchange rates. In the former situation (an identical
intervention in all countries) the exchange rate system as well as the
possible time lag in the import equation are irrelevant due to the equal-
country assumption.
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In Subsection d. the demand range, we will illustrate the pattern of adap-
tation if the economy moves into the demand range.
a. An increase in material government expenditures
Assumptions: no monetary sector, world-wide impulse.
Table 3a.2 gives the main results of a worldwide material
penditure impulse of 10%23 in period t = 2. (Column t = 1
starting values).
In the impulse period, real government expenditure goes up. Given
total output (capacity determines demand during all periods as indicated
by 'model = 0'), this must mean that via price increases price sensitive
private spending categories are crowded out. Since nominal net consumer
income is fixed, a (world-wide) price increase reduces net real consumer
income (wa) and consumer spending in all countries. So, exports and con-
sumption will shrink in real terms to allow for the increase in real
government ex-
provides the
government expenditures. The final spending category, investments, does
not change: since last year's profits are zero, the higher price level
does not influence the number of goods entrepreneurs can buy with those
profits.
At given wages, the higher output prices result in an increase in
profits, YR' This leads to more investments in period three. In the mean-
time, welfare (in t=2) is 0.25 lower than it would have been if no poli-
cies were pursued. This is due to lower private consumption, price insta-
bility (i.c. inflation) and an unbalanced government budget.
Increased investments in period three have two impacts:
- a spending effect: higher goods prices in t=3. and consequently a
slightly lower consumption and exports level in that period. This spen-
ding effect can be regarded as a secondary impulse on aggregate demand.
- a capacity effect: production capacity in period 4 goes up from 100 to
100.084. The assumed complementarity between capital and labour ensures
increased employment opportunities.
Since supply in the latter period grows, this leads to lower goods prices
and therefore higher real spending opportunities for consumers and lower
67
(but still positive) profits. This in turn will lead to increased supply
and employment, lower prices and profits, etc., in future.
Apart from a redistribution between private and public consumption, in the
short run (t=2) no volume changes were to be reported, just nominal
changes. In the long run (reproduced in the table by periods 100 and 101),
however, prices return to their initial levels while output and final
private as well as government absorption are at a higher level. The reason
final private absorption goes up is that since employment grows, household
income grows: unemployment benefits mount to 80% of wages. Thus private
spending goes up, again leading to higher employment, etc.24
So in the long run, welfare exceeds the level it would have had if
no policies were pursued, thanks to higher volumes (of production, private
final absorption and employment). Note that if in the long run k is the
bottleneck for production, hence k = y = 0, k (and y) can only be statio-
nary if net investments are zero, i.e., if the ratio of investments over
production equals b. This holds for all tables when depicting a true long
term situation.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, imports react
slowly,25 fixed exchange rates.
How does this concerted action (a world-wide government expenditure in-
crease) compare to a unilateral action in this respect?
The main difference is that in the latter case prices in the res-
pective countries no longer move simultaneously. Hence, the substitution
effect in consumption decisions is add~d to the income-effect described
above. Since the dependency of the ratio of imports to home consumption is
lagged, this substitution effect will not have an impact before period
three.
Didactically speaking, this 'splitting up' between an income ef-
fect and a substitution effect of price changes can be an advantage of a
lagged reaction of imports to relative prices. A second advantage is the
possibility it creates to illustrate the 'J-curve': as illustrated below,
a price decrease of home produced goods, for example, instantaneously
leads to more consumer spending, at home and abroad, i.e., imports go up,
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thus causing the balance of payments to deteriorate. In the period there-
after, consumers will switch from imports to home produced goods which
leads to a (on balance) positive balance of payments development.
The choice for a lagged influence of prices on imports also has a
disadvantage, however. Since it introduces a J-curve into the model, on
the short run the market for foreign exchange is unstable: a depreciation
26on the short run aggravates an excess demand for foreign exchange. For
the game this implies that the option for players to choose a system of
flexible exchange rates no longer exists.
Table 3a.3 illustrates the main consequences of an unilateral increase in
material governm.entexpenditures in country one (let us call this 'the
home country' from now on). In the impulse period (period 2) consumption
in real terms is crowded out by a production price increase in the home
country. This price increase has a positive influence on profits in this
country, inducing a capacity increase in period 4 (see below). Moreover,
it causes the consumer price (price of final private absorption) to go up.
This increase is attenuated however by declining prices of imported pro-
ducts (see below). Consumption as well as imports in real terms fall pro-
portionally to the rise in the price level of (final private) absorp-
tion.27
Since our imports fall, exports by the rest of the world will
decline. This implies a lower demand for the products of those countries,
causing the prices of their products to fall. This explains the falling
price of absorption abroad, and thereby the increased consumption and
import opportunities, causing an increase in 'our' (country one's) ex-
ports.
In regard to the respective welfare developments, the balance of
payments in country one goes up (caused by cheaper and fewer imports and
increased exports in volume but especially in price, inverse J-curve. see
above) which benefits our welfare. But this effect is more than compen-
sated for by
a shortage in the government budget, resulting from the impulse
- lower private (final) absorption
- a relatively high degree of price instability.
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This causes welfare to be lower than it would have been if no policy ac-
tion was taken. In the other countries welfare is (only marginally) de-
clining when compared with that same "no intervention strategy" due to in
creased private absorption on the one hand, but, on the other:
- a slight price instability,
- a (marginally) unbalanced government budget (the governments in those
countries run a surplus caused by lower prices for their purchases), and
- an unfavourable development of their balances of payments.
Comparison of these respective welfare developments illustrates that this
hypothetical four-country world is an intermediate of the traditional
small country assumption (where one country cannot influence the economies
in the rest of the world) and the (less traditional) two-country world
assumption, where country one can substantially influence the rest of the
world.
As a result of the deteriorated competitive position of last year, in
period three exports in country one drop and imports rise (the substitu-
tion effect). Consequently, the balance of payments of country one becomes
negative. The drop in exports causes the production price in country one
to fall,28 thereby reducing profits. The fall in production prices is
attenuated, however, by increased investment demand this period, due to
positive net profits in the previous year. Although falling production
prices do erode profits, the latter are still positive, causing a further
capacity increase in period 5.
As a result of the increased import demand by country one, exports
in the outside world increase. This causes higher production prices and
positive profits. The increased exports can be regarded as the 'leaking
away' of the spending impulse in country one. Given supply, they leave
less room for consumer expenditures (in volume), implying a slight reduc-
tion of private (final) absorption, which is effectuated by higher produc-
tion prices. On the other hand, these higher prices cause higher profits
which guarantees that production capacity in the outside world will also
start to grow (in period 5), after an initial decline in period 4.
In period 4 country one's production capacity increases. Capacity
changes cet. par. have adverse production price effects. As a consequence,
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in country one those prices fall, leading to lower profits, a (smaller)
capacity expansion, etc. This process of decreasing production prices,
profits and production (capacity) expansion continues throughout until the
balance between prices and costs is restored.
In the long run, due to the fact that the impulse partly "leaks away",
countries one and two develop alike. albeit that apart from exports the
volumes in country one have grown faster than in the outside world. For
the latter reason, the home country runs a deficit on the balance of pay-
ments (with a deficit on the government account equal to its counterpart),
whereas the other countries run surpluses in these respects.
A comparison of these long run results with the 'concerted' action in the
previous table shows that for country one the latter is only slightly less
stimulating with regard to its own production and employment. The dif-
ference equals the degree to which production and employment elsewhere are
stimulated. On balance, however, the outside countries suffer a welfare
loss in period 100 which is mainly due to the incurred price instability
in the short run. But since prices are stable in the long run, welfare
will increase in those countries after a few more periods, too.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, imports react im-
mediately, fixed ex.changerates
If the time lag in the import equation (2.12) is dropped, the long run
effects of a unilateral increase in material government expenditures as
discussed above are not affected, contrary to the short run effects. Com-
pare the present table (Table 3a.4) with the previous one. A major dif-
ference in the short run can be attributed to the fact that as imports
react immediately now, the same must of course hold for exports. Conse-
quently, given a government expenditure impulse, both consumption and
exports will be forced down to the extent of the impulse. Therefore,
private consumption will now be crowded out to a lesser degree than if
expor-t.shad not helped to clear the goods market. Exports fall to the
extent of the output price increase, as demonstrated in Appendix 2.2.
By the same token, in periods two and three, the price increase of
country one's product will not influence imports, neither in volume nor in
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price (whereas in Table 3a.3 imports declined in volume as well as in
price in period two).
Table 3a.4 also illustrates that in the outside world. opposite effects
occur: since imports out of country one become more expensive (due to the
impulse). the substitution effect gives rise to more consumption of home
products at the expense of those imports. On the other hand. the same
increased import prices will make the consumer price index go uP. decrea-
sing the demand for those home products to the same extent. On balance.
consumption will stay at the previous level. both in periods two and
three. Since exports in volume are also constant (see above). total demand
remains fixed. leaving product prices in those countries unaffected.
This gives rise to a further difference when compared to the case
of a lagged influence of relative prices on imports: since product prices
are fixed in the short run (just like production costs). profits in the
outside world will remain zero (whereas in Table 3a.3 they declined in
period two. and improved in period three.) Capacity changes will therefore
not occur -given the lagged response to profits of two periods- until
period 6.29
The fact that. albeit late. the production sector in this outside
world is affected can be attributed to capacity -and thus employment and
income- changes in country one that occur in period 4. The higher profits
generated in period 2 will affect YL in period 4. This implies that from
this period onwards the derivation given in Appendix 2.2 (of imports sole-
ly depending on their own price level) no longer holds: the increased
employment opportunities will increase demand both at home and abroad.
This also accounts for the fact that from period 4 onwards. country one
will experience a shortage on its balance of payments for a number of
periods.
Overall. however. a pattern of adjustment similar to that of imports
determined by lagged prices can be observed: higher prices in country one
will on the one hand increase profits. capacity and employment and thereby
-on the other hand- also increase import demand in the outside world (the
"leaking away" process) invoking the same sequence there. Higher capacity
will lead to lower prices. and thus the reversed chain in the longer run.
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Welfare developments in the respective countries in the longer run
are comparable to the ones given in Table 3a.3.30
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, imports react im-
mediately, flexible exchange rates
The results produced in Table 3a.4 can also be compared to the main ef-
fects of a similar impulse under the regime of (world-wide) freely
floating exchange rates. With capital internationally immobile in the
traditional Mundell-Fleming framework fiscal policy is more effective if
exchange rates are free, due to the invoked higher export demand caused by
a depreciation of the home currency.
The main results concerned here are given in Table 3a.5· In our
case -the case of a 'supply model'- such an exchange rate regime more
suitable for expansionary fiscal policy should show a higher price in-
crease (due to increasing exports caused by the depreciation), hence
higher profits and thus a higher increase in production capacity.
Comparing Tables 3a.4. and 3a.5 shows that this is indeed the
case, albeit to a minor extent.
In periods two and three, exchange rates do not fluctuate. This can be
explained along the lines followed above: the product price increase in
country one in t=2 does not change import demand -neither in volume nor in
price- and the relative decline in exports (volume) equals the percentage
rise in product prices. Since, as a consequence, neither the value of
exports in home currency, nor the value of imports in foreign currency
changes, their ratio (the exchange rate) should be constant as well.
In period 4, the increased labour income that gave rise to a de-
ficit on the balance of payments in country one if fixed exchange rates
were maintained will now ensure a depreciation of the home currency:
ER1j(j=2,3,4) goes up. Since in the rest of the world such an income ef-fect on import demand does not "yet" exist,31 the value of their import
demand (that is country one's export value) does not change. Hence, the
depreciation in Table 3a.5 equals the percentage rise in import value in
country one that would have occurred if exchange rates had been fixed (see
Table 3a.4).
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Since the depreciation is obtained to offset the increased nominal import
demand by country one in currency two, that import demand in volume will
never change. As a consequence, product prices in the rest of the world
will be constant in all periods. And thus, even stronger, nothing in the
production structure of the rest of the world will change. Consequently,
the rest of the world will not benefit (in the sense of an increase in
demand) from a government expenditure impulse in country one, contrary to
the case of fixed exchange rates. The only consequence in the other coun-
tries will be a slightly higher demand for imports from country one (due
to the appreciation of their currency) and a fluctuating consumer price
level. Initially, this consumer price goes up (imported inflation); later,
given the gradual return to initial product prices in country 1, a lower
consumer price results (due to the appreciation).
In real terms the flexible exchange rates in this version insulate outside
countries, both in the short and in the long run.
The results presented above relate to a typically demand-oriented instru-
ment. Most impulses open to players here are demand-oriented. Given the
exogenous character of real government expenditures, the results of mani-
pulation of the tax rate on labour income, for example, can largely be
explained along the lines followed above.
While a typically supply-oriented instrument, a change in the tax rate on
profits, will be discussed in Subsection c, we will now look briefly at
the main results of a 'mixed' impulse: a policy-induced change in wage
rates.
b. A change in wages 32
Assumptions: no monetary sector, world-wide impulse.
Again a wage impulse33 can be either a unilateral action or an action
pursued world-wide.34 We will start by describing the main results of the
latter, as reproduced in Table 3a.6
The only thing really happening in this table is that in the impulse
period (t=2) all wages and prices are increased by 10%, the magnitude of
ilie impulse. The reason is straightforward: output prices and costs are
increased (in all countries) to the same extent, leaving no room fur
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profits to emerge. The reason output prices go up by 10% is that consump-
tion and exports should in volume be constant (supply-model). Since rela-
tive prices are constant. a substitution effect on exports or imports
cannot be expected. Furthermore. since the impulse raises nominal wage
income by 10%. real consumption can only be constant (given Py
if prices are increased to the same extent.
The only thing left is this world-wide price increase to the ex-
tent of the impulse (and consequently a welfare decline). This can be






Initially the economy is at C with output prices equal to average costs.
Increasing PL causes the demand curve to shift upward (to the right)
portionally. Since the economies are at full capacity. however. this




of sales have gone up by the same amount. implying constant (zero)
profits.
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Far more interesting, analytically speaking, is a similar but unilateral
action: PL = +10% in t=2,
1
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, imports react slowly,
fixed exchange rates.
See Table 3a.7. The increase in the price of final private absorption (P)
in country one in period 2 will be "about" 10% (see below). This ensures a
constant real labour income and therefore a constant demand (in real
terms) for country one's products, equal to full capacity output. Private
consumption of home products (c) does not change and (since mlc should
still be constant) neither does the demand for imported products - both in
real terms. Since in the outside world products imported from country one
become more expensive, real wage rates fall which results in less consumer
spending. To compensate for this development, product prices must fall,
leaving c (and thus m) unchanged.
Lower product prices in the outside world imply lower import
prices (Pm) in country one. For the average of Py and Pm in country one
(PI) to go up by 10% as discussed above, product prices in that country
should rise by more than 10%,36 in this case by about 13%. This leaves
room for profits to reach a positive value, whereas in the outside world,
due to the price fall, they become negative.
So, given the conditions of the supply model -where initially
output and all components of demand are fixed in real terms- an (unila-
teral) increase in wages leads to an increase in profits. A drop in wages
would have led to net losses.
Instantaneously, country one's balance of payments will show a
surplus: with volumes unchanged -as discussed above- this balance will be
determined by increased export prices and decreased import prices (J-
curve). This will attenuate the fall in welfare in country one caused by
the invoked consumer price increase and the unbalanced government budget.
The outside countries will experience a sharper fall in their welfare
levels mainly due to a shortage on their trade account.
In period three a substantial switch between consumption in country one
and consumption elsewhere (in favour of the latter) takes place. Exports
by country one shrink, while those out of the other countries are boosted.
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This is caused by the deteriorated competitive position of country one in
the period before. The respective imports show a reverse trend.
As a result of this fall in demand for country one's products,
product prices will fall. giving rise to an on balance increased consump-
tion volume. The remainder of the gap (caused by falling exports) is fil-
led by increasing investments made possible by positive net profits in
period two. The average consumer price level in country one will fall - an
outcome of falling prices of home products and increased prices of im-
ported goods. The latter development is caused by the switch in expen-
ditures.
Profits in country one sharply decrease (and in fact become nega-
tive) as a consequence of declining product prices. This will more than
offset the positive investment developments in this period. described
above: in the long run the capital stock in country one (k1) will de-
crease, while in the rest of the world it will show an expansion (caused
by the switch in demand described above).
Since in this case k determines the output actually produced. the
respective output volumes will show equivalent developments. Unemployment
in country one will. as a consequence. show a sharp increase. whereas in
the other countries it will fall. Also in the long run, the distribution
of output over the respective spending categories in country one will
change: fewer exports (due to higher product prices) will facilitate rela-
tively more consumption (although employment falls this is made possible
by higher wages), both in real terms. Exports in the 'outside countries'
go up. Thanks to increased employment opportunities. the same holds for
consumption. albeit to a mild extent. Note that in the long run output
prices in country one have increased by the percentage of the wage im-
pulse. whereas in the other countries they returned to their initial
value.
This leads us to the conclusion that labour in country one hardly
benefits in the long run from the 10% wage impulse in period two: total
(private final) absorption goes up by less than 1.8%, whereas unemployment
increases by about 50%. In the outside world, that absorption falls by
about 0.5%. whereas unemployment declines by about 20%. So. given the
assumptions. wage policy is hardly more than an expenditure switching
device on the long run. Moreover. price instability in country one has
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greatly exceeded its counterpart in the outside world. Since, finally,
country one experiences a deficit on its balance of payments (reflecting
the surplus of the other countries) due to increased absorption with
lowered production, and a relatively large imbalance in the government
budget, welfare in country one is seriously hampered when compared with
welfare outside and when compared to the situation of no-intervention.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, imports react im-
mediately, fixed exchange rates
The main results under these conditions are shown in Table 3a.8. Again, in
the long run this table is virtually identical to Table 3a.7, but this
does not hold for the short run. Owing to the immediate switch to products
produced outside country one, as early as period two a shortage on country
one's balance of payments emerges.
Since falling exports (in volume) leaves a gap in total production
to be filled by increased consumption, the rise in the price level of
private final absorption in country one will be lower than in Table 3a.7.
Since the output price increases by less than 10%, net losses will be
experienced immediately. In the outside world increased demand by country
one's consumers will force product prices to go up, resulting in profits.
Hence, the effects occurring in period three in Table 3a.7 now show up -in
a qualitative sense- in the impulse period. Also, the J-curve effect no
longer appears. On the other hand, in the short run Table 3a.8 shows a
substantially less oscillating pattern.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, imports react im-
mediately, flexible exchange rates
See Table 3a.9. Apart from exchange rate changes, the only thing happening
is that product prices and costs increase to the same extent, leaving
profits unaffected.
The reason this is obtained is very closely linked to the result
derived in Appendix 2.2:
as long as household income is unaffected. In other words: under this
assumption imports do not depend on prices of home products. If nominal
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wage rates are enhanced, this will, apart from possible substitution ef-
fects, cause a proportionate increase in imports (and home consumption),
provided the price index is constant. As a result, product prices abroad
will go up. In turn, this will lead to a decline in imports proportionate
to the price increase abroad, but this substitution effect as such will
not alter the value of imports.
The remaining deficit on country one's balance of payments will
cause its currency to depreciate. This causes the volume of its imports to
go down proportionally. Since the volume of imports initially went up by
the percentage of the wage impulse (10%), the depreciation -forCing this
volume to fall back to its original value again- should be 10% as well.
As a consequence, the price of imported products denoted in coun-
try one's currency will go up by 10%. The wage impulse initially enhanced
the demand for home products (and imports) proportionally. Given the
restrictions on supply, prices of these products will go up, again to the
same extent. 37 This way P = P = P.38 This explains why in real termsm y
nothing changes (and in nominal terms, only in the first period) if, with
flexible exchange rates, one country increases its wage rate.
c. A change in profit tax rates
Let us now turn to the analysis of a typically supply-oriented
impulse and let us assume a reduction in period two in the tax rate on
profits erR)'
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, imports react im-
mediately. flexible exchange rates
If this were the only impulse, given the absence of a monetary sector, the
respective economies would not diverge from their original starting posi-
tion. The reason is that initially profits were assumed to be zero, so a
change in the tax rate on those profits would change neither net profits
nor tax receipts.
Therefore, let us assume a profit tax rate reduction in country
one (from 0.6 to 0.5 in period two, leaving it at that level for all sub-
sequent periods) in combination with an impulse generating profits in that
country: an increase in material government expenditures of 10% under the
assumption of flexible exchange rates. The latter impulse was described
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above in Section a (Table 3a.5). The differences between that table and
the one to be discussed here (Table 3a.10) can therefore be attributed to
the profit tax reduction.
Since all expenditures out of profits (investments and tax payments) were
assumed to be lagged, period two shows the same picture as before that
is, without tax rate reduction.
In period three those expenditures increase. Since investments go
up, other private spending categories will be suppressed further than
before, by a larger price increase (c and x fall more sharply). Product
prices rise faster, constituting an extra impetus to net profits. Conse-
quently, capacity expansion (and therefore employment increase) from pe-
riod 4 onwards will be larger than without the profit tax decrease.
As entrepreneurial tax payments fall, on the short run the govern-
ment deficit increases if compared to the situation without tax reduction.
However, in subsequent periods the government budget is positively
influenced.39 In the long run, however, all differences with Table 3a.5
disappear.
The general picture that shows up can readily be understood if one recalls
the adjustment mechanism described in the preceding section of this chap-
ter. This mechanism boils down to capacity adjusting to demand shocks (via
influences on product prices, profits and investments, respectively). A
decrease in the taxation rate on profits has virtually the same impact as
a higher response of investments (that is capacity-changes) to profits.
The effect is a higher oscillation of economic variables around their
trend values. In other words, the upswings are higher, the downswings are
deeper, but the new long term values are not changed by an alteration of
the tax rate on profits.
d. The demand range
Assumptions: no monetary sector, world-wide increase in the labour tax
rate.
The impulses described so far all showed a clear persistency of the econo-
mies to stay in the "supply-model-range": the variable 'model' kept its
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initial value of zero during all periods. This feature was also typical
when this version of the game was actually played. Nevertheless, it is
surely possible to get the model in the 'demand-range', the range where
goods prices are determined by costs and the volume actually produced is
determined by demand. In this range capacity will, however, react quickly
so that the model will return to the supply range.
This can be illustrated with the help of Table 3a.11, where the tax rate
on labour income is increased rather drastically (by 20% - points from 24%
to 44%) in period two in all countries. The dramatic fall in consumer
demand will make the model switch to the demand-range immediately. Output
prices drop to the level of PL (= 0.8) and will stay there until capacity
has adapted sufficiently (period 6). The latter shrinks, due to a fall in
profits attributable to lower output prices. The welfare level is affected
rather unfavourably: prices vary sharply during the adjustment process and
employment opportunities fall dramatically. Especially after the impulse
period, the imbalance of the government budget remains remarkably low when
compared to the magnitude of the impulse. This can be explained by the
increasing number of unemployment benefits.40
Section 3B Combining the present model with the monetary block
Formally, it is possible to combine the model used in this chapter with an
explicit monetary sector as described in the final part of Chapter 2. We
will start out this section by demonstrating that the combination of the
investment equation (based on past profits) and a bonds market with ever-
lasting securities can in some circumstances produce 'perverse' results.
(Moreover, the influence of monetary disturbances on investment behaviour
is very weak - see below.) As a consequence, this combination should not
be recommended to future game leaders. This constitutes a further argument
for an alternative investment equation not leading to those 'unorthodox'
results (see next chapter).
The basic feature of the monetary sector producing the possible absence of
real effects of monetary policy or its perverse results mentioned41 is the
assumption that depreciation allowances are invested in bonds.42
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Suppose that in this model and with a stationary real sector, the
interest rate on bonds goes up, due to a contractionary monetary impulse.
This will imply on the one hand that the new investments (equal to 20) are
financed at a higher rate of interest. On the other hand, depreciation
allowances bear that same higher rate of interest. Consequently, profits
will not change and therefore investments will not be influenced by this
monetary POlicy.43
This clear dichotomy in the case of a stationary economy between the real
and the monetary sector is demonstrated by Table 3b.1 below. In that table
the effects of a contractionary monetary policy (MP = -5% for all coun-
tries) in period two are given.44 The interest rate does indeed rise, as
expected, but the real sector is not influenced.
This does, however, not justify the above statement of possible "perverse"
results. These perverse implications will occur in the situation where,
before the monetary policy entrepreneurs experience losses and a contrac-
tionary monetary policy is pursued. In that situation, before the monetary
impulse, the value of depreciation allowances is higher than that of in-
vestments: net losses lead to net disinvestments. As depreciation allowan-
ces were assumed to be invested in bonds and investments in fixed capital
were supposed to be financed externally, in such a situation firms on
balance invest in bonds. If the government raises the interest rate (the
monetary policy), the increase in financing charges (due to externally
financed investments) will in absolute terms be smaller than the increase
in interest proceeds (out of invested depreciation allowances). Conse-
quently, due to the contractionary monetary policy, profits will go up,
leading to more (as opposed to less) investments.
Analogously, if in that same initial situation (net losses), the govern-
ment decided to follow an expansionary monetary policy, firm interest
proceeds would fall more sharply than interest payments. Hence, realized
losses would increase and as a consequence investments would go down
rather than up.
This is illustrated in Tables 3b.2 and 3b.3. In the first table
the main results of a government expenditure reduction and a monetary
contraction (G -10% and MP = -5% in all countries) in period two are
presented.45 In Table 3b.3 under the same assumptions (among others, a
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life span of 10 periods46) the main effects of solely a decrease in
material government expenditures are shown. Comparison of the two tables
tells us that contractionary monetary policy is indeed expansionary with
regard to investments.
A final, more practical reason not to combine this version of the real
sector with the monetary sector is the small extent to which monetary
impulses influence investment behaviour (if they do have an influence at
all - see above). This 'marginal' influence is illustrated by the com-
parison of Tables 3b.2 and 3b.3. The reason is that profits made last year
(determining investments) are a product of all machines in use. If in-
terest rates rise, only the latest addition (i.e., new machines) will be
financed more expensively. Consequently, total profits (and thus future
investments) will hardly change. This characteristic provides a further
argument to switch to an alternative investment function, e.g., the one to
be presented in the next chapter.
Especially the possible perverse influences of monetary policy provide a
didactic argument to use the model discussed in the present chapter with a
real sector only. If used this way, the game may not only help students to
understand the behaviour of the equations involved, but it may also serve
as a 'step-up' to other, more complex versions of the game, for example




1 In this chapter, when we speak of capital, we are referring to physical
capital goods, unless otherwise indicated.
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the Effects of Monetary Policy", Technical Report 29, Bank of Canada,
Dec. 1981.
5 As will be remembered from Chapter 2, depreciation allowances received
by firms are invested in bonds. With autonomous investments (as all
fixed investments financed externally) equal in size to depreciation,
in a stationary economy (i.e., if net fixed investments are zero and
gross investments equal depreciation) firm bond supply equals firm bond
demand.
6 Technically, the lag is necessary to prevent simultaneity between
investments and their determinant.
Our specification is for example in compliance with an empirical Dutch
study by Tjan, who approaches expected profitability, a determinant of
investments, by past profits and assumes a lag between the decision to
invest and the actual purchase of investment goods. See H.S. Tjan,
"Rendement, interestvoet, bezettingsgraad en investeringen", Centraal
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before.
8 If this part of investments should keep the capital stock constant if
no net investments are undertaken, theoretically it should equal the
investments of 0 + 1 periods ago. To prevent an 'echo-effect', we will
stick to the assumption in the main text.
9 In an equilibrium point, y can refer to real demand as well as to real
supply (both regarding firm output). y relates to supply only, Yd
relates to demand only. In diagrams for t~chnical reasons sometimes
capitals are used for these respective symbols.
10 Technically, the computer model contains two supply curves. One is
horizontal and the other is vertical; only one of them is relevant.
11 In this section, we will leave the monetary sector aside. The reason is
that as will be discussed in Section 3B of this chapter - the
combination of the monetary block described in Chapter 2 with the
present investment equation can lead to 'perverse' results.
12 One of the variables that should stay at their starting level in order
to qualify 8 as a stationary equilibrium is the wage rate. If in B,
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u would be unequal to Q and a Phillips mechanism would apply, wages
would change (see eq. (2.14)). Consequently, in the starting position u
equals Q. It can be shown that activation of this Phillips mechanism
does not always increase the chances of stability. Hence, in order not
to let the game die a premature death, this effect should be moderate.
Moreover, it can be shown that for stability purposes £ should be high
enough. once the Phillips mechanism is introduced. It is repeated that
for the sake of simplicity we leave this mechanism out in the remainder
of this dissertation unless otherwise indicated.
13 Obviously, generally speaking, demand will not remain constant (for
instance, as a result of the decline in demand for investment
purposes). We postpone discussion of this process to Section 3 below.
14 For the sake of simplicity. it is assumed here that the demand curve
would remain at Yd .
1
15 This is one of the reasons why we regard the alternative investment
function based on expected profitability of new capital goods - as
preferable. See Chapter 4.
16 If the Phillips mechanism is incorporated. in the long run unemployment
must be such that the influence of this mechanism on wages is zero
(i.e.. u = Q). If it is positive (u < Q). production costs will rise.
which at given prices implies losses, net disinvestments, lower
production capacity and higher unemployment, until u = Q. The reverse
holds if u > Q.
17 If a monetary sector is included in the model, this is only possible
for the real sector. See Chapter 4.
18 We sometimes speak of 'years' when we mean 'periods'. Of course the
length of a period in the model does not necessarily coincide with that
of a year. Unless otherwise indicated. the long run position is
given by the last two columns in a table. The reader is reminded that
Chapter 7 summarizes the effects under all alternative assumptions of
fiscal policy. wage policy. profit tax policy and monetary policy.
19 In four identical economies the balance of payments should equal zero
initially. This implies zero net national savings. Consequently. if
profits are to be zero, private savings are nil and net government
savings should be zero as well. See Kalecki's law.
20 Since all countries are identical in the starting period, exports
should equal imports initially.
21 Assuming that civil servants' salary equals wages in the market sector,
while the unemployed get 80% thereof.
22 Table 3a.1 and all other tables are calculated by the computer using
the Powell method.
23 10% of an initial value of 4 implies an impulse of 0.40 on initial
total purchases with firms of 100. This indicates that a 10% impulse on
G the maximum admitted to players in the game - is in that sense a
relatively small one. When we speak of "an impulse of 10%", we mean an
impulse bringing G to a higher level in period 2 and leaving it there
for the remainder of the periods analysed.
24 In the long run due to fewer unemployment benefits the initial
government deficit, apart from rounding errors, disappears.
25 'Imports react slowly' indicates that a time lag is assumed in equation
(2.12), the relationship between the mlc ratio and relative import
prices.
26 Since imports make up only a small fraction of total private consump-
tion, the impact of increasing import prices (deteriorating BB) exceeds
the income effect on volumes traded, x and m (improving BB).
27 Since c and m both drop by P and P > P(>Pm), nominal consumption (ofhome produced goods) will actually rncrease.
28 The respective movements in production prices reinforce the unfavoura-
ble balance of payments development for country one.
29 Table 3a.4 suggests a fixed capital volume until period 7, but given
the small change in investments in period 5, the seemingly constant
capital volume in period 6 is due to rounding.
30 A difference, however, is found abroad. Owing to more short run price
stability (see above), welfare on balance now increases.
31 Which can be verified by inspection of "k" in Table 3a.4 in period t=4.
32 As may be remembered from Chapter 2, if the wage rate paid in the pri-
vate sector changes, the pay of civil servants and the unemployment
benefits will automatically be raised proportionally.
33 Wages are calculated as the wages that would have applied if no action
was undertaken in this respect plus an amount equal to the impulse-
percentage times last period's wages. If wages are increased this way
in period t and no further developments take place, they will remain at
this level for all periods > t.
34 The intermediate possibilities (of two or three countries increasing
their wages) are not discussed here.
35 In 0 all production costs have gone up by 10%. This also holds for
capital costs since they equal, per unit, Pk bPy'
36 Given the lagged response of mlc to relative prices, a 10% nominal wage
increase should be compensated for by a more than 10% increase in the
price of final private absorption in order to leave c and m (both in
volume6.~naffected. Th~~pcan be shown as follow~:p + m P
P " Y P + m P hence P = Y mc.Py+m Pm y c Py+m Pm m ' c+m Pm/p
y
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Since c and m should be constant (see main text), and since the numera-
tor increases by 10% (the nominal wage increase) while the denominator
goes down (the ratio (P /P ) decreases), the price index, P, rises by
more than 10%. This mseeond order effect has a consequence that, in
order to keep real consumption constant, real labour income - measured
as nominal income over the (final private) absorption price level -






due to the depreciation, country one's products
leaving volume and the price of exports
38 Since real household income and profits on balance do not change, the
picture remains unaffected after t=3.
39 This result can be compared to what is generally known as the
'Laffer curve'.
40 To be sure, in the game it is possible that in some countries the
demand model applies, while in others the supply version obtains.
41 If combined with an investment function of the type i = f{..'YR ).
-1
42 As the reader will recall, this assumption was necessary to produce
constant (zero) profits if the (externally financed) investments
equalled depreciation (and hence over time a constant k resulted).
43 Neither will they be influenced by expansionary monetary policy.
44 The model used here assumes no international capital mobility, a life
span of 10 periods, and import reacting to changes in relative prices
with a lag of one period.
45 Under the same assumptions of Table 3b.1.
46 Instead of 5; the difference is a result of the inclusion of a monetary
sector. See Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4 Complementary factors of production, investments determined by
calculated rate of return
Section 1. Introduction
At the end of Chapter 3 several disadvantages were given of combining the
investment function used in that chapter with the monetary sector. In that
same chapter some peculiarities of the investment equation as such were
given.
In the current chapter an alternative formulation for expected
profits, the determinant of investments, is developed (Section 2). The
subsequent section compares the present investment behaviour and the one
assumed in the previous chapter.
To find out how the model reacts to this alternative speCification, some
impulses are analysed (Section 4). First, in Section 4A, the analysis
pertains to a model only containing (explicitly) a real sector. In the
subsequent sections a monetary sector is also included. Here a distinction
will be made between the situation where capital is (internationally)
immobile (Section 4B) and the one where capital is mobile (Section 4C).
Section 2. Derivation of the investment equation
Central to the present investment hypothesis is the idea that investors
will not look at realized profits to get an idea of what future profits
will be -as in Chapter 3- but that they will try to estimate the extra
profits that will emerge from a possible investment.1 If estimated pro-
fits are positive, entrepreneurs are assumed to expand on their capital
stock. If they are negative, the stock of physical capital will shrink.2
When deciding upon net investment in period t, expected prices of output
and factors of production in period t+2 are of interest: period t+2 is the
period where those new investments will be in operation. First, we assume
a time lag of one period between the decision to invest (iD) and the ac-
tual purchase of the capital good (as discussed in Chapter 3); second.
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there is an equal time ~ag between purchase and actual installation (see
Chapter 2).
As 'our' entrepreneurs act under conditions of perfect competi-
tion, those prices of output and factors of production are given. At these
(expected) prices he can supply as many goods as he wants to, and he can
hire or buy as many factors of production as needed, exceptions disregar-
ded (see below). Knowing this, the net present value of the expected gains
(in money terms) from an expansion of the stock of capital by one unit,
labelled "NPe" , can be calculated as
(4.1)
The expected costs and benefits of an investment of one machine (read:
physical capital good) in its first year of operation are summed on the
right hand side of (4.1), where all expected variables relate to period
t+2. unless otherwise indicated.3 The respective terms and factors are
explained as follows.
Given x. the machine will produce! goods. Per product the positive dif-
x e eference between expected output prices and labour costs equals Py - ocPL.
This gives rise to the first term on the right hand side of (4.1). The way
expected prices of products and factors of production are calculated is
dealt with below.
The second term in (4.1) represents depreciation costs: per period an
equal percentage (equal to 0) of the machine valued at replacement value
(pe)4 is depreciated.
y
The third term in (4.1) indicates other financing charges: in-
terest payments. Since a machine is actually bought and financed exter-
nally in period t + 1. in each subsequent period expected interest charges
mount to r x pe
Yt+1
So far. (4.1) gives an indication of gross expected profits of an invest-
ment of one machine. To make this "after tax profits". the first three
terms have to be multiplied by (1-TR).
Finally, to get present terms. the expression has to be divided by
1 + the discount factor (the net interest rate5) using as an exponent the
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number of periods between the present one and the one in which the profit
is expected to occur, equal to two.
NPe being determined, the hypothesis with regard to net investment deci-







In (4.2) the denominator of the bracketed term, PV(pe ), represents the
Yt+l
present value of the expected price of a machine when bought (one period
ahead). It functions as the deflator for nominal expected returns to get a
rate of return.6
The bracketed factor is multiplied by ke/ye. If the number of machines
available is the expected bottleneck for production, this factor equals
one. If, however, capital is expected to be abundant, the factor becomes
larger than one. In this case -and labour still being ample (see below)-
this situation refers to the demand model, with pe below average costs (in
e y
expected terms). Therefore, NP will typically be negative here, causing
net disinvestments. To make sure these disinvestments are larger if the
expected degree of underutilization of capital is higher, the net present
expected rate of return is multiplied by the reverse of the expected de-
gree of utilization of capital.7 The outcome, after multiplication by the
reaction coefficient q, gives net (dis) investments. The way this coef-
ficient is set is discussed in conjunction with Table 4a.2 below.
As stated, (4.2) holds as long as the supply of labour is ample. If labour
is expected to be scarce, however, entrepreneurs will not expand the num-
ber of machines since the extra labour needed to handle these machines
will not be available. In that case, we assume they will only be able to










In (4.3) l:max represents the amount of labour expected to be available
for the private sector two periods after the decision on net investment is
taken. It equals total expected labour supply minus the expected number of
civil servants. see below.
Net investment decisions as determined by (4.2) and (4.3) lead to actual
investments one period later. When added to depreciation. 6k, it results
in total (gross) investments. i:
i (4.4)
In (4.1)-(4.4). as throughout Chapters 3 and 4, both« and K are fixed at
1. Moreover. if no monetary sector is included. the interest rate is for
the sake of simplicity set at O.
For the decision making process, the entrepreneur needs infor-
mation on a number of macro-economic figures for t + 1 and t + 2. Output
prices. wages rates. macro-economic output and the national capital stock
are parameters which influence his micro-economic investment decision.
The variables expected for t + 1 and t + 2 included in (4.1)-(4.4) are
calculated as follows. As stated in Chapter 2. Subsection 2.1.7. expec-
e etations on wage rates (PL). labour supply (ls)' number of civil servants
(l:), and nominal demand (ye) are extrapolations of actual values. using
the weighted average rate of growth over the past 9 years as the factor of
extrapolation.
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For s 1,2, the expected output price level equals
maximum of and eex PLt+s
(4.5)
If the first term on the right hand side determines prices, the conditions
of the supply-model are expected to apply in t + 1 or t + 2 (modele = 0).
If the second term equals prices, the demand model is expected to obtain
in those periods (modele = 1).
In that same sequence, expected real output equals
minimum of capet+s and (4.6)
In (4.6) the expected maximum output equals
ecapt+s minimum of!(le t)ex mmax, +S and (4.7)
where the expected capital stock
for s 1 equals k - i + it t-9'
for s 2 equals (4.8)
In (4.8) the expected investment in t + 1 is needed. Obviously, the entre-
preneur deciding on his investments under conditions of perfect competi-
tion cannot take actual in here: he will have an assumption with regard to
macro-economic investment activity. We assume here (as well as in Chapter
6) that he will estimate them to equal current investment (i) extrapolated
with a factor equal to the weighted average rate of growth in real final
demand (g+c+x) over the past 9' years.
If the game leader decides to choose this version of the game, the model
equals the one used in the previous chapter where the investment equation
is replaced by the set (4.1)-(4.8).
92
Section 3 Comparison of the investment sectors
At first sight there is a strong resemblance between the investment sector
presented above. (4.1)-(4.8). and the traditional one used in Chapter 3.
if the discount factor is left out in the new set: substitution of
(y-y -6kP - (0 -B» for Y in the equation concerned (3.6) -under theL y p -1 R_1






where (Op-B) should be read as interest paid minus interest earned and q
for the moment indicates the reaction coefficient (assumed equal to 1 in
equation 3.6). The resemblance is even stronger if a lag between the deci-
sion to invest and the actual investment (see above) is introduced into
(3.6)' .
Major differences between the respective investment functions are.
however:
1. The right hand side of (3.6)' refers to the profitability of machines
actually in use, whereas in the current chapter profitability of new
machines determines investments. The latter is more correct.
2. In (3.6)' the current profitability (of all machines) is considered to
be of importance to the investor, while in this chapter the expected
(marginal) profitability of machines is taken into consideration.
3. In (3.6) the discount factor is left out. This discount factor is one
of the ways through which monetary policy will now influence investment
behaviOur (see below).
4. Part (4.8) of the investment equation is lacking in the traditional
assumption with regard to investment behaviour. Although in line with
the assumption of perfect competition, the latter allows capital expan-
sion to take place even if it is obvious that these extra machines will
be out of operation because of an expected shortage of labour.
Moreover. as shown in the final section of Chapter 3. the traditionally
assumed investment equation can produce perverse, marginal or zero in-
fluences of monetary impulses if combined with a monetary sector as the
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one described in Chapter 2. This is no longer true if the present invest-
ment equation is used (see below). Together with the differences listed
above, this provides a serious argument for the game leader to prefer
(4.1) - (4.8) to (3.6) and (3.6)' respectively, especially if (s}he wants
to include a monetary sector in the game. A monetary contraction (leading
to a rise in interest rates) will now lead to a fall in NPe and thus in-
vestments, because:
1. interest charges on new investments will always go up;
2. the discount factor goes up implying a lower net present value of
future profits (NPe).
Consequently, a monetary policy will now, generally speaking, have its
intended effects on investment.
Section 4. Description of some impulses
In Chapter 3 the effects of impulses if ~ reacts immediately to relativec
price changes were contrasted to the ones if ~ reacts with a delay. Thec
latter case was especially useful for demonstrating the J-curve. Since
students normally play with different levels of complexity, starting with
the one depicted in Chapter 3, a further illustration of this curve would
be less useful.
Consequently, we will confine ourselves here to a description of
the effects of impulses under the more simple assumption of an immediate
reaction in the ~ ratio, concentrating, due to the difference between thisc
chapter and the preceding one, on investment behaviour and on possible
monetary aspects.
In Section 4A impulses are presented without an explicit monetary sector.
In Section 48, a monetary sector is included, but there is no internatio-
nal capital mobility. Finally, in Section 4c some impulses are discussed
assuming both a monetary sector and international mobility of capital.
That section is subdivided into 4C.1, assuming fixed (but adjustable)
rates of exchange, and 4C.2, discussing flexible rates of exchange.
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Section 4A. Impulses without monetary sector
The results if none of the groups manipulates its instruments are presen-
ted in Table 4a.1. This leads to the same stationary economy as the one
described in Table 3a.1. Since output prices and production costs are
expected to stay equal, expected profits will remain zero. Hence net in-
vestment decisions (and consequently net investments) are zero, keeping
the capital stock at its initial level. Welfare falls at a rate of 0.25 a
period for reasons described in Chapter 3.
Analogous to that same chapter, this section will be subdivided into
a. a government expenditure impulse
b. a wage impulse
c. supply-side policy
d. the demand branch.
Moreover, an extra subsection, e, is devoted to various types of import
tariff policy (including customs unions). As we prefer the investment
sector of the present chapter to the one of Chapter 3, we will use the
former when analyzing import tariff policy.
Section a. A government expenditure impulse (S)
Assumptions: no monetary sector, world-wide impulse
The main results of a world-wide increase in government expenditures of
10% are shown in Table 4a.2. Coefficient c536 of equation (4.2), q, was
set at a level (of 30) resulting in virtually identical first two periods
(t=2 and t=3) in Tables 3a.2 and 4a.2.
The explanation of investment behaviour, however, is different now.
Because of the impulse, an immediate nominal increase in production is
obtained, causing expected nominal production to increase as well. Given
an expected fixed capital stock, and thus an unchanged expected real out-
put, this enhances expected output prices and thereby net investment deci-
sions.
This causes investments to go up in period t = 3 and with real output
still fixed, this leads to a further price increase, higher nominal pro-
duction (both actual and expected) and higher profits. In Table 3a.2 the
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latter causes net investments to rise further. In the current table, how-
ever, net investment decisions fall. This is explained as follows.
On the one hand, the increase in nominal expected production forces ex-
pected output prices up. On the other hand, the expected capital stock in
t : 3 is no longer constant, due to the positive net investment decisions
of the previous period. This raises expected real output, causing pe to
y
fall. This causes a fall in net investments: in this model only containing
(explicitly) a real sector, the price of capital is a constant fraction of
output prices, and with PL (and thus p~) constant, the only determinant of
net investments is the expected output price level.8
Net investments remain positive, however, causing a gradual in-
crease in the stock of capital, both actual and expected. Together with a
continuous drop in expected nominal production (caused by a gradual de-
cline in output prices), the latter ensures a continuous fall in expected
output prices (and thus in net investments) until period 9.
In that period a cyclical revival of net investment is obtained, explained
as follows. Although nominal production in that period is lower than in
the previous one, the expected rate of growth is higher (albeit still
negative) causing an on balance increase in nominal expected demand and
thus in expected output prices and in net investments. The reason the
expected rate of growth is higher lies in the fact that while formulating
expectations only the last & years (in this case 5) of the development in
Yare taken into account. This implies that the early years of rapid de-
cline in nominal production lose their impact as time goes by.
Although the trigger for net investments differs from the one in the pre-
vious chapter, causing different developments in the medium term, the long
run situation is identical, with capital stock, output and employment
expanded and prices back at their initial levels.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange rates
With an unilateral impulse in government expenditures (see Table 4a.3),
the analysis runs along very much the same lines. Just like in Chapter 3,
the difference lies in the "leaking away process" starting when employment
in country one starts to grow, i.e., period 4 (see Table 3a.4). Since part
of the extra earnings are directed to imports, nominal production (both
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actual and expected) falls if compared to Table 4a.2, causing expected
output prices and investments to be lower. By the same token, in the out-
side countries the process of net investment decisions starts in that
period.
In the long run the economies of Tables 4a.3 and 3a.4 are identical.
Section b. A wage impulse (PL)
Assumptions: no monetary sector, world-wide impulse
We start by analyzing the major consequences of a multilateral wage in-
crease to keep competitive positions unchanged. Table 4a.4 shows that
expected output prices and expected production costs rise equally. Conse-
quently, "iD" will not deviate from the zero-level it started with. Note,
however, that expected wage costs (as expected output prices) initially
rise by more than the 10% impulse; they rise by 17.5%. Their expected rise
relative to actual wages gradually declines until after ~ years (i.e., in
period 7) they equal actual wages. This is due to the way expectations
with regard to wages, for example, are formed.
As with a worldwide wage increase in the previous chapter (see
Table 3a.6). Table 4a.4 produces as the sole impact a once and for all
increase in the price level.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange rates
The next table (Table 4a.5) shows the most important effects of a
wage impulse of 10% in country one solely. For the same reason as given
with this impulse in the previous chapter (Table 3a.8), output prices in
country one will rise by less than 10% now.
As a consequence, nominal production rises less. Hence expected output
prices will rise by less than the 17.5% expected wage increase invoking
decisions to divest. This causes investments to fall in period 3. As a
consequence. output prices fall leading to a lower nominal production
(both actual and expected). As such this forces expected output prices
down. But due to last period's negative investment decisions, expected
output falls, forcing expected output prices up again. On balance output
prices fall but not as fast as expected wages. This explains the smaller
net disinvestment decisions in period 3.
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In the subsequent periods, this trend is reinforced by lower real output
(due to the disinvestments) forcing output prices up. This cannot help
expected nominal output to fallon balance (due to the formation of expec-
tations). But together with a decline in expected production capacity
(y~), expected output prices do not fall as sharply as expected wage
costs. As a consequence, net investment decisions gradually fall to zero.
On balance, the same developments as in Table 3a.8 took place, resulting
in lower production and employment and 10% higher output prices in country
1, whereas in country two, due to the switch to their products, employment
and production have increased at output prices that have returned to their
initial value.9
Section c. Supply-side policy
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, flexible exchange
rates
If the government decides to reduce profit tax rates in a situation where
net expected profitability equals zero (as in the starting position), that
policy would have no impact. Therefore, as in the previous chapter, we
combine this policy with an expansion of material government expenditures
(also in country one) assuming flexible exchange rates. See Table 4a.6.
This table should be compared to Table 3a.10 to discover differences
caused by the alternative investment behaviour. It should be compared to
Table 4a.6' (increase in government expenditures in country 1 with
flexible exchange rates) to discover the effect of the tax rate policy.
As in Chapter 3, the tax rate policy has no influence on the long run.
Before that new equilibrium is reached, investments oscillate more, again
as in Chapter 3. The reason for the wider oscillation (compared to Table
4a.6') is that, since in period two net investment decisions are higher,
in period three total demand is higher, leading to a higher output price,
and a consequently higher nominal output, both actual and expected. The
latter causes expected output prices to be higher, although in that period
real expected output is higher, too (due to a larger expected capital
stock). Hence, in that period net investments are still higher than in
Table 4a.6'. But owing to the invoked investment activity, expected output
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accelerates, pressing expected output prices (and as a consequence the
investment activity itself) down again.
So, once again, in a model explicitly containing only a real sector, the
alternative investment sector, in a qualitative sense, does not change the
outcomes of the impulse.
Section d. The demand branch
Assumptions: no monetary sector, world-wide impulse
To compare investment behaviour in the "demand-branch" in the respective
chapters, Table 4a.7, which focusses on a world-wide labour tax increase
of 20%, is included (analogous to Table 3a.11).
Owing to the impulse, the consequent drop in consumption forces the
variable 'model' to switch to 1, indicating that the horizontal branch of
the supply curve applies.
Due to the fall in nominal production, expected nominal output falls as
well: actual and expected output prices equal (rigid) actual and expected
labour costs (0.8). The expected value of 'model' equals one. As long as
this holds, the difference between expected output prices and costs is at
a constant level of _0.16.10 Nevertheless, net disinvestments gradually
decline as time goes by (see Table 4a.7). In Table 3a.11 a similar pheno-
menon could be noticed,11 but the explication is now different. The pheno-
menon halting the disinvestment process in the present table is not (as in
Table 3a.11) explained by a declining actual underutilization of capital
(causing lower losses), but by a lower expected rate of underutilization.
In t = 2, the expected stock of capital drops very mildly (as a conse-
quence of lower expected final production) to 99.4, indicating that accor-
ding to expectations, about 27% of capital will be out of operation (ke/ye
= 99.4/78.1 = 1.27).
The consequent net disinvestment in period three pushes (nominal and real)
expected output down further, indicating a higher than 27% expected un-
derutilization. But the same disinvestments force the expected capital
stock down to a larger extent (to 93.47, not shown in the table). This
results in a lower expected underutilization rate (23%). As a consequence,
net disinvestment decisions in t = 3 are smaller than those in period 2.
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From period 4 onwards, expected nominal output increases, although actual
nominal production still falls. This is explained by the structure of
expectations: as time goes by, the impressive drop in nominal consumer
demand in period two gets a lower weight in determining expected nominal
demand. So, although the expected rate of growth in Y is still negative in
period 4, it is less negative than it was in the previous period. On
balance, expected nominal (and real) production goes up. This causes the
gap between the expected capital stock and the expected output to shrink
further. In period 6 the expected capital stock is again the bottleneck
for production (as a consequence, P; exceeds P~ in that period), whereas
in that period the (actual) stock of capital still exceeds (actual) output
(hence, Py = PL).
Compared to Table 3a.11, the variable 'model' returns to its original
value one period later now, caused by smaller disinvestments in the pre-
sent case. But the pattern of adaptation is, roughly speaking, again the
same in both chapters. The long run outcomes are also identical.
Section e. Protection
In this section we will look at various types of import tariff policy (a
world-wide increase in tariff rates, a unilateral increase in tariff rates
and the creation of customs unions).
First, in Section e.1 we assume, as in the basic version of the game, that
import tariff revenues are not redistributed to households. Then, in Sec-
tion e.2 this assumption is revised in the sense that tariff revenues are
fully repaid to households.
An important difference between the two alternative assumptions can be
traced by recalling the initial hypothesis with regard to consumer behavi-
our.
The household budget constraint
C • (M+BT)
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(where M + BT represented the tariff inclusive value of imports) was re-
written as
C = YL + TRF - BL - M - BT








So, in Section e.1 the nominal value of consumption of home produced goods
only changes if nominal net income changes.
The alternative, with tariff revenues redistributed, as assumed in Section




As a consequence, in Section e.2 below, nominal consumption of home
produced goods cet.par. rises if import tariffs are levied by 1:E times
the revenue. The reverse also holds: if the tariff revenue falls, home
consumption of home produced goods declines by 1!E times that fall.
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Obviously, a second difference between the two assumptions regards the
government budget surplus. With tariff revenues redistributed to
consumers, they disappear from the equation concerned.
Section e.1
Assumptions: import tariff revenue is not redistributed, no monetary sec-
tor, fixed exchange rates
The main consequences of a world-wide switch from free trade to import
tariffs of 20% in period t = 2 are shown in Table 4a.9. The welfare ef-
fects are clearly negative, not only in the short run, but also in the
long run.
The main cause is that, with such an impulse, real net consumer
income (wB) is lowered, while consumer expenditures are, in all countries
to the same extent, switched from imports to home produced goods. So,
every country will experience lower private demand (in nominal terms) for
its products (C+X), causing a drop in expected demand, output prices and
consequently in net investments. Therefore, over time all determinants of
welfare -except for the balance of payments, of course- force welfare down
when compared to the situation of no intervention.
The most important influences of a unilateral action in this res-
pect are shown in Table 4a.10: the implementation of a 20% import duty in
country one without retaliation by the other countries.
As shown above as well as in Appendix 2.2, in the short run,12 the
relative price change for consumers in country one will on balance leave
the volume of home consumption13 (and exports) intact: the rise of P doesm
not influence home consumption. As total demand for those goods is un-
changed, product prices in country one will remain one. Expected nominal
demand is not affected, either. Therefore, expected output prices remain
at their previous level, and so do net investment decisions.
However, the artificially increased import price causes imports
out of the rest of the world to decline and, as a consequence, their pro-
duct prices will fall. Hence, real net labour income in those countries
goes up, causing consumption of home produced goods and imports (out of
each other14) to go up, as well. The fall in product prices will depress
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both expected demand and expected output prices. Decisions to divest are
taken. Since imports into country one are forced back in period two, given
the way expectations are formed, expected nominal demand after a few pe-
riods will start to grow again. This together with a declined expected
production capacity leads to higher expected output prices mitigating
disinvestments.
Welfare developments in the respective countries are rather interesting
here. In the short run, the protecting country (country 1) harms its own
welfare. This can be attributed to a severe drop in private final absorp-
tion (the drop in imports), an unstable government budget (the import duty
revenue) and fluctuating prices.
In the longer run, however, welfare in the home country is still harmed by
this kind of protection, but its counterpart in the outside world falls
extremely sharply, mainly as a result of increased unemployment, a deficit
on the current account and an unbalanced government budget.
These respective welfare developments will invite the outside countries to
retaliate. Once protection starts, a situation of global tariffs as
described above might be the result, with all countries worse off than
without protection (in any country), but better off than if they were
excluded. (Compare Table 4a.9).
Suppose such a world with all countries levying (for convenience)
identical import tariffs is indeed the outcome, Will it then be favourable
to create a customs union with two or three countries ? Within the frame-
work of the model concerned here, the answer can be given with the help of
Tables 4a.12 and 4a.13.
For technical reasons the impacts of customs union formation (in
period t = 2) are more easily generated in a world where global tariffs
are already uniform in period zero. To give a fair impression of customs
union effects, the resulting figures -as given in Tables 4a.12 and 4a.13-
should therefore be compared to the figures of Table 4a.11: the situation
with all countries indiscriminately levying import tariffs of 20% from
period zero onwards.
The main consequences of the formation of a customs union in pe-




abolish import duties on their bilateral trade flows, leaving the
import tariffs unaffected (i.e., tij = 20% for all i, j, except15t21 = 0%).
Since imports out of countries 3 and 4 are as expensive as they
were without the customs union, comparison of Tables 4a.11 and 4a.12 shows
that, in volume, those trade flows are unaffected. International trade
flows inside the customs union as depicted by m12 (= m21) will, however,
by the same token, increase: after tariff prices of those imports go down.
In itself this will force pre-tariff prices of those products up again (Py
goes up). That is why consumption of home produced goods in the partner
countries falls in real terms and due to increased actual and expected
nominal demand, expected output prices rise, causing fewer divestments.
And for the same reason (Py in the customs union going up) imports out of
the customs union by countries 3 and 4 (as indicated by m41) will go downa bit.
The most important shift is, however, immediately obvious from the
respective tables: trade between the partner countries increases, pushing
pre-tariff prices and thus investment activities in those countries up. On
the short run welfare in the block countries increases slightly, mainly
due to a more balanced government budget. On the long run, however, wel-
fare developments are more pronounced: the increased investment activities
in the block countries, or rather the lower disinvestments, will allow
more employment and more private spending opportunities than without a
customs union.
Welfare in the outside world is only harmed to a minimal extent.16
The traditional, classical fear of 'trade diversion' that might harm world
welfare is not justified in this model.17 World welfare, not only in the
short run but especially in the long run, is improved by customs union
creation.18 The gain in welfare for the larger part goes to the block
countries without any serious harm to the outside world. On the long run,
the latter even benefits as a consequence of increased exports to the
block countries causing its trade balance to be in surplus.
If the customs union contains three, as opposed to two, partner
countries, the above conclusions are all the more true. As a consequence,
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welfare in the partner countries is raised even further than in the prece-
ding case. This can be verified by studying the figures in Table 4a.13.
This table refers to the creation of a customs union by countries 1, 2,
and 3 in period t 2, leaving 4 out.
The final step would be to include even country four in the block,
which would in fact imply a return to free trade in period two. Obviously,
this step favours welfare the most (see Table 4a.14), which is perfectly
in line with the Cooper-Massel proposition,19 in the sense that a customs
union is in general inferior to a step towards full liberalization of
trade.
Table 4a.14 in fact refers to a short period of global protection
(periods 0 and 1) followed by a return to free trade. As a consequence,
the economies return to their initial positions. Although preferable to a
customs union, comparison between Tables 4a.1 and 4a.14 teaches us that it
is better to leave out all protection.
It should be stressed that we do not claim to have illustrated the
Cooper-Massel proposition here. Trade creation and trade diversion are
classical concepts to which our model cannot be applied. The only thing
stated is that the developments in welfare as defined in the game using
its basic model do not contradict the ones described by classical litera-
ture.
The picture described above changes drastically if the government
is assumed to redistribute its tariff revenues for 100% to households.
This is illustrated in the next subsection, e.2.
Section e.2
Assumptions! import tariff revenue is redistributed, no monetary sector,
fixed exchange rates
As stated in the introduction to Section e, if the government reimburses
its tariff revenues to households, as assumed here, nominal home consump-
tion increases, with far reaching consequences for the impacts of trade
policy.
In Table 4a.9' describing the effects of global protection from period two
onwards and to be compared to Table 4a.9, nominal consumer spending goes
up from 60 to 62.1818.20 This compensates for the deflationary impulse
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found in Table 4a.9. if added to extra (nominal) demand for imports out of
country one by consumers in the rest of the world.
As a consequence. with restitution. protection not only discourages im-
ports. as in the previous subsection (e.l). but also encourages (nominal)
home consumption.
Since the increase in nominal consumption equals the decrease in nominal
exports. output prices are left unaffected. Therefore. both actual and
expected nominal demand are constant. leaving expected output prices as
well as net investments at their previous levels. The only impact of uni-
form and global protection is a one time increase in the overall price
level. causing a one time downward shift in welfare (obtained in the im-
pulse period). Without restitution. the resulting deflationary impulse led
to net disinvestments and a downward shift in production and employment
and. in the long run. to a disappearance of the initial government budget
surplus (mainly due to increased unemployment benefits).
If only country one raises its import tariffs. the results are shown in
Table 4a.l0'. to be compared to Table 4a.l0 without restitution. The fact
that the import tax revenue is now (partly) directed to home consumption
constitutes an impetus to local consumption and (in the longer run) to
production. In contrast to Table 4a.9'. defeated exports (due to outside
tariffs) no longer compensate for this impulse. Consequently. the present
table shows an increased demand for home products, initially virtually
only in nominal terms. but later. when supply has adjusted. in real terms.
The increase in employment ensures that welfare will rise. even if com-
pared to the no-intervention case (Table 4a.l). after an initial decline.
because of price movements and a fall in private final absorption.
Comparing Tables 4a.l0' and 4a.l0 indicates that only with restitution of
tariff revenues can import tariffs be regarded as a true expenditure
switching device in the long run. The increase in home production in the
long run equals the reduction in outside production in Table 4a.l0'.
whereas in Table 4a.l0, production falls allover the world. In both cases
the home country runs a surplus on its current account as soon as the
tariff is installed as well as in all periods to follow.
Moreover. in both cases welfare in the outside world is harmed by the
imposition of a tariff. But, whereas in Table 4a.l0 welfare in the home
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country was harmed as well (as in neo-classical trade theory21), with
restitution of the revenue welfare (in Table 4a.10') was increased in the
long run. The latter is not only explained by a government surplus (ex-
plained by higher labour tax revenues and fewer unemployment benefits)
with an equal counterpart at the trade balance. but also by a lower rate
of unemployment.
We can conclude that if the game is changed to allow for redistribution of
import tariff revenues. unilateral protection pays after a few periods.
The outside world. however, is still harmed, inviting them to retaliate.
So. again, the situation of global protection might be the ultimate out-
come.
Is a customs union then still attractive without harming the outside
world? No. To illustrate this. Tables 4a.12' (customs union between coun-
tries 1 and 2) and 4a.13' (idem. between countries I, 2 and 3) are inclu-
ded, analogous to Tables 4a.12 and 4a.13, respectively, where the customs
union effects are detected by a comparison to Table 4a.ll'. In essence.
the latter table is a copy of the stationary situation of Table 4a.9'.
Obviously. in Table 4a.12' intra-block trade increases: country one's
products are now cheaper in country two, and vice versa, which is the same
phenomenon as without redistribution (Table 4a.12). But an extra (nega-
tive) impetus is given here in the form of a negative compensation of
household income caused by lower tariff revenues in countries one and two.
As a consequence. prices increase less than they did in the situation of
no (negative) restitution to consumers (compare Tables 4a.12' and 4a.11'
on the one hand, and Tables 4a.12 and 4a.11, on the other). The impetus on
demand and investment is therefore less. Consequently. production grows in
the block countries. but less than in the 'non-restitution case' .22
If three or even four countries join the block. exports by the partners
rise faster than if only two countries were members. But the negative
restitution effect also grows and outweighs the positive effects of in-
creased block trade. This is most easily seen in Table 4a.14' where in
period two the initial starting position is restored again (return to free
trade). That is why the output price increase in Table 4a.13' is less than
in Table 4a.12'. with the well known impact on actual and expected nominal
income. on expected output prices and, consequently. on net investments.
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Still, a customs union of two or three countries benefits welfare in the
long run, due to a (limited) balance of payments surplus, a government
surplus and decrease in the rate of unemployment and unstable prices du-
ring the adjustment process. In the outside world welfare drops as a
result of the shift feature of import tariffs. Total world welfare
declines. In this sense, the Cooper-Massel proposition also holds in the
"restitution-case": full liberalization of trade (Table 4a.14') results in
a higher level of world welfare than a customs union.
Above we analysed the consequences of customs union creation in a world of
protection. An alternative would be to start in the original Table 4a.1
situation of world-wide free trade.
The consequences of a two-country block in that situation are depicted in
Tables 4a.15 (customs union between countries 1 and 2, no redistribution)
and 4a.15' (idem, with redistribution). In the former case, initially
nothing much happens within the block. Only imports out of countries three
and four decline.23 This creates a fall in their output prices, followed
by divestments. Once employment in the outside countries drops, exports by
the block countries start falling, with the known consequences for in-
vestments and production. Hence, a customs union is first of all bad for
the outside world, dragging the block production along.
But with restitution (see Table 4a.15'), the "purely switching
feature" ensures that production in the block countries rises, whereas
outside production falls. The long run welfare effects are evident.
Summarizing, the question whether a customs union in the long run improves
or harms welfare and production in the block countries and in the outside
world can be answered by the matrix in Diagram 4.1, where y denotes the
real product by firms, W represents welfare and the superscripts B, * and
w refer to block, the outside countries and world, respectively. The sym-
bols » and « mean "much larger" and "much smaller", respectively. Final-
ly, AI 0 means "about; zero".
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starting position ~ global protection free trade
~ restitution/
no restitution
no restitution of ~~ > 0 B > 0 ~~ < 0 B < 0, AY AY
* * * *import tariff revenue ~W ~ 0 , AY • 0 ~W « 0 , AY < 0
~Ww > 0 , AYw > 0 ~Ww « 0 AYw < 0
(Tables 4a.12-4a.ll) (Tables 4a.15-4a.l)
with restitution of ~~ > 0 , AYB > 0 ~~ > 0 , J> 0
* * * *import tariff revenue ~W < 0 , AY < 0 ~W « 0 , AY < 0
~Ww < 0 w = 0 ~Ww « 0 AYw = 0, AY ,
(Tables 4a.12'-4a.11') (Tables 4a.15'-4a.l)
Diagram 4.1: effects of a customs union
In none of the situations does the outside world benefit by the
customs union in the long run. The block countries benefit if the starting
position is global protection. If it is free trade, they only benefit if
tariff revenues are redistributed. Only if tariff revenues are not re-
distributed, are the ultimate impacts of customs union creation in line
with the traditional ones: a customs union is preferable to global protec-
tion but inferior to free trade. If those revenues are, however, redistri-
buted (i.e., if import tariffs are used in a truly expenditure switching
way), those conclusions are severely violated: for the block countries a
customs union is still preferable to global protection, but welfare in the
outside world suffers more. As a result world welfare drops if in a world
of protection a customs union is created. Moreover, countries can gain
both in welfare and in production in a free trade world, if they decide to
create a customs union. Also in this case world welfare is harmed, how-
ever.
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As stated in Chapter 3, one of the main reasons to prefer the
investment equation used in the current chapter is the expected logical
impact of monetary policy, That is why we now turn to an analysis of im-
pulses in a model combining the real sector given above and the monetary
sector described in Chapter 2.
Section 4B. With monetary sector; no international mobility of capital
Before dealing with the consequences of monetary policy, we will first
look at the 'economy of no intervention'. This situation is presented as
Table 4b.l. The starting values -see below- are chosen such that the real
sector is constant, while the monetary sector is only constant in the
interest rate, the transmission factor from the monetary to the real
block. This implies that the outcomes of impulses to be shown below
should, for monetary variables -except for interest rates-, not be com-
pared to the starting values (period one), but to the figures in Table
4b.l. Note that since inclusion of the monetary sector implies disap-
pearance of F in the welfare function, the bonus points for F = 0 without
intervention are no longer earned. Consequently, the 'automatic' drop in
welfare is larger now: 0.5 point a period.
The trend in the monetary sphere is necessary in order to allow for wealth
owners. If this category exists, wealth exists, probably partly invested
in bonds. These bonds give rise to interest proceeds (again at least part-
ly invested in bonds); so, bond demand and wealth will continuously go up.
To get a stationary rate of interest if no interventions are made, the
former is balanced by an increase in the supply of bonds by the govern-
ment. Given the assumed initial behaviour of portfolio investors (see
below), in the starting position the government is assumed to finance half
of its deficit through issuing bonds, i.e., initially ~1 = 0.5. Over time
such a behaviour implies increasing government expenditures (interest
charges go up), which increases F again. The trend concerned here equals
2% addition per period, equal to one half of the initial net interest
24rate.
The remaining starting values are chosen as follows. An interest rate of
10% increases the rental price of capital by 10% of the output price level
if compared to the assumed 0% rate of interest when the monetary sector
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was not included. To compensate, e (the life span of a machine) is doubled
to 10 as soon as such an (explicit) monetary sector applies.25 This way
the rental price is kept constant relative to the model without a monetary
sector.
Out of a portfolio (wealth, V) in t = 0 equal to 300, given interest rates
of 10%, the first half is invested in bonds (each valued at 1/0.1), the
other half is held in cash. Consequently, the number of bonds in t = 0 is
15, equal to interest proceeds (00) in period t = 1. Interest proceeds are
paid by the government (Og=5) and by firms. Firms not only pay interest to
wealth owners, but also to other firms. In period t 1 the latter part
(not included in 0026) equals 1, the former equals 10. As stated in Chap-
ter 2, depreciation charges in t = 0 are invested in bonds and lead to
interest proceeds (labelled B) of 1 (= 10% of bkP ) in t = 1.27 In they
starting position, the extra demand for bonds by firms (equal to deprecia-
tion allowances) equals extra supply by firms (the externally financed
investments).
A summary of this starting pOSition is given in Appendix 4.1.
In this section, we will subsequently discuss the following impulses:
a. An increase in material government expenditures
b. An increase in the wage rate
c. Supply-side policy
d. Monetary policy
a. An increase in material government expenditures
Assumptions: monetary sector, world-wide impulse
Table 4b.2 relates to a global government expenditure increase of 10%.28
In the impulse period, investment decisions go up as a consequence of
higher output prices increasing ye and thus expected profitability of
investments. The increase is attenuated. however, by the rise in interest
rates, caused by an increase in the number of bonds supplied by the
government, financing its increased deficit for 50% via 'neutral' means.
(That is, with ~ assumed to be unchanged at 50%. the increased deficit
will lead to more bonds).
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In the next period, the government deficit falls, as a result of higher
profit- and interest-tax receipts. Nevertheless, the interest rate rises
further, which is not only caused by the extra supply of bonds by firms
(to finance their extra investments): the government deficit is still high
when compared to Table 4b.l and to total portfolios. It should have drop-
ped further to facilitate a decline in the rate of interest. Again, the
interest rate constitutes a break in business expansion, albeit a mild
one. The other factor explaining the fall in net investment decisions is
the one familiar from Table 4a.2: a decline in the expected output price
level caused by an increase in expected output (due to last period's net
investments).
Capacity expansion in the subsequent period leads to falling
prices, lower net investments (together with a lower deficit, caused by
lower unemployment, decreaSing the interest rate through fewer extra sup-
plied bonds), etc.
The nature of the adjustment process is hardly influenced by the
introduction of a monetary sector, if we compare this sequence with the
one in Table 4a.2.29
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM30, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
The same holds for the implications of a unilateral increase in G,
see Table 4b.3. One remarkable aspect of this table, however, is the
development of interest rates in the outside world. Although absence of
international capital mobility is assumed, these interest rates are never-
theless affected, albeit to a very minor extent.31 Increasing investments
abroad are not the main reason for changing interest rates in those coun-
tries, since they are hardly affected. The main factor at stake here, is
on the one hand a lower deficit on the government account (caused by more
exports -and thus fewer unemployment benefits- and higher profit and
labour tax receipts). On the other hand, profits rise in period 4 in the
outside world (due to more exports), in period 5 partly invested in bonds,
which drives the interest rate down, too. Obviously, the influence on
foreign rates of interest will be larger if one assumes international
mobility of capital. (see Section 4c below). Again, the introduction of a
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monetary sector does not change the nature of the adjustment process.
b. An increase in the wage rate
Assumptions: monetary sector, world-wide impulse
It may be remembered from Section 4A above (see Table 4a.4) that if wages
rose allover the world, nothing happened apart from a one time price
increase. This resulted from the fact that all (expected) costs rose to
the same extent as the output price level. An identical impact was found
in Chapter 3 (see Table 3a.6). Now, in a model including a monetary block,
this is no longer true. Capital costs are only partly linked to the output
price level expected for t + 2. The remainder is linked to the interest
rate and the output price level expected for t + 1. They are not changing
proportionally. This is illustrated in Table 4b.4, presenting the impacts
of a global 10% wage rise. To equilibrate demand and (fixed) supply, out-
put prices rise by 10% in the impulse period. This is due to the fact that
all households earn 10% more, nominally: civil servants and unemployed
also get the 10% wage increase. But, by the same token, the government
deficit increases, forcing the interest rate up.
At a fixed expected (real) output for two years ahead, the 10% increase in
P causes a 14% increase in nominal demand and hence output prices ex-y
pected for two periods ahead rise similarly. The price level expected for
one year ahead is lower. Given the (marginal) increase in the interest
rate, expected capital costs rise less than expected wage rates and output
prices - all for t + 2: when machines are bought (i.e., in t + 1) prices
are expected to be lower than when they are in use (i.e., in t • 2).32 As
a consequence, expected financing charges are relatively low. This leads
to an expansion of the capital stock (including the one expected), forcing
output prices in the longer run down again.
Note that in the long run, the situation of the impulse period reappears,
except of course for the monetary variables (including F) and the
variables concerning expectations. This also holds for gross profits: with
production at its previous level and sold at prices 10% higher, just as
labour income and depreciation charges, a constant interest rate leaves
room for positive profits.
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In the previous chapter with investments depending on actual profits, this
could not have been a long run equilibrium position.
Apart from that, although the adjustment process was influenced, the new
equilibrium position reflects the one familiar from Chapter 3: apart from
a higher wage-and-price level, no real impact of a world-wide wage policy.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, unilateral impulse, fixed (cq.
flexible) exchange rates
If only country one increases its wage rate, we have to make a distinction
between fixed and flexible exchange rates. In the former case {see Table
4b.5l, because of its higher output price level, exports by country one
fall, attenuating the rise in output prices, if compared to the previous
table as well as to the flexible exchange rate case. In the latter, the
drop in exports is prevented by a depreciation equal to the impulse (see
Table 4b.5'). Adjustments in the exchange rates ensure that here the
developments in country one equal those with a global wage increase,
whereas the outside world is perfectly insulated. This conclusion could
also be drawn in Section 4A above.
With exchange rates fixed, however, in the impulse period, as
stated, the output price rise in the home country is mitigated. As a con-
sequence, the government deficit is lower and the consequent rise in in-
terest rates is lower (compared to the other two "wage-impulse-tables").
As such, this would stimulate investments: the expected price of capital
is lower. But, owing to falling exports and a consequently lower output
price increase, expected nominal demand is lower, causing expected output
prices to fall relative to the other two tables regarding a wage increase.
If capital costs are subtracted, the outcome is lower than the expected
labour costs. The latter equals the one in the other two tables concerned.
As a consequence, the wage rise no longer leads to an expanSion of the
capital stock, but to a decline thereof.
Whereas the outside world experiences the positive effects of a demand
impulse (increased exports to country one), the wage increasing country
suffers from a contraction. The implications for "welfare" are evident.
The nature of the adjustment process as well as the ultimate outcome are
comparable to the ones without a monetary sector (see Table 4a.5).
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So, with a wage impulse we can conclude that the adjustment process is
influenced by the inclusion of a monetary sector if the impulse is either
worldwide or is combined with freely floating exchange rates. The new
equilibrium position, however, is comparable33 to the ones found if such a
monetary sector is not included.
c. SUpply-side policy
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM
If supply-side policy (i.c., lowering the tax rate on profits and interest
receipts) is applied, the real sector of the economy is still not influen-
ced. The reason is not, as in the previous chapter, that th.e basis for
this tax rate is zero, initially. On the contrary, this basis is now posi-
tive, since it is formed by profits and gross interest receipts equal to
15.3 in the impulse period. The reason is explained as follows. At the
initial rate of interest of 10%, half of total portfolio holdings are
assumed to be invested in bonds. Also, 50% of every increase in wealth,
here due to a lower tax rate, is invested in bonds. So a tax cut resulting
in a one dollar increase in wealth causes the demand for bonds to go up by
half a dollar. The same tax cut, however, forces the government deficit to
go up by that same dollar. Since we assumed half of the (extra) deficit to
be financed by bonds, this implies a 50 cent increase in the supply of
bonds as well. Supply and demand for bonds increase to the same extent.
Equilibrium between the two is therefore established at the previous rate
of interest. As a consequence, the real sector of the economy is not in-
fluenced. Apparently, the neutrality of supply-side policy in this situa-
tion can be relieved by changing the initial level of ~1' the degree of
monetary financing of the deficit.34 Another remedy, however, is to intro-
duce international mobility of capital. Therefore, we leave this analysis
to Section 4c below.
d. Monetary policy
Assumptions: monetary sector, world-wide impulse
The major results of a global monetary expansion of 10% are listed in
Table 4b.6. This impulse is defined as the device whereby the Central Bank
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(assumed to be an integral part of the government) buys 10% of the exis-
ting stock of bonds owned by the PUblic.35
By such a monetary expansion the number of outstanding (govern-
ment) bonds decreases. This causes interest rates to fall (from 10% to
9·31%, see Table 4b.6 ): at the initial rate of interest the ratio of
money over bonds in the asset portfolios is disturbed. An increased demand
for bonds results, causing interest rates to fall. At the lower interest
rate (making bond holdings less attractive), a new portfolio equilibrium
is established, where the share of bond holdings in the total portfolio
drops below the initial 50%. At the same time, due to the interest induced
wealth effect, the value of total portfolio holdings increases.
Outside the monetary sphere, nothing happens in the economy in the impulse
period except for the fact that, as a consequence of the lower interest
rate, the expected rental price of capital falls, causing net investment
deciSions to rise.
In the subsequent period actual investments rise. As such, this
would explain the increase in the rate of interest: all investments are
financed by issuing bonds. But the fall in the government deficit
(financed for 50% with bonds) exceeds this rise by far. Consequently, the
supply side of the bond market would justify a further drop in the rate of
interest. However, owing to the previous fall in the interest rate (in pe-
riod two), net interest proceeds (added to portfolio holdings) have drop-
ped now. Therefore, the increase in total wealth (V) is mitigated, causing
(cet. par.) a higher interest rate. Gradually, the interest rate returns
to its initial level.
Meanwhile, in period three the gap between expected output prices
and expected costs has declined. This is not only due to the higher in-
terest rate explained above, but also to lower expected output prices: net
investment decisions of period two now lead to the expectation of a higher
future output volume, pressing output prices down.
So, expected profitability of new machines, originally enlarged by expan-
sionary monetary policy, is squeezed by falling output prices on the one
hand, and rising costs of capital, on the other. In a period not shown in
the table, this leads to net disinvestments, reversing the expansionary
trend. This leads us to the provisional conclusion that a global monetary
policy in the current model can influence investment and production in the
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short and medium term, but is unable to do so in the long run. Obviously,
the traditional Mundell-Fleming scheme, where monetary policy is capable
of influencing interest rates and production, stipulates the immediate
impacts of the impulse (reproduced here as periods 2 to 4), but omits the
consequences on interest proceeds, likely to be at least partly reinvested
in bonds. Therefore, it cannot claim to produce true long run results.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
This conclusion with regard to the long run inefficacy of monetary policy
also holds if the policy is carried out on a "unilateral" scale and ex-
change rates are fixed. The two tables concerned (Tables 4b.6 and 4b.7)
are very much alike. A slight difference, however, lies in the amplitude
of the wave invoked by the monetary policy: due to the fact that output
prices in country one rise, exports to the rest of the world drop if the
impulse is carried out unilaterally. This forces output prices down if
compared to its multilateral counterpart. Consequently, the same holds for
expected demand. But the main message from Table 4b.6, namely that in the
current setting on the long run monetary policy is ineffective, is upheld.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, unilateral impulse, flexible ex-
change rates
The same conclusion can also be drawn if exchange rates are flexible. The
differences between the table concerned (4b.7') and the one regarding
fixed exchange rates (4b.7) lie in the short run and are nearly negligi-
ble. They relate to the fact that where with fixed exchange rates a
shortage on the trade account evolved, now a depreciation is obtained, at-
tenuating the drop in exports. Furthermore, once again, the outside world
is also in the short run insulated through the movements of the exchange
rates.
In the long run the expansionary open market policy changes neither any of
the real variables, including exchange rates, nor the interest rate. In
this sense the exchange rate of country one "overshoots" and its rate of
interest "undershoots" its long run value.
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The above conclusions with regard to the inefficacy of monetary policy
hold (in this version of the model) if the open market operation occurs
once. They do not hold, however, if the monetary policy takes the form of
a change in the percentage of the government deficit financed by bonds cq.
money. In the game this impulse (a change in ~1) is treated as "permanent
unless otherwise indicated". In fact, a 'once and for all' change in "'1
boils down to a permanent expansionary or contractionary monetary impulse.
Formulated this way, each period a new impulse is given, pushing the in-
terest rate down (if the impulse is expansionary). But at the same time,
portfolio developments resulting from all previous impulses, push the rate
of interest back up again. In the end, an equilibrium between the two is
found at a new level of interest rates (and output prices, etc. see
below) .
To illustrate that in this case monetary policy is effective,
Table 4b.15 is included where, for a change, ~1 is decreased from 50% to
40% in all countries, indicating that an extra 10% of the deficit is now
bond financed. (Still, we do not assume international mobility of capi-
tal.) As a consequence, the interest rate continuously rises until a new
equilibrium is found at a 12% rate of interest. Due to the sterilization
assumption with regard to imbalances on the trade account, a similar but
unilateral impulse by country one results in the same effects if exchange
rates are fixed (see Table 4b.16) as well as if exchange rates float free-
ly (see Table 4b.16'). Again, in the latter situation. the outside world
is insulated.36
Finally, in the previous chapter we rejected the combination of the
'simple' investment equation with the monetary sector of Chapter 2 by the
use of Table 3b.2, showing results of a government expenditure decrease of
10% in combination with a monetary contraction of 5%. The latter appeared
to be expansionary. In the present chapter, however, it was expected to
work contractionary with regard to investments. Comparison of Tables 4b.8
and 4b.9 justifies this expectation.37 The inefficacy of open market
policy discussed above, however, ensures that the long run outcomes in
both tables are identical.
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Section 4c. International mobility of capital
If international mobility of capital is assumed the stock-adjustment
feature embodied in the bond demand equation (2.27-2.28) is crucial in
analyzing the impacts of intervention. If interest rate differentials are
set at a new level, the desired stock of bonds out of each country is set
at a new level. This extra demand is immediately satisfied via internatio-
nal capital flows. If net interest rates stay at their new level, cet.
par., those capital flows cease to exist. What is left then are inter-
national interest payments in the subsequent periods.
In Table 4c.1 the "stationary" situation of no-intervention is given if
international mobility of capital is assumed. Due to the assumption of
preferred local habitat, holdings of local bonds are twice as high as
those of bonds issued in each of the three 'outside' countries. For
reasons explained below, this table also includes the values of the profit
and interest tax revenue (BR) 38and the number of bonds issued (0).
If international mobility of capital is included in the model, a problem
arises with regard to the accuracy of the calculations in the longer run,
which can be illustrated as follows.
Obviously, in a symmetric world with no interventions, no international
flows of capital occur: the capital balance. as well as the service ac-
count. should be zero. The "zero's" in the respective rows in Table 4c.1
are. however. rounded. In all periods a certain inaccuracy is accepted by
the computer. For instance, in periods 200 and 201, with a 7 digit dis-
play. the capital account in country one shows a deficit -capital is in-
vested in 'outside' bonds- with a subsequent surplus on the service ac-
count.
The latter is after taxation added to the investment portfolio of country
one and increases the error in the subsequent period.39
In the outside world. the opposite happens. As a consequence. the computer
calculates a decrease in country one's interest rate (due to the growth in
its wealth). whereas in the other countries the interest rates rise.
Therefore. the outflow of capital out of country one is reinforced.
As a consequence, the inevitable inaccuracy of the computer makes the
outcomes after period 200 unreliable.40
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The tables to follow that regard models including international mobility
of capital will therefore only relate to the first 200 periods. Obviously,
this implies that no conclusions can be drawn on the true long term ef-
fects of impulses, unless otherwise indicated.
Given the symmetric world included in the model discussed here, the
results with world-wide impulses are identical to the ones presented in
Section 4B above, where no international mobility of capital was assumed.
For that reason we will concentrate here on "unilateral" interventions. In
Section 4C.l we assume fixed but adjustable rates of exchange and in Sec-
tion 4C.2 we assume world-wide freely floating exchange rates.
Section 4C.l. Fixed exchange rates
In this section we will subsequently discuss:
a. an increase in material government expenditures;
b. a monetary expansion;
c. an increase in the wage rate;
d. supply-side policy;
e. a devaluation.
a. An increase in material government expenditures
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
In Table 4c.2 the intervention relates to an increase in material govern-
ment expenditures in country one. The picture displayed here illustrates
that the way the economy behaves now differs essentially from the one
excluding the international mobility of capital.
The government deficit in period three is now higher in the home country,
and smaller abroad, than it was in Table 4b.3. This is accounted for by
the fact that part of the extra bonds needed to finance the deficit in the
previous period is bought by foreigners (which drives the outside interest
rates up, too). In the current period (period three) the government of
country one pays interest charges not only to home citizens (as in Section
120
4B). but also to those foreigners. In turn, they pay part of these pro-
ceeds as tax to their own government. Where in Section 4B 60% of total
government interest payments were received back as interest tax, now the
government in country one "subsidizes" the other three governments.41
This higher deficit prevents the interest rate from falling (as it did in
Table 4b.3). In the subsequent periods. the home country's government, due
to the higher interest rates faces larger interest charges. a consequently
higher deficit and a higher interest rate, and so on. The opposite happens
in the outside world. A consequence. the flight by all wealth holders.
including those abroad, to bonds issued in country one42 mitigates but
cannot prevent the gradual widening of the gap between the "two" interest
rates.
The introduction of international capital mobility inserts a source of
instability into the model. Although this could probably be prevented by
treating the interest tax as a "withholding tax". this has purposefully
not been done in the game so far. The reason is straightforward. Although
some countries apply a withholding tax regime to interest proceeds,
others. among which the Netherlands, do not (yet). Moreover. the phenome-
non described above might be traced to the reality of international econo-
mics: the international debt crisis. Furthermore. this way. the idea is
illustrated to players that an increase in government expenditures, given
the method of finanCing, necessitates future expenditure cuts. Finally,
the price of consols (inverse of the rate of interest) should be calcula-
ted differently then, see Appendix 2.3. If so. one major advantage of
choosing 'consols' as the form of bonds is lost.
Returning to Table 4c.2. it can be observed that in the impulse period,
the increase in the 'home' interest rate is smaller than without inter-
national mobility of capital: the rise attracts capital from abroad (see
KAB1)0). mitigating the increase as such. Abroad, the interest rate goes
up as a result of the lower availability of capital.43
Whereas in previous tables the expansionary policy at home could
be regarded as 'supporting' with regard to production and employment
objectives abroad, in the short term it can now be regarded as 'conflic-
ting'. The higher interest rate depresses profit expectations and there-
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fore net investment decisions. As a consequence, in period three invest-
ments fall. Together with the slightly lower government deficit, caused by
higher interest tax receipts, this prevents the interest rate in those
countries from rising along with the one in the home country. Owing to the
impulse in period two, at home expected nominal demand goes up, stimula-
ting investments, notwithstanding the higher interest rate level. Only
when exports from outside countries to country one start to grow does the
nature of the demand oriented policy again turn to 'supporting'.
In later periods, when the interest rate differential between the respec-
tive countries as described above has grown to a certain extent, the
policy becomes counterproductive for the initiating country, whereas out-
side countries benefit. The home country, with its continuously rising
rate of interest, experiences a negative influence on its investment ac-
tivity, and consequently on its production and employment level, whereas
the outside world, thanks to the 'subsidization' of their governments,
observes an upward shift in investments, production and employment.
b. A monetary expansion
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
As seen, the interest rate continuously rose, both absolutely and
relatively, in country I when it expanded its material government expen-
ditures. If it increases its money supply, its interest rate will con-
tinuously fall. The reason given above is mirrored in this case. See Table
4c.3.
In the impulse period, due to the lower interest rate, 'our' holdings of
outside bonds rise and 'outside' holdings of 'our' bonds fall, both
relative to VI and V2, respectively. As a result, country one's capital
account shows a deficit. In all countries net investment decisions are
taken because of the fall in interest rates. Hence, on the short run the
monetary policy is expansionary not only in the initiating country, but
also in the outside world. This also held in Table 4b.7 where no mobility
of capital was assumed. In that table, in the long run, this one time open
market operation was ineffective.
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But now, in the subsequent periods, countries 2, 3 and 4 pay interest to
wealth holders in country one (see KOBl) , who, in their turn, pay taxes on
those receipts to their government. That is why the government deficit in
the initiating country falls more sharply in period two, when compared to
the no-mobility-case, although its interest payments (OG) fall to the same
extent. The lower deficit forces the interest rate down further in country
one. But in the remaining countries the deficit is enhanced forcing the
rate of interest back up again.
The respective movements in the interest rates are responsible for the
continuous expansion of the capital stock at home, and the relatively
stable one in the outside world. In period 200 a situation has developed
where in the home country labour is the bottleneck for production expan-
sion,44 the government runs a substantial surplus (not only due to low
transfers, but especially to positive interest tax receipts combined with
low interest payments) and the interest rate is nearly zero. The latter is
caused by the low need of funds by the government. As a result the demand
for bonds issued in I, both by country one and by the other countries, is
at its minimum level relative to wealth (2% of VI and 1% of V2, respecti-
vely) .
In summary, whereas in the short run the monetary policy is 'supporting',
its effects on the outside world are mitigated as time goes by. Its impact
on the initiating country, on the other hand, grows over time up to the
point where labour is fully utilized. Without capital mobility (Table
4b.7) we concluded that in the long run all real impacts disappeared.
c. An increase in the wage rate
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
If the unilateral action consists of a wage impulse in country one, during
the first periods the real sector of the economy behaves very much as if
capital was not mobile (compare the present Table 4c.4 and Table 4b.5).
The monetary variables react similarly, albeit that in those periods,
owing to the mobility of capital, the interest rate differentials are
smaller now.
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In the longer run, however, the mechanism described above starts widening
the gap in the respective government deficit and interest rate develop-
ments. The higher government deficit in country one (as in Table 4b.5
caused by higher transfer payments) is partly financed by an import of
capital, causing a deficit on the service account in all periods after
t = 2. This way, country one's government subsidizes the governments
elsewhere. This is illustrated in period 10 by 00 in both countries: in-
terest receipts in country one are lower than without capital mobility,
whereas in the outside world they are higher. Given taxation rates, the
same holds for interest tax receipts. In the longer run (period t = 200),
the government of the home country runs a substantial (and growing) defi-
cit, while in the other countries they run a (growing) surplus. As a con-
sequence, interest rates are higher than initially in country one, and
lower elsewhere. The latter facilitates an expansion of the capital stock
in those countries. As a consequence, labour has become the bottleneck in
the outside world. In the wage increasing country, however, due to the
divestments invoked by higher capital costs, the resulting unemployment
exceeds the one in Table 4b.5. Once more, one should be prudent, however,
in interpreting period 200 as an indication of the long run outcomes.
d. Supply-side policy
Assumptions: monetary sector, 1eM, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
As promised in Section 4B, we will now address the consequences of supply-
side policy in the sense of a reduction, in country one, of the tax rate
on profits and interest receipts, TR. See Table 4c.5. Initially, the im-
pact is only to be found in the monetary sector of the economy. On the one
hand, the government deficit in country one rises due to less tax
receipts. On the other hand, since a smaller fraction of interest proceeds
is taxed away, wealth in the home country rises faster, causing its demand
for all bonds to rise. These two forces have an opposite effect on the
respective interest rates.
Regarding the first trend: as the higher deficit is partly bond financed,
interest payments by the government rise more than without interventions.
Since part of these extra interest payments are cashed (and taxed) abroad,
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a development similar to the one observed above, can be expected. Indeed
this pattern is indicated by the first periods included in Table 4c.5.
Regarding the second: the part of the extra wealth invested in bonds is-
sued outside the home country sets a reversed trend in motion: interest
received in the home country and paid by other countries' governments.
Although relatively weak in the beginning, this second trend grows in
importance over time: interest receipts are added to wealth and again
partly invested abroad. See the continuously negative capital account in
country one and the consequently positive and faster growing service ac-
count.45
Consequently, by period 200 the government in the home country runs a
substantial surplus which is mainly a result of high interest tax
receipts. Seemingly this is in compliance with the Laffer hypothesis (a
lower tax rate leading to higher tax revenues). The reason, however, is
not so much a spur of growth, although as a consequence of the government
surplus the interest rate is very low causing the capital stock to grow.
Far more, as stated above, the higher tax revenues are paid by the govern-
ments in the outside countries who by that time run a substantial deficit.
The latter causes outside interest rates to be relatively high, and as a
consequence, the capital stock, and production and employment, have fallen
in those countries.
As in the short run production and employment are harmed in the home coun-
try and stimulated in the rest of the world, whereas in the longer run the
opposite is observed, we can in that sense conclude that, given fixed
exchange rates, a policy of profit tax reduction can be regarded as con-
flicting.
e. A devaluation
Assumptions: monetary sector, rCM, unilateral impulse, fixed (but adjusta-
ble) exchange rates
Before turning to flexible exchange rates, let us look at the 'mixture'
between the two, a devaluation (by country one) in a system with 'pegged
but adjustable rates of exchange'. See Table 4c.6.
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In the impulse period, the (unexpected) devaluation results in a surplus
on all parts of the balance of payments. Obviously, the trade balance is
in surplus for traditional reasons. The capital account is in surplus for
reasons given when describing the bond demand equation (2.27-2.28). A
devaluation cet. par. implies that foreign wealth owners are richer now,
in terms of currency one. If they desire to spend x% of their wealth on
bonds issued in country one. in currency one this increases 10% in value
after the devaluation. This is reflected by the increase in OVD21.46
Finally. the debt service account is in surplus as interest receipts from
abroad by wealth owners in country one (calculated as last year's holdings
of foreign bonds times the price of one foreign currency) increase 10% in
value as well.47
Moreover, the latter implies that government interest tax receipts in-
crease by 60% (the tax rate) of that gain. After allowing for more expen-
sive material government outlays, the government deficit is still lower
than without devaluation. (If fewer foreign bonds would have been kept in
the portfolio. the absolute gain for the government would have been 10-
wer.)
Finally. due to increased wealth in the home country (the value of 'out-
side' bonds in portfolio rises by the devaluation percentage), total
wealth rises which, together with the smaller government deficit. forces
the home interest rate down.
Meanwhile. in the real sector. exports increase. as a consequence of the
improved competitive position. forcing expectations with regard to demand
and output prices uP. which in turn stimulates investment decisions.
In the outside world, as can be expected from a typically switching device
such as a devaluation, exactly the opposite is obtained. Interest proceeds
fall below their trend level, pushing the government deficit up. Together
with the smaller demand for their bonds by country one (see above), this
accounts for the higher interest rate. Obviously. the cut in demand is
followed by divestments.
Basically, these developments in period two set the trend for the subse-
quent rounds. Special attention needs to be paid here to the debt service
account. The capital account surplus in period two in the home country at
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initial exchange rates could be expected to be followed by a service ac-
count deficit in period three. It should be remembered, however, that
'KABi' as well as 'KOBi' are defined in the currency of the 'money-impor-
ting' country, i, whereas OVDij was defined in currency j. Now in period
two, at given interest rates, a 10% increase in the home-value of assets
in the portfolio of country i and denominated in currency j (due to a
devaluation) will lead to a less than 10% increase in total wealth in i,
and therefore to a less than 10% increase in the demand for all assets
when calculated in currency i. Since foreign assets are now priced 10%
higher, home demand for foreign assets in currency j falls by less than
10%. And as their nominal yield (in the next period) in currency irises
by 10% (compared to the starting position), on balance the service account
of country one in period 3 is positively affected. In the table (and ta-
king into account changes in the rates of interest): the number of bonds
held in 1 issued in 2 in t = 2 equals OVD12 x r2 = 2.9879 (rounded), which
by definition equali their (money) yield in currency 2 in period 3. In
home currency (currency 1) this equals 2.9879 x 1.1 = 3.2867. Total
interest receipts (out of 2, 3 and 4) equal 3 x 3.2867 = 9.8601. Interest
payments by the home country in that same period (3) equal
(OVD21xr1) x 3 = 9.5728 (rounded). The balance on its service account
therefore equals 9.8601 - 9.5728 = 0.2873 (> 0) in period 3.
Also in period 4 the service account maintains its positive balance, which
is caused by the capital flight from the home country obtained in period
three. A further devaluation is expected in that period: as indicated in
Chapter 2, expectations with regard to exchange rates were assumed to be
extrapolative.
These international interest payments and their taxation, together with
the respective developments in transfer payments (falling in the home
country and rising abroad) initiated by investments, explain the falling
trend in the government deficit at home and the rising one abroad. In
period 200 a situation results where in the home country, due to a govern-
ment surplus, interest rates are very low, with demand for bonds issued in
1 at about their minimum level. These low interest rates have facilitated
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an expansion of the capital stock up to the moment where labour has become
the bottleneck for production.
In the outside world, although the government deficit has substantially
grown, the interest rate is on balance only mildly affected, probably due
to the preference of portfolio investors for the higher interest coun-
tries. The on balance slightly unfavourable developments in their capital
stock is consequently more likely to be caused by the 'real' consequences
of the devaluation: the expenditure switch.
Section 4C.2. Freely floating exchange rates
This section describes (in chronological order):
a. an expansion of material government expenditures;
b. a monetary expansion;
c. supply-side policy;
d. wage policy.
a. An expansion of material government expenditures
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impUlse, flexible exchange
rates
The results of a unilateral expansion of government purchases under con-
ditions of floating exchange rates are listed in Table 4c.7. The immediate
effects are dominated by the consequences in the monetary sector.
Due to the impulse, the home rate of interest rises, as the extra expen-
ditures are partly bond financed. The higher interest rate attracts
foreign capital: the capital account is in surplus causing the home cur-
rency to appreciate. As explained in the final part of the previous sec-
tion, this invokes a deficit on the debt service account (interest
receipts value less now in home currency). Obviously, the trade account
also displays a shortage (exports are harmed by higher output prices and
the appreciation). In the real sector profits rise (a higher output price
level and about constant costs), as well as nominal demand, both actual
and expected. This facilitates an increase in net investment decisions.
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In the outside world, the flow of funds into country 1 forces the interest
rate (marginally) uP. but this does not prevent positive net investment
decisions, The latter are positive as a consequence of higher export
demand (by country 1).
In the subsequent period (t=3) the need of funds by the home government
falls mainly as a result of higher profit tax revenues. Although this fall
outweighs extra funds necessary to finance increased investments, the
total "financing need" still exceeds the one without intervention. Never-
theless, the rate of interest returns to about its initial level: as the
previous appreciation of the currency creates an expected further appre-
ciation in t=3. supply of funds increases, which is reflected in an even
higher capital account surplus. As a result, the interest rate at home
falls. whereas the one abroad rises.48
So far, the monetary sector dominates the exchange rate development. But
in period 4, where expectations of appreciation are moderated due to the
way expectations are formulated and where especially in the home country
the stock of capital starts expanding, the real sector gains importance in
this sense. Induced by higher employment. labour income in the home coun-
try rises (and with it nominal import demand grows). leading to a depre-
ciation of home currency. The trade account is "helped" in this respect by
the shortage on the debt service account caused by previous influxes of
capital.
The resulting depreciation will gradually eliminate the expected appre-
ciation and thereby the capital import into country 1. From period 7
onwards the exchange rate developments are dominated by the service
account. The still negative balance on that account leads to depreciations
invoking a still moderate capital flight out of country 1 from period 9
onwards. By period 10 the shortage on the capital account outweighs the
(decreasing) deficit on the service account. The vicious circle between
exchange rates and the capital account becomes visible a depreciation
calls for an expected further depreciation. a consequent capital outflow.
a further depreciation. and so on.
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At the same time the table demonstrates the "break" in this circle (see
period 200). The capital outflow leads to a growing service account sur-
plus. At the moment the latter exceeds the outflow of capital, the circle
is broken and an "appreciation - capital inflow" circle starts, as soon as
the appreciation leads to an expected appreciation.49
All of these conSiderations, however, do not seem to have a large impact
on the nature of the adjustment process in the real sector as traditional-
ly depicted. By period 200, fiscal expansion has led to an increase in
production and employment in country 1. Production in the other countries
is at a (albeit slightly) higher level, too. Once more, however, period
200 cannot be regarded as the ultimate long run outcome.
b. A monetary expansion
Assumptions: monetary sector, leM, unilateral impUlse, flexible exchange
rates
If the government of country 1 decides to pursue a (one time) open market
operation, not surprisingly the resulting influences on interest rates and
rates of exchange are largely determined by monetary factors. Table 4c.8
provides the results of a purchase of I % of outstanding bonds in period
2.50 In the impulse period, in an effort to restore portfolio balance,
country one's inhabitants ask for more bonds (of all origins) and capital
is exported to the rest of the world. As a result interest rates in all
countries fall, but especially in the home country. This causes the home
currency to depreciate, and as a consequence the trade balance as well as
the debt service account are in surplus. As an immediate side effect of
the latter, interest tax receipts in the home country rise (incoming in-
terest payments are valued higher in home currency), whereas those abroad
fall, causing the home government deficit to fall and the one abroad to
rise, widening the international interest rate differential.
Meanwhile, in the real sector, the trade balance surplus in the home coun-
try is reflected in higher nominal export demand and consequently higher
expected output prices, inducing positive net investment decisions. By the
same token, in the outside world decisions are taken to reduce the capital
130
stock. This way, in the short run, monetary policy can be labelled "con-
flicting" here.
In period 3 the service account shows a surplus caused by the
previous capital export. This forces the exchange rate down (apprecia-
tion), which serves as a cause of a shortage on the capital account. This
deficit is enhanced by the expectations of a further depreciating cur-
rency.51 As time goes by, the latter is of less influence which shrinks
the shortage on the capital account over time. Still, during a number of
periods the capital account stays negative. As a result the service ac-
count grows and the currency gradually appreciates. In period 9 the home
currency has even on balance appreciated, causing the trade balance to
show a deficit. Obviously, the appreciation hampers future output expan-
sion.
Even before that time, as a consequence of the capacity effect of invest-
ments, output prices have fallen which discourages new net investments.
In the outside world, the opposite effects are obtained. When net invest-
ments in country 1 are positive, entrepreneurs abroad decide to shrink
their stocks of capital, and vice versa.
So, during the period of adjustment towards a new equilibrium, the moneta-
ry policy is conflicting. As stated before, the new long run position
itself is not found in the table.
c. Supply-side policy
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse. flexible exchange
rates
Table 4c.9 provides an insight into the consequences of a reduction of 5 %
in the tax rate on interest receipts and profits.52 The tax reduction
enhances the growth in wealth in the home country. A part of this larger
wealth is invested abroad, which creates a deficit on the capital account.
With exchange rates flexible, this calls for a depreciation of the home
currency. This has positive effects on the capital account itself, for the
service account and, more importantly, for the trade account. The increase
in exports positively influences expected demand and expected output
prices. As the latter more than compensates the rise in expected capital
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costs (caused by the higher interest rate that is invoked by an increased
government deficit). the immediate effect on investment decisions is now
positive. In Table 4c.5. assuming fixed rates of exchange. the rise in
exports was not obtained and as a result expected output prices did not
rise. In that table investment fell. which could be attributed to the
rising rate of interest in the first period.
Returning to Table 4c.9. this positive trend in the real sector is set
forth for a number of periods. As a result of higher demand (exports.
investments and later on consumption due to increased employment) expected
demand keeps growing, furthering the rise in expected output prices. Of
course, this trend is slowed down by the capacity effect of investments
themselves. But later on, the developments in the monetary sphere gradual-
ly dominate this reversal: the continuous expansion of wealth each period
is partly invested abroad giving rise to continuously rising interest
receipts. A growing surplus on the service account is the result, dic-
tating the currency to appreciate. This harms exports, output and employ-
ment. As a consequence, the government deficit rises. Moreover, right from
the beginning the government ran a higher deficit as a result of lower tax
receipts. This deficit (partly financed by foreign portfolio investors)
rises as a result of higher financing charges. So, the government, finan-
cing its foreign "colleagues" ends up with a large and growing deficit,
which forces the rate of interest up and investments down, etc.
Again, in the longer run the service account appears to dominate the pic-
ture.
d. An increase in the wage rate
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse, flexible exchange
rates
In the impulse period an increase in the wage rate -see Table 4c.10- leads
to higher imports and lower exports along lines familiar by now. Because
of the falling exports nominal output prices rise by less than the impulse
percentage. As a consequence, expected real wage costs rise and entrepre-
neurs decide to divest.
Given flexible exchange rates, the changed consumer behaviour causes a
depreciation of the home currency, leading to a positive balance on the
132
service account as well as on the capital account. The influx of capital
explains why the rate of interest in the home country falls (and rises
abroad) although the government deficit has grown, due to higher transfer
payments and nominal government purchases.
In the next period, the government deficit in the home country rises
further, mainly as a result of lower profit tax receipts: the wage
increase led to negative profits in period 2. In the outside world, where
period two's profits were positive as a result of the rise in demand for
their products, the opposite happens: a lower deficit and hence a lower
rate of interest. The international interest rate differential turns
positive now for the home country. But after correction for the expected
depreciation of the home currency this differential grows in favour of the
outside world and can therefore not explain the capital inflow. The latter
is explained, however, by the further depreciation. Although investments
in the home country fall now and due to their demand effect output prices
fall invoking exports to go up, the currency depreciates further, which is
explained as follows. In period 2 the home country imported capital. As a
consequence, if the exchange rate had been fixed, one would expect a defi-
cit or anyway not a large surplus on the service account in period 3.
However, a relatively large surplus on the capital and on the service
account is needed to counterbalance the still large deficit on the trade
account. These surpluses are invoked by a depreciation. As a result of
that depreciation the value of incoming interest receipts rises in home
currency improving the balance on the service account. The same deprecia-
tion also improves the balance on the capital account. This argument is
illustrated by the values of the respective balances that would have been
obtained if the exchange rates of period 2 would have applied: SiN'
0.67258, KOB1' = 0.01344 and KAB!' = 0.13601.53
In period 4 the interest rate differential is even more favourable for the
outside world (after correction for expected exchange rate developments).
Nevertheless, for the same reason as above, the capital account of the
home country is still Positive.54 But this circle does not continue for-
ever. The deficit on the trade balance falls (even without the deprecia-
tion55 as a result of a smaller demand for imported products, which is
caused by growing unemployment. After a few periods the depreciation
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needed to achieve the necessary equilibrium in the balance of payments is
so small that the service account can turn negative (here in period 7).
Meanwhile, in the real sector as a consequence of the disinvestments,
prices in the home country have gone up and profits are positive again.
The part of these profits that is taxed away attenuates the growth in the
government deficit. The other part, added to wealth just as the relatively
high interest earnings, cet. par. increases the demand for bonds.56 In
period 9 this results in a decline in the home rate of interest which,
together with the declining expected rate of depreciation, discourages
capital import (by that time still positive, however).
In the outside world, where profits are smaller each period since t=2, at
about the same time interest rates are rising.
This complex of factors (falling interest rates at home, smaller deprecia-
tions and thus expected depreciations of the exchange rate, rising
interest rates abroad) will in a certain period cause a capital outflow.
The table displays the situation in period 200: the capital outflow causes
the service account to be positive, calling for an appreciated currency
which in turn leads to a deficit in the trade account, reflected in high
imports and low exports. The small exports imply a low demand (output)
with clear implications on investments.
In this sense, with international capital mobility and floating curren-
cies, in the longer run the exchange rate developments, dominated by a
surplus on the service account which leads to an appreciated home cur-
rency, aggravate the unbeneficial influence of a wage rise on home produc-
tion and employment via their disadvantageous impact on exports. The same
exchange rate development benefits foreign exports, output and employment.
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Appendix 4.1 A summary of the starting position in t 1 if a monetary
sector is inc~uded
Companies Households
Y = 1 "p = 100,,0.8= 80 C = c"p 60,,1 60 C 60 YL 80L m L y
6kP = o.r-ioo-i 10 G 14,,1 14 M 16 TRF 20y
0 - B = 11 - 1 10 I 10,,1 10 BT 0
P
YR 0 X 16x1 16 BL 24
100 100 100 100
Entrepreneurs and Wealth owners Government
TR " 00 = 0.6 x 15 9 00 15 G 14 BL 24
TR " YR 0 YR 0 OG 5 BT 0-1 -1
savings 6 TRF 20 BR 9
F - 6
15 15 33 33
Bonds market
Extra supply of bonds: Extra demand for bonds:
i(-F) 3 t (t.V) 3




1 The same central proposition will be made in case of substitution. But
in that situation, the proposition will have different inferences, see
Chapter 6. The hypoth~sis in this chapter is (with modifications) based on
Freia, one of the models of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB), in
'FREIA, Een Macro-Economisch Model voor de Middellange Termijn', CPB
Monografie nr. 25, The Hague, 1983, pp. 30-37.
2 This formulation implies net (as opposed to gross) investments to be
dependent on expected profits --an assumption similar to (3.6). Theoreti-
cal considerations would favour gross investments, however. See
F.Scotland, 'Investment: A Survey of Models with Some Implications for the
Effects of Monetary Policy', Technical Report 29, Bank of Canada, Dec.
1981, p.17. But such a hypothesis has serious didactic drawbacks:
investments would vary sharply with heavy inferences on prices,
consumption, etc. Since also empirically such sharp fluctuations in
investments are not observed, we will stick to the formulation in the main
text.
3- In Chapter 2, it was assumed that expected interest rates equal present
interest rates throughout. The same holds for expected tax rates.
4 This coincides with the calculation of YR in equation (2.23).
5 This discount factor coincides with the one used to get the market
value of a bond. See Appendix 2.3. If no monetary sector is included, the
third term as well as the discount factor disappear from (4.1).
6 Analogous to the definition of the real interest rate, one might con-
sider substracting expected inflation from the term in brackets. Since
entrepreneurs were assumed to invest possible profits in bonds and not buy
consumer goods or machines, for example, (4.2) is formulated without this
price increase.
7 The idea of explicitly combining profit expectations and demand
expectations as determinants of investments is not only found in Freia
(see footnote 1 above) but also in Eisner, e.g., (see Eisner, 'Factors in
Business Investment', NBER, Ballinger Pub. Co., 1978, Chapter 4). In the
more traditional investment hypothesis of Chapter 3 this mechanism plays
an implicit role: given a difference between output prices and costs per
product, the profit (and hence net investment) will be smaller (cq. more
negative) if capital is underutilized.
8 With given tax rates under the assumption that capital is expected to
be the bottleneck for production expansion. See (4.2) and (4.3).
9 The similarity between the respective chapters is contained if the same
instrument was used with exchange rates floating freely. Here investments
do not change since output prices (actual and expected) rise to the same
extent as labour costs (actual and expected, resp.). Compare Tables 4a.5'
and 3a.9.
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10 If no monetary sector is included.
11 In Table 3a.11 net disinvestment decisions in t: 2 equal those in
t : 3, due to the fact that the actual capital stock is the same in both
periods. This is not the case in Table 4a.7.
12 That is, before volumes of production and employment are changing.
13 'Home consumption' refers to 'consumption of goods produced in the home
country' .
14 Not out of country one, since those goods were relatively more expen-
sive.
15 To save space, in Tables 4a.11, 4a.12 and 4a.13, only the variables are
listed with regard to the countries one and four. The outcomes for country
two equal the former, while the ones for country three equal the latter.
16 The only harm done to those countries is caused in the impulse period.
Due to higher product prices in the block countries, the price of imports
into the outside world and thus their price level of private final
absorption is increased, causing a slightly lower real level of that
absorption.
17 As explained, this is mainly caused by the exclusive short term rela-
tionship between imports and the price level of those imports. In the
longer run exports to the block countries (and production in the outside
world) even increase, because of the growing consumer demand in those
countries.
Note that the definition of "welfare" used in the SIER-game differs from
the one traditionally used in customs union theory.
18 This conclusion is supported
creation and trade diversion in the
creation, can hardly be traced.
by empirical studies estimating trade
EC: trade diversion, unlike trade
19 Cooper and Massel, 'A New Look at
P.Robson (ed) 'International Economic
Harmondsworth, 1972, pp. 91-98.
1or 1+e.t.M.Py




The remainder of BT is used to finance
21 The reader is reminded that 'welfare' in neo-classical trade theory is
measured differently.
22 Note the 'purely switching feature' of import tariffs in Table 4a.12':
what the block gains in production is lost by the rest of the world. The
feature also exists in Table 4a.13, for instance, but, due to the 2 by 2
division, it is shown more clearly here.
23 Remember that without redistribution the volume of imports cq. home
consumption only depends on the price level of the product concerned.
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24 A positive rate of interest combined with zero real growth and an
initial government deficit partly bond financed implies a continuous
increase in the government deficit and in government debt. This ingredient
of the game teaches players that in such circumstances policy measures are
needed to make sure the government deficit does not run out of hand.
25 To fix the capital stock at 100, gross investments are 10 (as opposed
to 20). To keep spending at 100, material government expenditures are 14
(as opposed to 4).
26 Recall from Chapter 2, that V., 00., OVD .. and O. relate to wealth-
owners and entrepreneurs (i.e., pri~ate ~erson§~, wher~as O. relates to
the total stock of bonds (including bonds held by firms). 1
27 We assume that when starting
earned by firms are 'cancelled
together with YR'
28 Since initially in a model with monetary block material government
spending equals 14, a 10% increase now equals 1.4. In Table 4a.2 the same
impulse came down to a 0.4 increase in G. This means that the respective
tables are in this sense incomparable. In addition, if the impulses had
been of the same absolute magnitude (i.e., if the present impulse would
have been 0.4/14 = 2.87%, the results would still be incomparable since,
among other things, the life span of machines is now 10 years (instead of
5 years).
the game, interest paid and interest
out'. Interest proceeds by firms are taxed
29 Just as in the no-monetary-sector case, welfare in the short run is
hampered by the impulse, whereas in the long run, due to higher employment
and private absorption, it is higher.
30 'ICM' stands for the International Capital Mobility as described in
Chapter 2.
31 Foreign interest rates seem to be stationary in Table 4b.3, but this is
due to rounding. Abroad, interest rates fall as can be verified by compa-
rison of V2 and 002 in Tables 4b.l and 4b.2 (V2 rises and 002 falls). See
also r2 in period 10 in Table 4b.3.
The assumption made in Chapter 2 that the monetary consequences of trade
balance disequilibria are neutralized, prevents an influence of the
foreign trade surplus on their rates of interest.
32 Remember that depreciation was assumed to occur at replacement value,
whereas financing charges were calculated over actual borrowings.
33 Since the life span is doubled, implying a longer time horizon for
expectations, for example, the impacts are not equal in a quantitative
sense.
34 Alternatively, one could raise government expenditures as in Section
4A, for instance.
35 This will, among other things, produce a decrease of the future
interest payments by the government concerned. Since, when formulating the
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equations, we assumed the Central Bank would purchase (or sell) only gov-
ernment bonds, there should be enough government bonds held by the public.
Consequently, the limits between which monetary expansion (and contrac-
tion) are allowed in the game are smaller than the 10% discussed here.
36 Whereas in the tables regarding a one time open market opera~ion, botb
r and P return to their initial values, now with a change in ttl'both P
and r ri~e. In both cases the long run equilibrium condition y
(l-b-r)P = PL, where 6 = 0.1 and PL = 0.8, is satisfied. Moreover, in alltables c6ncerning monetary impulses, the initial drop cq. rise in interest
rates is not overwhelming if compared to the size of the interventions.
Didactically, a more impressive reaction of interest rates could be
desirable. I tried to accomplish that by lowering the sensitivity of bond
demand to changes in the interest rate. As this complicates the
formulation of the bond demand equation and the results differed only
marginally, I left the coefficient concerned at 5.
37 Both tables refer to world-wide impulses.
38 In tables, no suffices can be used. So, 'BR', for example, should be
read as BR.
39 Since we assumed 'eternal' bonds, a mistake in one period will have its
impact in all periods to follow.
40 To illustrate this point: without interventions, in period 859 the
holdings of bonds by subjects in country one, issued in their own country,
reach the minimum level set in the bond demand equation, due to the inter-
national interest rate differential.
41 Obviously, the other three governments are also 'subsidized' in this
respect by firms in country 1 that borrowed capital from abroad. For ease
of explication, if this mechanism applies we speak of only governments
subsidizing each other.
42 Shown in the table as an increase in both OVD11 and OVD2l and a declinein OVD12 and OVD22, all relative to the portfolio concerned. The flightinto country one's assets is also at the expense of assets issued
elsewhere: see the relative fall in OVD23.
43 The rise in interest rates cumulated over all countries, equals the
rise in the 'home' rate without mobility of capital (see Table 4b.3): the
increased need of funds is now met world-wide, whereas in Table 4b.3 it is
to be met in the home country only.
44 Causing zero net investments.
45 To illustrate this point further, in Table 4c.5' one finds for the same
intervention the time interval during which the government deficit
switches from r1s~g (due to the first trend) to falling (due to the
second), whereas in the outside world the deficit keeps rising.
Furthermore, this table highlights the crucial role of interest proceeds
in country one (001).
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46 The same phenomenon is reflected in the fall of OVD12, a figure deno-
minated in currency 2. Measured in home currency, this figure actually
rises.
47 The difference
and the one in
holdings) x 15.3
(impulse).
between the figure concerned (001) in the present table
Table 4c.l equals 0.6 (share of foreign in total bond
(interest receipts with no intervention) x 0.10
48 Country 1, with its lower rate of interest is more attractive to
portfolio investors than the other countries once expected exchange rate
developments are taken into account. In period 3 the home currency
appreciates further. Defining S1N' as the trade surplus of country 1 if
exchange rates would equal those of the previous period, and defining
KOBl' and KABl' analogeously, in t=3 SIN'= -0.09064, KOB1'= -0.06683 and
KABl'= 0.19657. In t=4: SlN'= -0.10287, KOB1'= -0.08734 and KABl'=
0.01469. These figures are not included in Table 4c.7, but were calculated
separately.
49 Of course, this reasoning only holds "cet. par.", i.e., given interest
rates for example.
50 The impulse here amounts only to 1 %. as opposed to 10 % in comparable
previous tables. The reason is that at the required level of accuracy (11
digits) and using the present model (592) the effects of a 10 % monetary
impulse could only be calculated for 30 periods. In Chapter 6 an
alternative model (597) is used to overcome this problem. Using model 597.
in Table 7.4 (Chapter 7) some results are shown for a 10 % monetary
expansion under the present assumptions.
51 Remember, that currently expected exchange rate developments were
assumed to be a function of previous exchange rates.
52 Again, using model 592 an impulse of -10 % could not be calculated for
a sufficient number of periods here. This complicates a quantitative
comparison with Table 4c.5. A qualitative comparison, however. remains
possible.
53 Although in period 2 a capital influx was reported, KOBl' in period 3
is nevertheless positive. This is a result of the high interest rate in
the outside world if compared to the one at home, as well as of the fact
that interest earned abroad is worth a lot in home currency because of the
high price of foreign exchange.
54 In this period KOB1' = 0.01454 and KAB1' 0.19924.
55 In t=4 SlN' equals -0.57737.
56 Wealth (defined in home currency. see Chapter 2) also i-Lsea as a result
of the continuous depreciations.
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Chapter 5 Substitutable factors of production, investments determined by
lagged profits
This chapter contains:
Section 1. Introduction: the new equations, the global adjustment process.
Section 2. Adjustment processes
Section 3. An illustration of the model: some simulations
Section 1. Introduction
In the previous chapters complementarity between the factors of production
was assumed. On the one hand this implied that, given the amount of
(fixed) capital available on the short run, production could not be ex-
panded 1 even if labour was ample. On the other hand, prices of labour and
capital were not relevant to the production technique chosen, since by
definition only one technique was available.
In this and the next chapter we will study consequences of introducing
possibilities of substitution between the factors of production. The con-
sequences with regard to cost minimization, however, are postponed to the
next chapter, Chapter 6: the difference between Chapters 5 and 6 concerns
the assumed investment behaviour. In the present chapter, as in Chapter 3,
investments are taken to be determined by lagged profits, irrespective of
expected relative prices of labour and capital. (For the theoretical foun-
dation, the reader is referred to Chapter 3.) This simplification is aban-
doned in Chapter 6.
Production in both this and the following chapter is determined by the









Ys refers to the number of goods produced and supplied.
(5.1) combined with the assumption of profit maximization under perfect




where the first factor on the right hand side follows when (5.1) is re-
written as
1/ ~
1m = y .13 / k .13 (5.3)
blmhence, PL rY" P .!L .13 y
Combination with (5.2) leads to the short run supply curve
y
P ..Lk(/ .13) 1-.13
L
(5.4)
For given k (short run) and .13, (5.4) can be rewritten as
y (5.4) ,
(5.4)' clarifies the shape and "validity" of the supply curve, and is the
formulation found in Marston, for example. 3 Nevertheless, it is not the
equation used by the computer, since it assumes k to be constant whereas
over time k can change. As long as 1 is flexible, (5.4) is used as the4 m(rising) supply curve. In the game, the outcome of (5.4) is labelled Ys'
However, if 1m has reached its upper limit (total labour supply minus the
number of civil servants), the supply curve becomes a vertical line at
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y = (l -l )~ kl-~max s g (5.5)
In the computer model, Ymax is referred to as 'cap'.
So, as in the previous two chapters, the supply curve, as depicted in






Main differences between the respective kinked curves are, however:
- in the present situation marginal costs are rising as long as production
is below its maximum level, whereas with complementarity marginal costs
were constant in that situation;
- the 'kink' in Diagram 5.1 is due to the bottleneck labour, whereas with
complementarity it was either caused by the bottleneck labour or by the
bottleneck capital;
- if, with complementarity, the bottleneck was labour, accumulation of
capital could not shift the kink to the right, whereas in the present
situation it can.
Other differences between the "complementarity-model" and the present one
can be summarized as follows.
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The initial stationary situation (with about 3% unemployment, see Chapter
3) is now reflected by A on the 'non-vertical' part, whereas it used to be
located on the vertical part of the supply curve. The difference is ex-
plained by the different production functions. In Chapters 3 and 4 full
capacity output was reached as soon as either labour or capital was short,
but in the current chapter as well as in Chapter 6 this level of output is
obtained only if no extra labour can be hired.
The pOint of equilibrium on the product market is calculated slightly
differently now:
p Y
y ys or py
Y (5.6) 5
A further distinction from the complementarity-case lies in labour produc-
tivity. Whereas in the previous two chapters it was constant (by defini-
tion), it now varies along the supply schedule. This is reflected in the
wage equation where the game leader is allowed to let wages depend on
l~bour productivity 6 growth.
The model with substitution also differs from the one with complementarity
with respect to private labour demand. Labour demand by the private sec-
tor, 1m, used to be a linear function of business output. With substitu-
tion, 1m depends on ys as well as on the amount of capital, if the supply
curve is upward sloping, since then fixed capital will always be fully
employed. If the economy's situation is reflected by a point on the ver-
tical part of the supply curve (labour is scarce), 1m is calculated as the
difference between total labour and the number of civil servants.
A final distinction is found in the endogenous variable "model". When
assuming complementarity this variable was equal to one if the demand
model applied, with demand exclusively and solely determining the volume
of production, and prices solely depending on costs. "Model" equalled zero
if the supply version obtained: production determined by capacity, and
prices determined by the point of intersection between demand and supply.
In this and the next chapter this distinction is, strictly speaking, no
longer useful, as can be illustrated by the use of Diagram 5.1 above. If
the point of intersection between supply and demand is on the upward
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sloping part of the supply curve -as in the initial situation A- an in-
crease in demand will lead to an immediate upward adjustment in both
prices and output. At a point like B. however. an increase in demand will
on the short run only lead to higher prices. Because of the resemblance of
the latter situation to the one familiar from the complementarity chap-
ters. we will continue to indicate a situation like A by "model = 1" and
the one like point B by "model = 0".
Section 2. The adjustment processes
The reasons provided in Chapter 3 not to combine the present investment
behaviour with the monetary sector also apply in the present chapter. as
will be illustrated below with the help of Tables 5b.1 to 5b.3. Therefore.
when describing the adjustment processes we will assume that the model
only contains a real sector.
Let us first concentrate on situations characterized by "model









If demand is increased by a (world-wide) government expenditure impulse,
for instance, the demand curve shifts upward and to the right as indicated
by arrow 1. The new short run equilibrium is found at C with output and
production prices exceeding their previous levels. The rise in prices
depresses private consumption, but since output in real terms rises as
well, not to the full extent of the expenditure impulse. Due to "diminis-
hing returns to factor proportions", short run employment opportunities
expand by more than output does. As such, this rise in employment will to
a certain extent offset the inflation-induced fall in consumption. 8 Mean-
while, profits grow positive, although not to the full amount of the in-
crease in nominal output: the rise in profits is mitigated by the increase
in the number of people employed as opposed to the development with
complementary factors of production (see Chapter 3).
Consequently, next period's net investments will be positive, constituting
a further impulse on demand (not shown in Diagram 5.2), with short run
effects as described above.
Two periods after the impulse we can expect the capital stock to start
growing, which shifts the supply curve (5.4) to the right (arrow 2 in
Diagram 5.2). In principle one could expect two effects of an expansion of
the capital stock on employment: a 'expansion effect' (positive) and a
'substitution effect' (negative). The former is invoked by a lower price
level, which at given labour income increases the volume of demand, where-
as the latter indicates that a given number of goods can now be produced
with less labour. If the expansion effect prevails, it is enhanced by an
outward shift of the demand curve caused by fewer unemployed (and thus a
higher nominal household income), arrow 3 in the diagram: the employment-
effect.
As shown in Appendix 5.1, an expansion of the capital stock is on balance
likely to raise employment opportunities. given the price elasticity of
private consumer demand (of -1) and given rigid nominal wages.
As such. the outward shift of the supply schedule will lower output prices
and thereby, cet. par. profits. This reduces the incentive for a further
expansion of the capital stock and hence paves the way for the model to
reach a new stationary equilibrium. The employment effect. however, could
in principle block this lowering of output prices. Appendix 5.1 also
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shows, however, that on balance, output prices will be lowered by a growth
in the stock of capital. 9
Although in the short run the outcomes will deviate from the ones when
complementarity was assumed (Chapter 3), in the long run we expect the
outcomes to be identical. The reason is basically that in the long run
entrepreneurs will return to the initial capital/labour ratio. This can be
clarified as follows.
Initially the goods sector of the economy is represented by point A in
Diagram 5.3 where for simplicity the marginal cost curves are drawn
linear. P equals average costs (AC), profits are zero.Yo
Immediately after the impulse, when capital is still fixed. the expansion
of output (to B) is brought about by use of a more than proportionate
increase in labour: lm > y >
rises. Profits are positive:
k (= 0).
P > AC.Yl





The positive profits tempt the entrepreneurs to expand their capital
stock. As shown in Appendix 5.1, this will also lead to more employment
(so both k and lm rise), but the same appendix showed that the output
price level will fall. The latter implies that the increase in output is
smaller than the one in capital. And this, in turn, must imply that lm is
even smaller. Hence, the increase in the capital stock will lead to a drop
in the lm/k ratio.
So, the higher capital
right, will lead to a fall
stock, causing the set MC - AC to shift to the
in output prices (to P in C) and a fall in
Y2
the lm/k ratio. Profits in C are still positive, but smaller than in B.
Again the entrepreneurs will decide to invest in net terms.
This sequence continues until profits are zero, that is until output
prices have come down to the initial level of average costs, P Due toYo
the Constant Returns to Scale feature of the production function, not only
is the initial price level restored in the new equilibrium, but the same
is true of the lm/k ratio: lm = k. And, as a consequence, output, employ-
ment and the capital stock must in the long run have grown proportionate-
ly.
In other words, since the initial ~ en K will be restored, the long run
position (like in Chapter 3 reached where YR = 0) is characterized by
Y{PY-~L-K6Py) 0 or, since in the new equilibrium ~ = K = 1, by
(5.7)
Hence, if wages are fixed, the long run output price level will be fixed
as well. Meanwhile, volumes will have grown.
In summary, in the long run we expect an impulse on demand to be followed
by change in supply leaving prices on balance unaffected. The difference
with the complementarity-case will be found only in the short and inter-
mediate run.
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The main effects that can be expected from a word-wide wage impulse in the








Higher wages have two effects:
1. on the supply curve: as indicated by equation (5.4) 1 a wage increase
shifts the supply curve upward to the same extent10
2. on the demand curve: since al111 wages rise to the same extent, nominal
consumer spending rises with the impulse percentage as well.
On balance, output remains fixed. The only remaining effect to be expected
is a one time price increase. In terms of the long run equilibrium con-
dition (5.7). long run prices in the intervening countries will rise by
the impulse percentage.
If the wage improvement is only carried through in one country, or rather
not in all countries, with fixed exchange rates, exports will in real
terms fall. As a consequence, total demand and therefore production prices
rises by less than that percentage, causing losses and disinvestments in
the intervening countries, shifting the supply curve to the left. In a
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sense, this, let us say, unilateral wage increase, comes down to its mul-
tilateral counterpart (above) plus a negative demand impulse 'at home' and
a positive impulse on demand in the outside world.
In the long run we expect condition (5.7) to hold, so higher output prices
in the intervening countries and on balance unchanged output prices in the
outside world. But at the same time, due to the divestments mentioned, we
expect an unfavourable production and employment development in the home
country, as opposed to an expansion of production and employment outside,
caused by an improved competitive position.
With flexible exchange rates, however, the respective competitive posi-
tions will not change: the home country's currency will depreciate by the
impulse percentage to keep its trade balance from deteriorating. Conse-
quently, just as in Table 3a.9, we expect only a wage-and-price-increase
in the home country, leaving the outside world unaffected.
Investment stimulating policies (a reduction of the profit tax rate if
profits are positive) can be expected to have two kinds of stimulating
effects on both production and employment as far as the short and the
medium term is concerned:
1. due to higher net profits, demand for investment purposes is raised,
shifting the demand curve to the right
2. the faster accumulation of capital shifts the supply curve to the right
at a faster rate than without tax reduction. As shown in Appendix 5.1,
this can be expected to speed up employment growth. As both lm and k
rise faster, production will rise faster, too. But again as in Chapter
3, the long run equilibrium outcomes will not deviate from the ones
without a tax reduction.
In the 'supply-branch', that is, if the short term supply curve runs ver-
tically, the following effects of interventions can be expected.
A certain expansion of demand will lead to far higher profits. The reason
is straightforward: since the supply curve is inelastic, the demand in-
crease will for the full extent lead to higher prices, that is, to higher
nominal sales. Since extra labour cannot be hired (by definition), and the
Phillips mechanism is not included, the total wage bill will not rise and,
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apart from depreciation charges, the rise in profits equals the total rise
in sales. (This reasoning also applied to the short run situation with
complementary factors of production, Chapters 3 and 4.)
This should be contrasted to the situation where the supply curve slopes
upward: an increase in demand is partly met there by an increase in (real)
production, facilitated by an increase in the number of people hired,
i.e., by increasing the wage bill.
This steep rise in profits endangers the stability of the model: although
Appendix 5.2 shows that, also in the case of a vertical supply curve, the
subsequent increase in the stock of capital will cet. par. lower output
prices and profits. this conclusion only holds as long as the demand ef-
fect of investments does not distort the picture. But as that demand ef-
fect (i.e.• the outward shift of the demand curve due to more investment
demand) is relatively large if compared to the capacity effect (i.e., the
outward shift of the supply curve). prices and profits will on balance
rise, invoking extra net investments and so on.
An increase in demand. causing output prices. profits and net investments
to go uP. will induce the vertical supply curve to shift to the right. In
this sense, the economy will behave much in the same way as if the supply
curve sloped upward. The main difference, however. lies in the relatively
large outward shift of the demand curve destabilizing the adjustment pro-
cess. This stability problem will be illustrated below.12
If the vertical branch of the supply curve still applies and all wages.
including those of civil servants, increase. we expect the 'kink' in the
supply curve to shift upward proportionately: the rising part resembling
marginal (labour) costs rises, just as total demand. by the impulse per-
centage. As a consequence no important shifts can be expected.
If only market wages are increased, leaving wages of civil servants and
unemployment benefits unchanged. the former shift (in costs) is still
obtained. but the latter (in demand) is less than proportional. Depending
on the initial situation. this can shift the variable 'model' back to one
again. where the demand model applies. Since wage costs rise more than
output prices. we expect losses, divestments, a decreasing capital stock
and a further drop in employment (in line with Appendix 5.1). The decline
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in the capital stock will increase prices, mitigating losses. The process
halts where the long run equilibrium condition (Py=PL) holds.
All expectations expressed in this section will be verified in the next
one, Section 3.
Section 3. An illustration of the model: some simulations
This section is subdivided into:
3A.1 Simulations without a monetary sector and a rising supply curve
1. no impulse
2. extra government purchases
3. a wage increase
4. supply-side policy
3A.2 Simulations without a monetary sector and a vertical supply curve
In this section we will manipulate impulses to obtain a vertical
supply curve and discuss some impulses within that range.
3B. Simulations if the model includes a monetary sector, to illustrate
that it would not be useful to combine the present investment
equation with the monetary sector.
Throughout this section we assume an immediate link between prices and
international trade. Given the rather extensive description of the ex-
pected adjustment patterns in the previous section, we will confine our-
selves to points illustrated in the tables but not discussed in that sec-
tion.
Section 3A.1 Simulations without a monetary sector and a rising supply
curve
1. No impulses
Table 5a.l gives the familiar starting position. As the chart shows, the
coefficients are set at such a level that the present starting position
equals the one assuming complementarity between the factors of production.
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2. A government expenditure impulse
Assumptions: no monetary sector, non-vertical supply curve, world-wide
impulse
Table 5a.2, showing the major results if all countries increase government
purchases by 10%, mainly confirms the expectations described in Section 2.
In period two the price effect on consumption outweighs the employment
effect, although, with capital constant, employment grows faster than real
output, as expected. Period 4 confirms the outcomes of Appendix 5.1: an
increase in capital causes a (smaller) increase in output with falling
prices and an again smaller but still positive effect on employment. This
is repeated on a smaller scale in the subsequent periods until the new
equilibrium is reached (in period 189) where capital and labour have grown
proportionately to output, and prices are at their previous levels. As
also expected, this new equilibrium is identical to the one in Table 3a.2,
with welfare higher than without impulse as a result of higher private
final absorption and lower unemployment.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, non-vertical supply
curve, fixed exchange rates
Carrying out the same impulse unilaterally, the players group concerned
can expect the results produced in Table 5a.3. Qualitatively speaking, the
results do not deviate from the ones given in the previous table. The
magnitude of the expansion at home, however, is smaller. This is due to
the instantaneous switch to foreign products caused by the home price
rise. In terms of Diagram 5.2, this is reflected by a smaller shift in the
demand curve (arrow 1, and consequently, also arrows 2 and 3). By the same
token, this implies an expenditure impulse in the outside countries. So,
the latter can expect similar effects as the home country, albeit to a
considerably smaller extent. Apart from the magnitude of the effects, the
only difference can be found in the government sector: whereas the home
country runs a deficit (in period two the extra government purchases are
partly compensated for by fewer unemployment benefits and in the subse-
quent periods also by increased profit tax receipts), the outside world
runs a surplus on the government account, due to fewer unemployed in those
countries.
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A comparison with the complementarity case (see Table 3a.4) indicates that
now production rises immediately in the home country (in 3a.4 in period 4)
as well as abroad (in Table 3a.4 not until period 6). Whereas the former
is an immediate implication of the rising -as opposed to vertical- supply
curve, the latter is attributable to the immediate rise in household in-
come in the home country (which in turn is also caused by the rising sup-
ply schedule). The same rise in labour income also explains why the trade
balance shows an immediate deficit now, whereas in Table 3a.4 the deficit
did not emerge before period 4.
As far as the 'economic' variables are concerned, the new long run equili-
bria in both tables are identical, however. So, also under the present
assumption we can conclude that a unilateral demand impulse will partly
leak away, benefitting production, employment and final private absorption
in the outside countries to a relatively small extent, both in the short
and in the long run.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, non-vertical supply curve, world-wide
impulse
If the unilateral action was undertaken with (world-wide) flexible ex-
change rates, however, Table 5a.3' indicates that country one's economic
variables would move in virtually the same way as they did when the action
was world-wide, while the ones in the outside world would not be affected.
Hence, flexible exchange rates would ensure a nearly perfect insulation in
this case.
As the table indicates, in the present situation the depreciation is
obtained in the impulse period, whereas with complementarity (see Table
3a.5) this depreciation occurs later and is smaller. The depreciation is
earlier now as a consequence of the immediate expansion of employment and
thus of labour income. It is larger now, since with complementarity em-
ployment only grows with capital formation, whereas now it also grows if
demand goes up: the short term reaction of employment to a demand impulse
is sooner and larger if there are possibilities of substitution between
the factors of production.
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3. A wage increase
Assumptions: no monetary sector. non-vertical supply curve. world-wide
impulse
Table 5a.4 confirms the expectation formulated in Section 2 of this chap-
ter that a world-wide wage increase (here: of 10%) neither changes demand
nor supply in real terms. The only impact is a one time increase in output
and consumer prices (equal to the wage increase). harming welfare.
Assumptions: no monetary sector. non-vertical supply curve. unilateral
impulse. fixed exchange rates
If just one of the countries decided to increase its overall wage level.
Table 5a.5 would give an impression of the results to be expected. when
the system of fixed exchange rates would be adhered to. In the impulse
period. just as in Diagram 5.4. the marginal cost curve goes up by 10% at
given output levels. Demand for home products, however, no longer increa-
ses -in nominal terms- to the same 10%: as a result of the price increase,
our exports fall, depreSSing demand and consequently the price increase.
This leaves room for (net) real wages to go up (as indicated by the in-
crease in w~), and thus for an increase in home and especially imported
consumption. 1 The drop in exports will make home production fall below
its starting level. Given the capital stock, employment will shrink even
more sharply. This explains why total private consumption (COl. m1) does
not rise to the same extent as net real wages do.
Meanwhile, because of the increase in real wages, profits become negative,
implying disinvestments in period t = 3. An immediate effect of this will
be lower demand for products, and consequently, a further decline in em-
ployment. Prices also go down. increasing exports which attenuates the
decline in production.
After period t 3. due to net losses in the past, the capital stock
starts declining. This helps restore profits in two ways. On the one hand,
employment and thus labour costs fall. On the other hand, with a smaller
stock of capital, the supply curve moves to the left, pushing output
prices up.
In the end the economy reaches a new equilibrium with lower output and
employment and a 10% higher output price level in the home country, and
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higher output and employment and on balance unaffected output prices
abroad. If the trade balance deficit of the home country is also taken
into account (caused by a higher household income and a worsened competi-
tive position), it cannot come as a surprise that welfare in the home
country is harmed, whereas it rises abroad.l4
Assumptions: no monetary sector. non-vertical supply curve. unilateral
impulse. flexible exchange rates
The results obtained with fixed exchange rates change drastically if ex-
change rates float. See Table 5a.6.
Just as with a multilateral wage impulse. the real sector is unaffected
here. The deficit on the trade account, as signaled in the previous table,
is now replaced by a depreciation equal to the wage impulse, which also
equals the production price increase. Consequently, the only effect left
is a one time price increase in the home country.
4. Supply-side policy
Assumptions: no monetary sector. non-vertical supply curve. world-wide
impulse
If, as in this chapter, investments are determined by net profits, a
policy to increase investments via tax rate reduction can only be fruitful
if profits are positive in the first place. Therefore, we combine such a
(world-wide) tax reduction of 10% points with a (world-wide) government
expenditure increase of 10%. Hence, to interpret the effects of the tax
rate policy, we should compare the results in Table 5a.7 with the ones in
Table 5a.2. These effects are rather straightforward. but nevertheless
interesting. Of course, the tax rate reduction will induce more invest-
ments in t = 3, implying a higher secondary demand impulse in that same
period. Consequently. production, employment and prices exceed the levels
reached in Table 5a.2. Supply considerations start to playa role in
t = 4. Since capital formation is larger now, the supply schedule is
shifted outward. This facilitates a larger production expansion with
prices dropping faster.15
This process of a more rapid outward shift of the supply schedule, more
production and lower prices is repeated in the periods thereafter.
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A noticeable result is that a policy stimulating capital formation this
way is also beneficial in a fight against unemployment and inflation16 in
the short run. As signaled in Chapter 3, however, the policy actually
boils down to speeding up the adjustment process towards the same long run
equilibrium that would have been reached without it.
Section 3A.2 Simulations without a monetary sector and a vertical supply
As described in the first section of this chapter, the supply curve con-
tains a vertical branch at the point where labour limits production capa-
city.
The initial position
To study the general behaviour pattern of the model in this branch. let us
first turn to Table 5a.8 where a new equilibrium starting position is
created for the impulses in this section. This new equilibrium is esta-
blished by a reduction in the private production capacity to the level of
the initial production (100) through an increase of 3.7517 in the number
of civil servants while compensating for the side effects of this move on
demand.18 What actually happens diagrammatically is that the vertical
branch of the supply curve is moved to the left until the initial produc-
tion point (point A in Diagram 5.2) is reached. As Diagram 5.5 illus-
trates, the initial production point (still A) is now situated at the kink
in the supply curve.
As shown in Table 5a.8, actual production stays at 100. We move into the
vertical branch of the supply schedule, indicated by 'model; 0', since,
to circumvent problems due to rounding. the computer chooses this value
for 'model' on the condition that actual production times 1.0001 exceeds
private production capacity (of 100). Neither in the short. nor in the
long run, does this move have any impact on the economic variables in the
model. Obviously. the impact on 'welfare' is beneficial: it is for once
and for all increased to the level of 100.94. due to decreased unemploy-
ment.19
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The picture drawn by Table 5a.8 is our point of reference when analyzing






1. Government expenditure increase
Assumptions: no monetary sector. vertical supply curve. world-wide impulse
Let us first study the effects of a (world-wide) increase in government
purchases20 given in Table 5a.9 and illustrated in Diagram 5.6.
The impulse as such is reflected by the move from A to B in this diagram:
the extra demand by the government crowds out private consumer expenditure
via a price increase (see column 2 in the table). Higher output prices
lead to higher profits. producing extra demand for investment purposes in
the next period. t = 3. This extra demand (reflected by arrow 2) provides
a further impetus to prices and profits. In the subsequent period (t=4).
the increased stock of capital. at given employment. implies a higher
production capacity. moving the vertical supply curve to the right (arrow
4). As such. this pushes prices down. However. due to the high profits in
t = 3 and the consequently high investments in t = 4. the demand increase







Diagram 5.6 also contains the outward shift of the supply curve in the
event employment rises proportionately to the rise in the capital stock
(arrow 5). The latter applied in Table 3a.2. an expenditure increase as-
suming complementarity between the factors of production with capital as
the bottleneck for production.21 There. y l = k, whereas in the current
set of assumptions, lm = 0 and y = (l-~)k k. So, compared to the comple-
mentarity case, the fact that output prices in t = 4 (E) are larger than
those in t = 3 (e) can be attributed to the stickiness of labour supply:
if labour had been abundant, prices would have fallen (to F).
This procedure of higher output prices and higher profits and investment
is repeated in all reported periods. Since nominal net household income is
constant by definition, the ever increasing price level leads to a crow-
ding out of private consumption by investments. As stated in Section 2,
one way of stabilizing this process would be to change the investment
equation. To illustrate this point, Table 5a.9' is included, where beyond
t = 3 investments are kept constant in real terms. The table confirms the
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outcome of Appendix 5.2: the increase in capital in period 4 cet. par.
causes output prices to fall and profits to erode. With fixed investments,
the capital stock reaches its new long term value in period 8 and with it
the complete economy becomes stationary. Once more, for reasons of com-
parability, we stick to the investment equation used in Chapter 3.
The process of long run destabilization was found in all situations where
the 'supply model' applied. Only if the economy returned to "model = 1"
did the process became stable again.
We will illustrate these two statements with the help of a few other im-
pulses.
2. Decrease in the labour tax rate
Assumptions: no monetary sector, vertical supply curve, world-wide impulse
Firstly, a demand shock not found in public but in private consumption is
described in Table 5a.10. In that table the tax rate on household (labour)
income is decreased by 3 per cent leaving room for a demand increase. In
the impulse period the variable model still equals one: the extra produc-
tion is not high enough to result in a zero unemployment rate. But due to
the higher profits, extra demand for investment purposes in the subsequent
period makes 'model' switch to zero. From then onwards, the process des-
cribed above -of expanding capital stock, increasing profits and increa-
sing prices- is obtained.
3. Hiring extra civil servants
Assumptions: no monetary sector, vertical supply curve, world-wide impulse
Second, what happens if, starting in point A in Diagram 5.5 again, the
government decides to hire more extra labour, thereby restricting private
production capacity to below the initial 100? Again we manipulate civil
servants' salaries and government purchases to free the impulse from
'automatic demand-elements' .22 The results are listed in Table 5a.11.










In t = 2. the reduction in private employment (arrow 1) causes production
to go down: from point A to point B. The downward slope of the demand
curve makes prices go uP. thereby increasing realized profitability. Con-
sequently. in the next period demand for investment purposes increases.
constituting a further impetus to prices and profits. Again. the price
reducing effect of capital accumulation is outweighed by the price increa-
sing effect of extra investment demand. After a temporary reduction. both
private production capacity and prices exceed the levels they had without
the hiring of extra civil servants. See arrows 2 in Diagram 5.7.
4. A temporary decrease in the labour tax rate
Assumptions: no monetary sector. vertical supply curve. world-wide impulse
Now let us turn to a table dealing with an impulse that initially switches
the model into the supply branch and afterwards switches it back again
into the demand branch. to check if. as claimed. the tendency towards a
new equilibrium is restored.
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In Table 5a.12 a temporary reduction of 3% in the labour tax rate is re-
ported in periods 2 up to 5. i.e.• in period 6 the initial tariff of 24%
is reestablished. See bottom line of this table.
Periods 1 to 5 are identical to those in Table 5a.10 discussed above.
where in period 3 'model' gets the value zero. When in period 6 the ini-
tial tax rate is restored. consumer demand falls back, pushing output
prices down and unemployment up. 'Model' equals one again and losses are
incurred. As an inheritance from the past. in periods 6 up to 9. the
capital stock still grows.23 Output prices therefore drop further and
losses increase. But in period 10. when the stock of capital. due to the
losses mentioned. starts declining. prices are forced back up again and
losses are smaller. A comparison between periods 2 and 1000 indicates that
the model is stable again. In fact. the 'new' equilibrium equals the star-
ting position. illustrating that temporary shocks are. as usual, absorbed.
In'Section 2 of this chapter, we expressed the expectation that starting
in point A of Diagram 5.5 an overall wage impulse. except for a one time
price increase, would not influence the real sector in the economy. More-
over. if only wages in the private sector were to be enhanced, starting in
that same point A. we expected a new long run equilibrium since 'model'
would switch back to one. We will now verify these points.
5. Wage policy
Assumptions: no monetary sector. vertical supply curve. world-wide impulse
In Table 5a.13 all wages (including those in the public sector) are in-
creased by 10%. As expected. only the wage and price level are increased.
Nothing else happens.
In Table 5a.14. at the same time as the impulses are given to obtain point
A of Diagram 5.5. only wages in the market sector are increased by 10%.24
Starting in A (Diagram 5.5). the marginal cost curve responding to the
rise in wage costs rises by 10%. Nominal demand. however. does not meet
that rise: total civil servants' income was kept constant and the un-
employed were assumed to keep their original payments -in nominal terms-.
so the demand curve rises by less. As a consequence. the variable 'model'
in period two gets the value 1. The rise in output prices is less than the
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10% increase in wages, which leads to negative profits. At the same time,
since output is pushed back, with a constant capital stock, this holds a
forteriori for private employment, further curtailing consumer demand.
Next period's disinvestments lower production, employment and consumption
further. Prices and (negative) profits are also diminished.
In period 4 disinvestments shrink the available stock of capital, raising
output prices and mitigating losses. This pattern is repeated in the sub-
sequent periods.
A new long run equilibrium is found once output prices have gone up as
much as private wages have, which can only be established at a lower
output- and employment-volume. Total (real) household consumption is in
all periods smaller than without the wage rise. In the beginning this is
due to price increases. harming consumption by civil servants. Later on
this is established by the invoked unemployment when compared to starting
point A in Diagram 5.5.
Section 3.B Simulations if the model contains a monetary sector
This section can be very brief. Analogous to Chapter 3. we will only il-
lustrate that the combination of the present investment function with the
monetary sector given in Chapter 2 may result to didactically undesirable
and sometimes even perverse results.
Table 5b.1 shows that a contractionary monetary policy in the initial
situation of no profits or losses does not change YR' Hence, monetary
policy in this case does not have any impact on the real sector.
But a more fundamental reason for rejecting a possible combination of a
monetary sector with the real sector described above can be deduced from
Tables 5b.2 and 5b.3. In the latter, results of a contractionary budgetary
policy are shown. One of the effects is the emergence of losses invoking
net disinvestments.
One would expect that these disinvestments would be larger if a contrac-
tionary monetary policy is added. Table 5b.2 shows a opposite effect: from
period five onwards investments under a contractionary monetary regime are
larger.
The explanation of these 'strange' effects was given in the final section
of Chapter 3.
Like in Chapter 3 we conclude that combining the present real sector with
the monetary block would didactically be undesirable.
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Appendix 5.1. The impact of a larger capital stock on employment, output
prices and profits, if the supply curve slopes upward
Under the assumptions that nominal wage rates are fixed and that total net
household income (say D) is spent. the production block is likely to imply
a positive impact of a larger capital stock on employment. This paint is
proven as follows.
The demand curve.25 is rewritten as:
P D.y-1
Y
where D = (l-TL)(tPL+lgPLcs+luPLu) 26
so, dD (l-TL)(PLdl+PLudlu)
(1)
and. since dlm = -dtu'
dO (2)












If in (1)' equation (2) is substituted together with
dy (1)' ,
which follows from the production function, equalling (1)' and (3)'
results in
(4)
If in (4) account is taken of 1~1-~ y or l~k-~ -1yk
1 -1
j{Y (4) ,
k yand if both sides are multiplied by 1 1-~' the following expression




1 ~ 1 (5)
k D ...L i\ (I-TL) (PL-PLu)+ TI=i3J11-~ ~
where in terms of the main text, D (I-TL) (YL+TRF) and 1 = 1m'
Exceptional cases left aside, both numerator and denominator are positive
in the game.27 As a result, in general an increase in the capital stock
causes an increase in employment.
The final term in the denominator refers to the impact on employment of
the job creation itself: if unemployed are paid less than the private wage
rate, i.e., PL > PLu' their extra expenditures once they are employed
shift the demand curve to the right, which enhances the job creating ef-
fect of the capital stock enlargement. In equation (5), this effect causes
the denominator to fall, and as a result 11k to rise.
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If (5) (rewritten as ~) is substituted into (3)', we get
PL 1- -2]+ /3 (,a-1),t f3J..P die (6)
where kP-1,t-f3= y-1 and ,t1-f3kf3-2
in [ ] in (6) is summarized as [...]
~ y-1 (see above), hence, if the term
dP PL Q:& ([ ... ] - -k,t)dk
y f3 y
which is negative if [ ...] < ,tk
dP
< 0 if28that is: ydk
PL D D PL 1-TL (i\-PLu)1< lL +- 1-f3P 1-f3 f3
D > (1-TL)(PL-PLu)or :t;;; (8)
In other words, an expansion of the capital stock always leads to falling
output prices and cet. par. to an erosion of profits thereby mitigating
the incentive for a further expansion of the capital stock and paving the
way for the model to reach new stationary equilibrium.
More formally, the change in profits as a consequence of the increase in
the capital stock is calculated as
dYR dY dYL d(bPyk)
dkdledk~ P
dy ( k) dPy P d,t P
y dk + y-[, dk - L die - [,. y (9)
In (9), the first term on the right hand side follows from (1)", the
second from (3)' and the third from (5). If account is taken of (4)'. this
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leads to
dYR y d,t y y-6.k PL d,t
di{"" Pyf31 dk + Py(1-f3) k + -y- Fi" (1-f3) dk +
P
+ y-6k ....!: (f3-1) ~k_ P d,t c Py f3 L dk - o· y
or, after multiplying by I'
(P y y-6.k PL _ P ) ~ +yf31+ -y- (1-,9) f3 L.
k
(10)
In (10) ,t< 1 (see Appendix 5.1, equation 5).
k
As a consequence, dYR/dk < 0, as long as f3 is in the neighbourhood of the
share of the wage bill in total sales,29 and as long as y - ,t- k. Both
conditions hold in the initial equilibrium, for example.
A~2endix ~.2. The im2act of a larger ca2ital stock on out2ut ~rices and
2rofits, if the SU22ly curve is vertical
In the "supply-branch", per definition d,tm= o. With given wages, this
implies that dYL, as well as d( (1-TL) (YL+TRF» are zero.
Moreover, it implies that ,tmin the supply curve is replaced by ,tm.
So, the demand curve reads as
(1) P - -1 30 where D (1-TL) (YL+TRF)y Dy
The supply curve reads as
(2) y lf3 k1-f3m
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From (1): dPy - -2-Dy dy
where dy, following (2), can be replaced by





..JL -(l-,a) < 0
k
(4)
The impact on profits follows from
dYR d{Y -YL-&kPy)
dk = dk (5)
In (5), with a price elasticity of one, dY 0, in line with (1).31
Hence,
dP
-&(P +k ..---X)y dk
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NOTES (Chapter 5)
1 If capital was the bottleneck for production.
2 Since ~O is constant and set at 1, we will leave out ~O in the descrip-
tion here. Nevertheless, the game leader is allowed to change ~O.
3 R.C. Marston, 'Real and Monetary Disturbances in an Exchange Rate
Union', NBER Working Paper Series, nr. 705, June 1981. The marginal
cost curve described by (5.4)' is upward sloping and therefore always
situated above the average (variable) cost curve. Consequently, it can
for the full extent be regarded as the supply curve.
With ~ at 0.8 (so larger than 0.5) P is a degressively increasing
function of y. This is in compliance ~ith a positive value of the third
derivative of y with regard to 1 in (5.1). For convenience the supply
curve is drawn as a straight lin~.
4 From now on, we will talk of the supply curve as situated in a diagram
with P on the vertical axis and y on the horizontal, both in absolute
as oppo~ed to relative terms.





6 As stated in Chapter 2 (see eq. 2.14), the game leader has a choice
between an immediate and a lagged impact of productivity. The simul-
taneity of the solution process is strongly enhanced if he chooses an
immediate impact here: demand is determined by wages; demand and supply
determine volumes, and thereby labour productivity, which determines
wages again. Moreover, wages are a shift parameter in the supply curve.
As a consequence, it would be advisable to choose a lagged impact here,
also since reduction of this simultaneity has a didactical advantage.
Finally, it would resemble (Dutch) practice at this point: wages are
negotiated on the basis of past labour productivity growth. The reader
is reminded, that throughout Chapters 3 to 6 nominal wages are assumed
constant, unless otherwise indicated.
~ since a demand curve always intersects both with Y
Ys Ymax
, where only one point of intersection is relevant. See Chapter 3.
7 In Diagram 5.2, just like in previous chapters, for convenience the
demand curve is drawn as a linear negatively sloped curve. In fact, it
is not linear since its main component, consumer demand, is structured
as c = yL.P-1. The supply curve is also not linear as can be read fromequation (5)1).
8 The fall in consumption would again be larger if wages were a function
of (decreased) labour productivity in comparison to the situation
without productivity determined wages as discussed in the text.
9 In that appendix it is assumed that all countries act simultaneously.
If only country one would act, for example, the fall in its prices
caused by its higher capital stock, could lead to higher exports so a
170
further outward shift of the demand
simulations below, this does not lead to
present game.
curve. As illustrated by the
stability problems in the
10 This is more easily seen if (5.4)' is rewritten as:
PY ~ ~ + P~ s L (5.4)..
11 Remember that salaries of civil servants as well as unemployment bene-
fits are linked to the wage in the private sector.
12 This problem was not serious enough, however, to block the computer in
calculating the results of any of the submitted impulses all of which
were 1000 periods long.
One way to prevent destabilization is to replace the autonomous com-
ponent in the investment equation (bk) by a fixed number (20). If so,
investments do not rise since the stock of capital is high, that is,
since investments used to be high. This way one reduces the outward
shift of the demand curve. An alternative way, illustrated below, would
be to directly fix real investments. Since changing the assumed in-
vestment behaviour would reduce comparability with the other chapters,
we stick to the original investment equation.
13 The latter constitutes a demand increase abroad, giving rise to effects
as described in Table 5a.3 above. Note that a (nominal) household
income increase of 10%, as described here, has a far greater impact on
demand than a 10% increase in government purchases. (Initially net
household income equals 76, whereas the latter equals 4.) This explains
why even the effects leaked away here can still have the large impact
described in the current table: these effects perceived abroad are
larger than those in Table 5a.2, e.g. Again, in the game players are
not allowed to increase wages by such a high amount as 10%.
14 As stated, the effects on the outside world are, qualitatively
speaking, to a large extent similar to the ones that will be perceived
by a country unilaterally increasing its government expenditures. See
Table 5a.3.
15 To illustrate the respective price movements (seemingly identical in
the short run due to rounding), the variable 'INF' is included in the
table, indicating the relative price movements. INF(G) refers to those
with only an expenditure increase.
16 Albeit that the latter is enhanced in the short run, due to extra
demand for investment purposes.
17 That is an increase of t by 3.75/22 = 17.04545%.
g
18 First, since civil servants are paid more than the unemployed, total
transfer payments would go up, increasing private consumer demand. To
compensate, the new salary for those servants is lowered, to keep
transfers at 20. That is: since t x PLCS = 20 while t is 25.75 now,PLCS becomes 20/25.75 = 0.7767 (~ounded) instead of 0~8, or a decreasein government salaries of 2,9126% (rounded).
171
Second, 3.75 extra civil servants means an automatic increase in
material government expenditures of 0.1 x 3.75 = 0.375. To keep public
spending at its former level, g is reduced by 0.375/4 = 9.375%.
19 Welfare stays at its new level since the beneficial effects of zero
unemployment (AW = +0.25), zero inflation (AW = +0.25) and a balanced
government account (AW = +0.25) is exactly outweighed by the unbenefi-
cial effect of a balance of payments unequal to +4 (AW = -0.75). In
Table 5a.1, the initial situation in the game, welfare drops by 0.25 a
year.
20 Technically, this is done by leaving out the 9.375% decrease in g in-
cluded in Table 5a.8.
21 If the relative magnitudes of the respective impulses are taken into
account, price and investment developments in periods 2 and 3 are iden-
tical in Tables 3a.2 and 5a.9.
22 The respective impulses here are: Alg
PLCS = -7.4074% rounded and g = -12.5%.
5 (so 19 22.7272% rounded),
23 In those periods as a consequence of the violation of the cet. par.
clause, the positive relation between capital stock and employment as
found in Appendix 5.1 is blurred.
24 The impulses given here are calculated as follows. Since ATRF =
initially lu = 0, 19' PLCS = 20, where 19 = 25.75. Since
«1+PL)PLCS )(1+PLCS), with PL = 0.1, this implies 25.75 x-1




25 We concentrate on private consumer demand here, as real government
expenditures were assumed to be exogenous. We refrain here from pos-
sibly changing investments.
26 For convenience we write lm as lm or as 1 in this appendix.
27 Moreover, 1 < 1 as will be shown below (conditions (7) and (8)).
k
28 We assume here that the denominator of (5) is indeed positive.
29 If so, ~Py = PL and (1-~)Py bPy'
30 See Appendix 5.1: given g = g and i i.
31 If the other spending categories, investments and government purchases,
are constant in nominal terms.
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Chapter 6 Substitutable £actors of production, investments determined by
the 'optimal' stock of capital
Chapter 6 contains:
Section 1. Introduction: the investment block
Section 2. The global patterns of adjustment / some simulations
Section 1. Introduction: the investment block
Apart from the section on investments, the model used in the current chap-
ter is identical to the one presented in Chapter 5. The starting point for
determination of the investment volume is the one traditionally used if
possibilities of substitution between factors of production are assumed.
Examples are found in Kopcke, Jorgenson, Claassen and Scotland.1 All
start from the same proposition: investments, partly or completely, close
the gap between the actual and the 'optimal' stock of capital, where
'optimal' is defined as the stock minimizing production costs.
k
Diagram 6.1
This procedure can be illustrated by use of Diagram 6.1. In that diagram
an isoquant is drawn that can be derived from the production function.
Minimization of production costs is found at a capital stock DB given the
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ratio of the (expected) price of labour over the (expected) price of capi-
tal equal to tg ~. If the actual capital stock is resembled by OA, in-
vestments equal (a part of) the resulting gap AB.
How should the optimal capital stock be determined? Obviously it does not
only depend on relative factor prices, but also on output.
A problem is raised here by Borch when discussing Jorgenson's 1963 contri-
bution (same reference) with regard to the determination of the optimal
capital stock. He states (p.273) that it is correct to determine output
and employment for a given stock of capital on the short run, but that it
would be suboptimal to subsequently let actual output determine the
desired capital stock. This point is developed further by Gould and Waud2
who state that "The use of actual output to determine the optimal capital
stock is appropriate only in comparative static equilibrium situations or
when capital can be acquired without adjustment costs or other con-
straints" (p.34) "One way around these problems is to derive a target or
desired capital stock which depends only on exogenous quantities that are
unaffected by the firm's decisions or adjustment process"{p.35). On the
basis of a demand function and the production function, they develop an
equation for the desired capital stock depending on factors exogenous to
the investor. But they argue (footnote 9, p.36) that this "equation ... is
strictly correct in a dynamic context only when the exogenous variables
are expected to remain constant for some (presumably fairly long) period
of time. The investment process then represents an adjustment to the long-
run (stationary) equilibrium If this is not the case (i.e., if the
exogenous variables are expected to change substantially over time), then
a much more complicated model ...{for the).•. definition of the desired
capital stock ...is need{ed)". In other words, as in the SIER Game such a
stationary situation in the "exogenous" variables is not obtained, their
equation is not suitable for our model. Another (set of) equation{s) is
needed, satisfying the same requirement formulated by Gould and Waud, that
only factors exogenous to the investment decision should determine the
desired stock of capital. As present investment decisions do not lead to
changes in the capital stock earlier than two periods later, in the SIER
Game expected output and expected product and factor prices (beside other
items) determine the desired stock of capital.
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*We will first turn to this starting point (determination of k and with it
of the gap). Subsequently. we will discuss two kinds of investment beha-
viour. one following the traditional path described above. and one alter-
native investment function based on optimizing rather than maximizing
behaviour.
Determination of the 'gap'
*The cost minimizing stock of capital. k • is found where the ratio of the
expected price of capital to that of labour equals the ratio of their
respective marginal productivities3:
[( ]e [ Je = [pp~]e&~ / ~
Or. since the production function implies as partial derivatives
the production cost minimizing technique (*) is found where
Combined with the expected output level ye (discussed below) and with the
production function. this leads to
In (6.1). expected output. yeo is calculated as the minimum of expected
production capacity on the one hand (if labour is expected to be short).
and expected production with unlimited labour supply. on the other. The
latter is determined by expectations for two years ahead with regard to
output prices (P;). labour costs (P~). and the capital stock.
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The expected macro-economic capital stock. ke• equals the present one
minus the machines that will have become obsolete plus this period's in-
vestments (i) and next year's investments (it+1). The latter component
equals the presently planned investments (iO)' At this point it should be
remembered. however. that the expected capital stock is needed to deter-
mine expected output in order to get this period's investment decision.
This would imply the circle that Gould and Waud criticized (investment
plans determine themselves). As in Chapter 4. to break this circle we
postulate that macro-economic investments expected for next year( i.e.,
this period's investment decisions) equal actual (current) investments
corrected for the growth in real final demand.
Once "expected output with ample labour supply" (ye) is known. it is
s
compared with the expected production capacity. cape. determined by ex-
pected labour supply (t e). expected government demand for labour (t e)s g
and expected capital stock (ke).
The minimum of ye and cape equals expecteds





over ye equals expected output
if
FA' = weighted rate of growth in (c+g+x) during periods t - e ..... t and
e(superscript) = expected value in period t + 2
then
(6.2)




where ye is the minimum of y: and cape (6.7)
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Given expected prices of factors of production5, the set (6.1) (6.7)
* *suffices to calculate k . The 'gap' equals the difference between k and
the stock of capital that would result if no net investments were planned
(k~+l)' That is, gap = k* - (k - it-a + it).6
Determination of planned investments
Traditionally, one of the following two investment behaviours is assumed:
- either investments equal the complete gap AB (in Diagram 6.1). In that
case, apart from a possible decision and installation lag, k is con-
tinuously at its 'optimum', and, most elegantly, the macro-economic
production function as described in Chapter 5 reflects, through its
coefficients, the constant distribution of income;
- or investments are an exogenous fraction of AB7, gradually shifting the
actual capital stock to its 'optimal' size. Now, only in the longer run,
that is, as soon as k equals OB (ceteris paribus), is the previous dis-
tribution of income restored.
Several objections can be raised against these two alternatives. Entrepre-
neurs are neither certain of relative factor prices nor of expected sales.
If they were for 100% certain of both expected prices and output, OB would
indeed result in cost minimization (assuming adjustment costs are absent)
and, given sales, in profit maximization. If so, apart from possible tech-
nical barriers (see Jorgenson), the second alternative would not make much
sense: why should the gap AB only partly be filled if expectations are no
less than 100% certain predictions?
The first alternative does not seem too realistic, either. As we will see
below, the cost minimizing capital stock can vary sharply over time. Imme-
diate and full adaptations of the investment volume to the resulting
'gaps' would result in drastic empirically implausible changes in invest-
ments.
Since the major purpose of the game is first of all to illustrate and
explain standard macro-economic theories and concepts, the second alter-
native is nevertheless included in the game as an option for the game
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leader. For the same reason. the simulations to be discussed in this chap-
ter assume this investment behaviour. We prefer. however. the other option
available in the game for the game leader. stressing the role of uncer-
tainty in the (dis)investment decision. As this latter option can be
regarded as an extension of standard economic theory. it will be illustra-
ted in Chapter 7. Its underlying theoretical considerations will be
developed in the remainder of this section.
An alternative investment function
The development of this alternative investment behaviour can be pursued in
at least two ways. The first way would be to assume that investments are
undertaken up to the point where expected net marginal profitability of
investments equals a required exogenous minimum (rho).
This procedure would be facilitated by the convex nature of the isoquant:
moving from A in the direction of B in Diagram 6.1 results in"a gradually
decreasing expected reduction of costs.8 In other words. given sales. the
marginal profitability of investments declines and entrepreneurs invest up
to the point where that profitability (net cost reduction as a ratio of
investment costs) becomes smaller than rho.
If we were to choose this solution, two problems would arise. namely.
a. how big is the minimum required marginal net rate of return (rho)?9
And, related to this:
b. as stated above, the cost minimizing capital stock can vary substan-
tially over time, producing widely fluctuating 'gaps'. To allow for
some investments. even if this gap is relatively small. rho should not
be too modest. This same (exogenous) rho, however. would facilitate
vast investments as soon as the gap becomes large. This has as a con-
crete drawback that in a model like ours where one product per country
is manufactured, investments would tend to playa major role in the
economy as a demand factor, which conflicts with global empirical ob-
servations.
As an alternative, stressing the uncertain nature of expectations, we can
choose to endogeneize rho by using an amended version of the so-called
"non-Euclidic profit theory" as found in HartOg.10 In this theory the
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optimal size of the firm (i.e., the optimal capital stock) is established
via a utility-approach. Utility is here assumed to be an increasing
function of expected profits and (given risk aversion) a decreasing
function of the amount of capital involved.11 In this framework, an entre-
preneur only strives for maximization of expected profits if uncertainty
does not exist or is not one of the determinants of his utility level. In
more normal circumstances, however, he optimizes as opposed to maximizes
expected profits.
Amended for our problem, we assume that entrepreneurs are "conservative"
in the sense that deviation of the capital stock from its present level
yields disutility. This disutility grows more than proportionately with
the deviation concerned. The disutility could also be based on the exis-
tence of financial or social adjustment costs progressively connected to
changes in k ,
On the other hand, utility grows with expected profits but less than pro-
portionately.
In concrete terms, we assume the following utility-function:
(6.8)
ewhere YR represents the level of
tain level of the capital stock,
(6.8) has as properties: ....£!
6yeR
expected profits associated with a
12and C1, C2 and C3 are constants.
6U2 6U 6U2> 0, 2:e < 0, 61dkl < 0 and T.-:-;-
b y: 6 Idkl
cer-
< 0
In other words, extra (expected) profits are valued positive, but a second
increase in these profits increases utility less than proportionally; a
deviation from the actual capital stock is valued negative, and a second
(further) deviation deminishes utility more than proportionally.
Combined with the decreasing marginal productivity feature embodied in the
Cobb-Douglas production function referred to above, the hypothesis can be
summarized as in Diagram 6.2.
In this diagram, the curve 'd(U) = 0' resembles combinations of net (dis)-
investments and expected profits that yield the same level of utility. OC
indicates the estimated 'gap' (in absolute terms) between actual and cost
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minimizing capital stock. If investments fully close this gap (implying
Idkl = OC), the expected increase in profits equals DC. Investment hypo-
theses based on profit maximization would therefore lead to OC as net
investments.
Since in our framework, however, the investor dislikes deviations from the
actual number of machines (0), he calculates the increase in his utility
level for every marginal increase in investments.13 Once his utility
falls, the process halts and total net investments are known (here OE). In
other words. net investments are determined by the point where the in-
crease in utility (by virtue of higher expected profits) is outweighed by
the decrease in utility (due to higher net (dis)investments).
If the extra utility caused by the increase in expected profits is lower
than the disutility of one unit of investment (i.e.• 0.005 x gap. see
below). the gap will. ceteris paribus. never be closed and the initial
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Diagram 6.2
The starting level of utility as indicated by (6.8) is now calculated on
the basis of actual net profits and with initially Idkl equal to zero. For
each marginal unit of investment. say 15 the expected reduction inai •
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production costs is calculated as the expected reduction in labour costs
minus the expected increase in capital costs (both in net terms).
The first part, expected reduction in labour costs, follows from the pro-
duction function in combination with ye (determined by 6.7): for each
stock of capital the need for labour (i.e., number of workers) equals:
That is, for each "step" i (extra marginal investment) the expected reduc-
tion in labour costs equals (with i = 1...200 and aO = 0)
For example, if i=49, the factor above (A) in brackets equals
k~+1 + 0.48 gap, and the one above (B) equals k~+1 + 0.49 gap. As the
latter capital stock exceeds the former, required labour is less and the
outcome of (6.9) is pOSitive.
The second part, the increase in expected costs of capital, equals
ePk x r a.b=O 0
i
(6.10)
Total expected reduction in production costs equals
(6.9) - (6.10) > 0
For each step. the increase in utility is calculated along the lines pro-
vided by (6.8). Step j which does not increase this level is left out when





Finally, the lag of one period between planned and actual purchase of
investment goods leads to
i (6.13)
for gross investments, i.
This alternative investment sector has the following properties.
- The decrease in expected production costs caused by one unit of invest-
*ments declines when k~+l approaches k (i.e., when !gap! declines). This
implies a positive relationship between !gap! and iO. In other words,
net (dis}investments are larger if the cost minimizing capital stock is
farther remote from the actual stock of capital.
- It implies the pleasant feature that of a small !gap! a larger propor-
tion is 'closed' by net (dis}investments.18
It entails a plausible asymmetry: a firm incurring losses (or modest
profits) will be more anxious to reach the cost minimizing stock of
capital than a firm making (higher) profits. That is why we will label
equation (6.8) 'the asymmetric investment function'.
As stated above, however, these features will not be illustrated and their
consequences will not be discussed before Chapter 7, Section 3B.
For the remainder of the present chapter, we restrict ourselves to more
traditional, symmetrical, investment assumptions, namely, the one where
net investments equal an exogenous part (here set at 1/4) of the gap bet-
ween the stock of capital that is expected to minimize production costs
*(k ) and the one expected if no net investments would be undertaken.
What will be the implications for the patterns of adjustment if we pos-
tulate this investment function?
See next section, Section 2.
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Section 2. The global patterns of adjustment I some simulations
In this section the following impulses will be described:
a. increase in government expenditures;
b. increase in wage rate;
c. monetary policy;
d. supply-side policy.
These impulses are analyzed assuming a non-vertical supply curve.
Moreover, in Subsection e we will briefly discuss the vertical branch of
the supply curve.
a. Increase in government expenditures;
Assumption: no monetary sector
If in the initial starting position as reflected by Table 6a.1 demand
rises in a model not explicitly containing a monetary sector, it is known
from Chapter 5 that this will immediately be followed by an increase both
in output and in the output price level. As a consequence, expected nomi-
nal demand also increases, causing a rise both in expected supply and in
the expected output price level. The former (increase in ye) implies an
outward shift of the isoquant, pushing k* up. At given ye, this increase
*in k is mitigated by the latter (increase in pel as an increase in the
y
expected price level implies an increase of the expected rental price of
capital. As the 'gap' is positive, net investments will occur.
The capacity effect of those investments will first of all shift the ex-
pected supply curve to the right as soon as the expected macro-economic
stock of capital starts to grow, which presses expected output prices
*down. This reduces k and hence narrows the 'gap', The 'gap' also shrinks
*as a result of the net investments themselves. As soon as k falls below
the expected stock of capital, the 'gap' turns negative and the above
reasoning is reversed.
A long run equilibrium is established where actual and optimal stocks of
capital coincide and, consequently, net investments are zero. Since by
definition the 'optimal capital stock' equals the cost minimizing one, the
long run equilibrium will as in Chapter 5 be characterized by a labour
coefficient and a capital coefficient that have returned to their initial
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levels.19 Just as in that chapter, supply will adjust to increased demand
at a price level determined by equation (5.7). See Tables 6a.2 with all
countries increasing government purchases by 10%, and 6a.3 where only
country one acts in this respect under a system of fixed exchange rates.
In the latter table, the outside world receives part of the impulse as
households in country one spend part of their increased income in those
countries. If exchange rates float, this result is no longer obtained: see
Table 6a.3' displaying the insulation feature of the model.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, fixed exchange rates
If the model does entail a monetary block, the rate of interest is ex-
pected to rise initially, if the impulse on demand is caused by an in-
crease in government purchases, but only to a mild extent if compared to
the complementarity case: the expansion in the government deficit is mode-
rated by an immediate fall in the rate of unemployment and higher labour
tax receipts. (Compare Tables 6b.2 and 6b.3 to Tables 4b.2 and 4b.3,
respectively.) The initial rise in the rate of interest will be followed
by a further rise as soon as investments start to grow.
With a higher rate of interest, the optimal capital stock falls. As a
result it will cet. par. take more time for supply to adjust to increased
demand. As in Chapter 4, however, these movements in the rate of interest
do not change the outcomes of the adjustment process.
Meanwhile, as Table 6b.2 illustrates, although net investments equal only
*25% of the 'gap', due to the relatively large changes in k and thus in
investments, still the positive relation between (actual) stock of capital
and employment is blurred. This relation was established in Appendix 5.1
under the assumption that non-consumer demand does not change. In period 5
in Table 6b.2, for example, k rises but 1m falls. The latter is explained
by the drop in demand for investment purposes.
Moreover, the resulting higher rate of unemployment in that period causes
the government deficit to grow (more social security benefits, lower
labour tax revenue). This delays the fall in interest rates until the
period where disinvestments are actually carried out.
Comparison of Tables 4a.2 and 4a.3 with 6a.2 and 6a.3, and of Tables 4b.2
and 4b.3 with 6b.2 and 6b.3 shows, that the differences between those
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tables are found in the short run and not in the long run. In other words,
the different investment and production functions do alter the way to, but
not the location of the new point of equilibrium if the impulse concerns a
government expenditure increase.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, flexible exchange rates
This conclusion also holds if flexible rates of exchange are assumed. Also
here we find that freely floating exchange rates insulate the economy as
long as no international mobility of capital is assumed. Table 6b.3' shows
the outcomes for the intervening country to be identical to the situation
where nothing of the impulse "leaked away" (as in Table 6b.2).
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, fixed exchange rates
Even the problems with the stability of the model if international mobili-
ty of capital is included are similar to those found in Chapter 4. A coun-
try increasing its governm.entdeficit attracts foreign capital financing
part of that deficit. The service on this extra debt (interest payments)
go in part to other countries and is taxed in those other countries. The
intervening country thus subsidizes the governments of the other coun-
tries. See Table 6c.1 where, assuming fixed exchange rates, country one
embarks upon extra government purchases. By period 200 the government
deficit in that country is 10 times higher than in the other countries,
with obvious consequences for the interest rate differentials and the
levels of investment activity.
Remedies for these long term problems and a more detailed analysis of the
short term and medium term impacts of the intervention were presented in
Chapter 4. Here, as a main point it suffices to state that in the impulse
period, as could be expected, the interest rate in the home country does
not rise as much as in the situation of no capital mobility (compare Table
*6b.3). As a result, k is now higher and more net investments are under-
taken. In the first periods the process of adaptation much resembles the
one found in Table 6b.3. The greater investment activity causes the ex-
pected capital stock to grow and thus expected output prices to fall.
reducing the incentive to invest. But the difference emerges when after
period 10 the rate of interest does not fall as it did without capital
mobility. As indicated above, the reason lies in the strongly growing
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deficit on the government account. As a result, the expected price of
capital grows. This growth is reinforced as, due to the disinvestments,
expected output falls, forcing expected output prices up. Whereas by
period 200 the home country "ends up" with increasing government deficits,
rising interest rates, increasing divestments, a shrinking stock of capi-
tal, falling production and an increasing rate of unemployment, in the
outside world the opposite phenomena can be observed. And by no means can
this period be labelled "the end", as will be remembered from Chapter 4.
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, flexible exchange rates
Alternatively, a system of floating rates of exchange could be adhered to.
See Table 6c.1' .20 An interesting difference between this table and the
one discussed above lies in the shorter run. As usual. the expansion of
the home government deficit in the impulse period causes the interest rate
to rise. but with an identical impulse now more than in Table 6c.1. The
rising interest rate calls for an appreciation of the home currency, which
in turn harms the export position and with it total output. As a result
unemployment will fall by less, causing the shortage on the government
account to rise more steeply. So in the short run. the system of flexible
exchange rates causes the government deficit (and with it the rate of
interest) to rise faster. Meanwhile. the fiscal expansion causes the ex-
change rate to appreciate on the short run.
As a result of the higher rate of interest, but especially as a conse-
quence of the lower rate of growth in final demand (determining the one
expected in investments and thus the expected macro-economic stock of
*capital). k falls (relative to 6c.1).
As in Table 4c.7. after a few periods (in the table in period 5). the home
currency starts to depreciate. One major reason is that the previous
surpluses on the capital account result in an increasing deficit on the
debt service account. A few periods later. this depreciation invokes ex-
inflow. A similar pattern
This prevents the rate of
with fixed exchange rates
(Table 6c.l above). As a result. neither the optimal stock of capital or
total production will fall as it did in the previous table. But once more.
period 200 cannot be regarded as the long run outcome.
pected depreciations. mitigating the capital
evolves in the monetary sphere as in Table 4c.7.
interest from rising continuously as it did
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b. Increase in wages.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, world-wide impulse
A world-wide increase in wages will be neutral with regard to the
'optimal' capital stock. This is due to the fact that the expected output
price increase equals the increase in expected labour costs - analogous to
Py = PL both in the previous and in the present chapter. This has two
effects.
First, expected output in real terms does not change.
Second, since the expected rental price of capital, given zero interest
rates, moves proportionately with the expected output price level, the
ratio between the expected factor prices does not change either.
Since both effects dictate the cost minimizing capital stock to stay at
the original level, real net investments will not occur. Because, as shown
in Chapter 5, the other variables will not change either, Table 6a.4 il-
lustrates that no impact at all is to be expected from this impulse, ex-
cept for a one time price increase.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impulse, flexible exchange
rates
The same conclusion holds for a unilateral wage impulse with flexible
exchange rates and no monetary sector. This impulse, as seen before, leads
to a production price increase in the home country equal to the deprecia-
tion. Consequently, consumers will not shift from home products to im-
ported goods, nor vice versa. All prices (of goods and factors) will move
proportionately. This also holds for expected prices. Therefore no net
(dis)investments can be expected here, which is confirmed by inspection of
Table 6a.6.
Assumptions: no monetary sector, unilateral impUlse, fixed exchange rates
With fixed exchange rates, however, the deteriorated competitive position
leads to a decline in the demand for goods produced by country one. See
Table 6a.5. As a consequence, just as the rise in the actual output price
level falls short of the rise in marginal production costs (Py< PL), the
expected output price rise (caused by higher nominal demand) and with it
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the expected price of capital will be lower than the expected labour price
increase (P;< P~).As such, this would at given output increase the
'optimal' capital stock. But expected output will for the same reason
fall. As shown in Appendix 6.1, the second effect outweighs the first,
pushing the optimal stock of capital down. In the impulse period this
effect is reinforced by a drop in the expected capital stock, due to a
drop in real final (export) demand. The latter causes expected investments
to fall with it, pressing the expected stock of capital down.
A negative gap results, producing net disinvestments. In the subsequent
*periods two opposite effects on k can be expected: the divestments in the
impulse period will cause a drop in the expected capital stock (see equa-
*tion 6A.2) and as such a fall in k But at the same time, the capacity
*effect of the disinvestments will force the ratio P;/P~ up, pushing k up
again. For the model to reach a new equilibrium, the second effect should
after some time outweigh the first, reversing the trend from divestments
to net investments.
In the long run equilibrium condition (5.7) holds again with output prices
that have gone up by the impulse percentage. Volumes will equal those
found in the new equilibrium in Table 5a.5. Only the path to this new
equilibrium diverges. Abroad, the effects boil down to the effects of a
demand impulse. this time financed in the home country.
Assumptions: monetary sector, world-wide impulse
If a monetary sector is included, however, the impacts are different.
As illustrated in Table 6b.4, a world-wide increase in wages will no
longer be neutral to investments. The main reason is that prices expected
for period t+1 (the period where investment plans are carried out) do not
rise as much as output prices and labour costs expected for t+2. As
neither pe/p~ nor ke deviate from their starting levels, the same will be
y e *true of y. But the other determinant of k , expected relative factor
e e eprices, does change: Pk (depending on P ) rises by less than PL' AsYt+1
labour is expected to be the relatively more expensive production factor,
in their strive for cost reduction, entrepreneurs will deCide to expand
*their capital stock. The rise in the optimal stock of capital (k ) will be
attenuated by the increase in the rate of interest attributable to the
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higher government deficit. The latter is caused by the increased salaries
of civil servants and social welfare benefits.
Together with the 'automatic' drop in nominal expected demand, the conse-
quent increase in ye will in the subsequent periods force expected output
prices down which, in turn. will temper the expectations with regard to
*output again. This leads to a decline in k . At the same time the actual
*capital stock starts to rise. This narrows the 'gap' between k and the
expected capital stock. As soon as that gap turns negative, the process of
investments is replaced by a process of divestments.
In the long run, the overall wage impulse is neutral with regard to all
real variables. The same result was (immediately) reached without monetary
block (Table 6a.4). The exception regards profits. In the long run they
reach a value of 1 (rounded), an inheritance from period 2. where sales.
labour costs and depreciation charges all rise by 10% but net interest
paid is unaffected.
Assumptions: monetary sector. no ICM. unilateral impulse. fixed exchange
rates
If under a system of fixed exchange rates but no international mobility of
capital only one country faces an upward shift in the wage rate, with a
*monetary sector it will take more time before the downturn in k is (part-
ly) reversed if compared to the description above pertaining to the econo-
my without such an explicit monetary block. This delay is caused by the
upward movement in the rate of interest invoked by the enlarged government
deficit. The higher interest rate will on the one hand raise the expected
*price of capital and thus lower k . On the other hand. the enlarged defi-
cit on the government account is now financed (for 50%) at a higher rate
of interest. increasing future interest obligations by that government. a
consequently higher deficit , etc. This destabilizing element (over time
partly or completely offset by the smaller supply of bonds by firms).
together with the one given above without a monetary block. should be
outweighed by the stabilizing one (lower expected real labour costs) for
the model to reach a stationary equilibrium again. Inspection of Table
6b.5 teaches us that ultimately this equilibrium will indeed be reached.
It is hard to compare its numerical outcomes to the ones in Table 6a.5.
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especially since in the first the period of reference on which expecta-
tions are based (as far as they are of a extrapolative nature) is twice as
long. As a result a 10% shock in wages, for example, influences expected
values less dramatically than if this period is shorter. So, the drop in
expected output (and with it in the optimal capital stock) is lower in
Table 6b.5 than it is in Table 6a.5. In both tables, however, prices of
goods and production factors all end up 10% higher in the home country
(and are restored abroad), and the initial capital/labour ratio is res-
tored. Moreover, in both tables the new equilibrium is characterized by
lower output and employment at home and increased output and employment
abroad. As stated before, a wage impulse in country one functions as a
demand impulse for the other countries.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, unilateral impulse, flexible ex-
change rates
If mobility of capital is still not assumed, the system of flexible ex-
change rates still ensures insulation if wage rates fluctuate.
As a result, the table concerned if no explicit monetary sector is inclu-
ded (Table 6a.6) was identical for the home country to the one where wages
were manipulated in all countries (6a.4). If a monetary sector is inclu-
ded, the same holds: for the home country the results of Table 6b.5' equal
those in 6b.4. In both instances (Table 6a.6 and Table 6b.5', respective-
ly) the only impact on the outside world pertains to the overall price
level. This goes up as a result of higher import prices.
Meanwhile, the exchange rate of the home country 'overshoots' its long run
value after the impulse period if a monetary sector is included. The
reason lies in the non-neutrality of an (overall) wage impulse under these
circumstances. As a result of increased investments, household income
rises with a consequent influence on import demand. This leads to a depre-
ciation of the currency. As soon as 'the gap' is narrowed, investments
fall and with it the demand for imports by families and the rate of ex-
change. Another factor influencing the exchange rate is the price level in
the home country influenced by changes in the capital stock (among other
items) .
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Assumptions: monetary sector. leM. unilateral impulse. fixed exchange
rates
The picture drawn above changes drastically. if international mobility of
capital is assumed.
For the case of fixed exchange rates the outcomes presented in Table 6c.2
should be compared to those in Table 6b.5. In the beginning the differen-
ces are of a gradual nature. As capital is now mobile. the home interest
rate rises less than it used to do. As a result. with an equal expected
output price for t+l and for t+2. the expected price of capital rises
*less. dampening the drop in k • which causes disinvestments to fall as
well.21 The important difference with the above tables. however. lies in
the longer run. where as usual the country enlarging its government defi-
cit is faced with a deficit running out of hand. (The reasons for this
phenomenon and the way to remedy this instability were given in Chapter 4
and repeated above).
As in Table 6c.1 this leads to strongly rising interest rates in the home
country and minimal interest rates abroad. The impacts on the respective
optimal stocks of capital are obvious.
Assumptions: monetary sector. lCM. unilateral impulse. flexible exchange
rates
These results can be compared to the ones regarding the same impulse. also
assuming international mobility of capital but flexible rates of exchange.
See Table 6c.2'.
In compliance with Table 4c.10. the rate of interest in the home country
no longer rises "drastically": the depreciation (invoked by the drop in
exports and increase in imports) ensures that the value of foreign demand
for home bonds measured in home currency rises (as their currency is more
worth now). Nevertheless. on balance the substantial extra supply of bonds
by the (home) government makes the interest rate go up.22 As in Table
4c.10. the depreciation ultimately leads to a foreign interest rate that
exceeds the one in the home country. In the same way as the depreciation
increases the value (in currency one) of foreign holdings of bonds issued
in one (OVD21). it decreases the value of country one's holdings of
foreign assets in currency two (OVD12). As a result foreign rates of in-
terest go up as well.
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The main consequences of the wage rate increase, however, remain: falling
output (and increasing unemployment) as a result of lower exports. But the
depreciation attenuates this fall. Expected output does not drop as fast
as it did with fixed exchange rates (Table 6c.2). Added to the lower rate
of interest (causing a smaller increase in the expected price of capital),
*k will not fall as sharply and disinvestments will not be as large as
with fixed rates of exchange.
In the outside world the rise in exports and production is tempered by the
depreciation of currency one. As a consequence, expected output and the
optimal stock of capital do not grow as sharply as they did in Table 6c.2
with fixed rates of exchange. The latter's growth is also (mildly) mitiga-
ted by the rise in foreign interest rates.
In the subsequent period, the home currency depreciates further. If ex-
change rates of period 2 had also prevailed in period 3, the deficit in
the trade balance would have been about constant, whereas the service
account would be in deficit and the surplus on the capital account would
have fallen drastically.23
To keep the total balance of payments in equilibrium, the currency depre-
ciates, forcing the deficit on the trade balance down and the surplus on
the service account and the capital account up, relative to the case of no
adjustment in exchange rates.24 The depreciation stimulates exports and
total output if compared to Table 6c.2 (fixed exchange rates).
Concluding, in the first periods the depreciation of the home currency
prevents output and expected output to fall as hard as would have been the
case without exchange rate adjustment. This causes divestments to be smal-
ler, which results in 'higher' expected output and a 'higher' optimal
stock of capital.
The depreciation, however, declines each period: because of the deprecia-
tion, the trade deficit declines each period and with it the need for a
counter balancing positive service account and capital account. And since
the depreciation falls, in the course of time the expected depreciation
drops, too (here in period 9. see RMERE 12). This tempers the expected
profitability of capital exports and thereby the need for the currency to
depreciate.
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Meanwhile, interest rates are not fixed. In the home country, additions to
wealth (interest receipts and net profits) are larger, inducing wealth to
grow faster. At the same time, the gap between the government deficit in
the home country and its counterpart abroad falls (because of higher
profit and interest tax receipts). Together with the divestments resulting
from the wage increase and the increase in wealth signaled above, this
implies that the extent to which the home interest rate exceeds the one
abroad, growing in the first eight periods, is forced down in subsequent
periods. Given the immediate stock adjustment nature of international
portfolio transactions, cet. par. this would have led to a deficit on the
capital account. In periods 9 and 10 this deficit does not yet occur be-
cause of the still positive expected depreciation and the depreciation
itself. But as period 200 indicates, after period 10 this deficit does
indeed emerge. The consequences of this capital export are impressive. By
period 200 the picture is dominated by the consequently positive service
account. This balance is responsible for the large appreciation of the
home currency. As a result, exports and with it home production have
shrunk and unemployment has grown dramatically. Abroad, the picture is
reversed: a high level of exports and production caused by a cheap cur-
rency.
Once more, the outcomes of an impulse in the longer run appear to be
dominated by the service account.
c. Monetary policy
Assumptions: monetary sector, world-wide impulse
If all countries expand their stock of money, the rate of interest will
fall, which lowers the rental price of capital. Cost minimization will
*make entrepreneurs decide to invest in net terms: k rises. This case is
illustrated in Table 6b.6.
When carrying out their plans (in t=3), their extra supply of bonds drives
the rate of interest up. On the other hand, the government deficit falls
as a result of increased employment and lower interest obligations. This
smaller deficit constitutes a lower need of funds. Depending on the para-
meters (as ~1)' the rate of interest will rise or fall. In the present
table it rises. The other component of the rental price of capital (pe )
Yt+1
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will fall as soon as expected output rises sufficiently. The latter in-
creases as a result of the invoked investment activity itself. The conse-
*quent fall in expected capital costs makes k rise further. If the model
is to return to a stationary equilibrium, the other determinant of k* (ye)
should fall after some time and outweigh this substitution effect. As the
table illustrates, virtually all variables do indeed return to their ini-
tial position.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
If only one country increases its money stock, without international mobi-
lity of capital and assuming fixed rates of exchange, it can by and large
expect the above consequences adjusted for temporary demand impulses. See
Table 6b.7. The increased investment activity will drive home output
prices up and deteriorate its competitive position. Exports will fall
constituting a negative demand impulse. As soon as the stock of capital
has grown sufficiently, output prices fall and improve the home country's
competitive position. As a result exports rise, which constitutes a posi-
tive impulse on demand. Moreover, as a result of increased household in-
come, imports will rise. The latter implies increased economic activity
abroad. The analysis of the consequences of this impulse for foreign coun-
tries follows the lines of a demand increase not financed by the govern-
ment, however, and of a temporary nature. Due to the temporary nature of
the 'added' impulse, total long run outcomes in all countries resemble
those of Table 6b.6, which again equal those of the non-intervention case,
except for welfare: during the adjustment process prices are moving
slightly, unemployment first goes down in all countries concerned, in-
terest rates are lower in the intervening country (temporary) and, as a
consequence, especially government interest obligations in those countries
are lower.
Assumptions: monetary sector, no ICM, unilateral impulse, flexible ex-
change rates
If flexible rates of exchange are assumed, but still no international
mobility of capital, Table 6b.7' confirms the insulation feature familiar
by now from previous tables. In other words, the outside world is not
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influenced and the intervening country experiences the same impacts it
would have if all countries had acted simultaneously in the same respect.
This also implies that for exports to drop along with home consumer demand
(as it did in Table 6b.6), the depreciation should be slightly lower than
the production price increase. In the long run, for exports to return to
their initial level, this depreciation on balance vanishes.
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse, fixed exchange
rates
If the assumption of international immobility of capital is dropped, the
neutrality of monetary policy in the long run signaled above is ques-
tioned.
With fixed rates of exchange the process leading to instability known from
above reappears. The country with the lower government deficit is, after
some time, subsidized by the other governments. In this case (see Table
6c.3) the former is country one expanding its money supply. The consequent
fall in the home rate of interest (which is of course smaller than without
mobility of capital, compare Table 6b.7) exceeds the one abroad. As a
result the optimal stock of capital at home rises by more than in other
countries, which invokes a higher expansion of investments in country one.
In the short and medium term a pattern of adaptation seems to emerge that
mirrors (qualitatively speaking) the one without international capital
mobility. The expansion at home may be larger than the one abroad but in
the first years no signs of conflict arise.
However, beneath the surface Table 6c.3 shows areas of developing con-
flict. The capital outflow out of country one in the impulse period causes
a positive balance on the debt service account in the subsequent periods.
Moreover, in period 3 the home country administration faces lower interest
obligations (OG1)25 pressing its budget deficit down. In the outside
world, however, this deficit is rising due to lower interest proceeds and
thus a lower profit tax revenue. So, the interest rate differential bet-
ween the home country and the outside world widens, giving rise to a fur-
ther capital outflow and to a larger debt service account surplus in the
subsequent periods. Money invested abroad yields interest to be paid
abroad but taxed in the home country: the familiar destabilizing cycle.
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By period 200 the interest rate in the home country has fallen to its
minimum.26 The optimal stock of capital is therefore very high, and the
same is true of the actual number of machines. The latter implies that
investment demand not only for net investments but also for replacement
purposes27 is very high. So high, that the variable 'model' equals zero:
the economy in the home country faces a zero rate of unemployment.
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse, flexible exchange
rates
If capital is mobile internationally, and exchange rates are flexible, the
pattern is much more synchronous in the various countries. See Table
6c.3'.
In the impulse period the Mundell-Fleming scheme holds: monetary policy is
more effective now (if compared to Table 6c.3) due to the depreciation
(induced by the capital outflow) that stimulates exports and thus output
in the home country. Less well known are the impacts on employment abroad:
the same depreciation makes exports by the other countries (to the home
country) more difficult, which harms output and employment. So, in the
short run monetary policy is conflicting.
But conflicts disappear in time. At the new rates of interest and the new
rates of exchange (established in period 2), portfolios would be in equi-
librium in period 3. ceteris paribus. Hence, the immediate reaction in the
monetary sphere would result in zero capital flows in the next rounds,
ceteris paribus. But the depreciation in the home country calls for fur-
ther expected exchange rate depreciations, and hence a further capital
flight out of the home country.28 This drives the home rate of interest
up.
Moreover, the service account (positive in the impulse period because of
the depreciation itself) will now be positively influenced by the previous
capital outflow out of country one. As such, this calls for a (gradual)
appreciation of the home currency. As soon as the value of that currency
exceeds its initial value (between periods 7 and 8), exports fall and
imports rise on balance (both by country one). About simultaneously, total
output abroad has on balance risen.
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The actual appreciation mitigates the expectations of a depreciating home
currency. So. the capital account shortage of the home country declines in
every period .
Period 200 is in several respects the opposite of period 2: a home cur-
rency that has on balance appreciated, the home country is harmed by its
expansionary policy (less production and employment), it is faced with a
higher government deficit, its interest rate exceeds the one abroad
(abroad this rate falls short of its initial level, at home it exceeds
this level), and, last but not least, it has a (large) capital account
surplus and a vast deficit on the service account.
All of these elements show how dangerous it is to look only at the short
run effects of monetary policy.29
d. Supply-side policy
As long as international mobility of capital is excluded, a supply-side
policy cannot be expected to be really effective with the present invest-
ment equation. even if profits are positive. Since such a policy does not
change the optimal stock of capital, investments will not change. Without
a monetary sector, the only effect will then be a lowering of tax pro-
ceeds, but one can hardly call this the main objective of a supply-side
policy. This conclusion can be verified by comparing Tables 6a.2 and 6a.7
for a model excluding a monetary sector.30
Essentially, it remains valid if a monetary sector is included as far as
TR refers to the tax rate on profits. In this situation all possible ef-
fects (see below) are caused by a change in the rate of interest. In fact,
one could question whether such effects are really what is intended by
"supply-side policy". Nevertheless. what are the consequences of this type
of policy if a monetary block is included?
Assumptions: monetary sector, world-wide impulse
Under these circumstances, the decrease in the tax rate, besides increa-
sing the government deficit, speeds up the growth in wealth. See Table
6b.8. As seen before, if no international capital mobility is assumed
(given rates of interest) 50% of the extra wealth is invested in (home)
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bonds, just as 50% of the increased deficit of the administration is fi-
nanced by bonds. On balance, the tax rate reduction does not influence the
*rate of interest. As a result k also remains unaffected and the tax rate
policy is ineffective.31
Assumptions: monetary sector, ICM, unilateral impulse
This picture changes, however, with international mobility of capital. In
that case, the extra need of funds by government is only partly met by an
increased demand for bonds issued in the home country as wealth grows only
in country 1. As a result, the home rate of interest rises and the capital
balance displays a deficit.32 The rising rate of interest in the home
country causes a fall in the optimal stock of capital in the home country
in the short run. As a result of the capital export out of country one,
the interest rate abroad falls and the optimal stock of capital rises in
the short run.
With fixed rates of exchange (see Table 6c.4) the familiar picture of a
government in the home country subsidized by the other countries emerges.
Its interest rate falls to extremely low levels in the longer run. The
effects on the optimal (and with it on the actual) stock of capital are
obvious: although on the short run the fall in the profit and interest tax
is counterproductive, in the long run it is not.
With flexible rates of exchange (see Table 6c.4') the home currency ini-
tially depreciates as a result of the capital account deficit. In the
longer run, however, the consequent service account surplus is 'transla-
ted' into an appreciation, harming output and expected output. As a
result, the optimal capital stock in the longer run falls in the home
country. So, both in the short and the longer run,33 for the home country
the tax rate policy discourages investments. Abroad, however, investments
are stimulated.
e. A note on the vertical branch of the supply curve
As described, with an upward sloping supply curve (the situation described
above) a demand increasing policy will stimulate investments. In a supply
model (i.e., with a vertical supply schedule caused by the bottleneck
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labour), however, such a policy is counterproductive with regard to in-
vestments, which is explained as follows. Given technical coefficients,
output is determined by the availability of labour and capital. The same
holds for expected output, the first determinant of 'optimal' k. An in-
creased demand for products does not alter this determinant. It does,
however, change expected nominal demand (which goes up). increasing the
expected prices of products and thus the rental price of caPital.34 The
'optimal' capital stock will therefore fall and so will investments. More-
over, since investments fall, the expected capital stock will decline,
causing a decline of expected output in the subsequent periods, which
constitutes a second negative impetus on investments.
This conclusion, formally derived in Appendix 6.1, is contrary to what was
found in the previous chapters. There, production price increases on
balance benefitted investments by increasing expected profits, or at least
did not harm them.35 In the present situation, however, net investments
would be harmed via an increase in the rental price of capital.
This feature is illustrated by a comparison between Tables 6a.8 and 6a.9.
both assuming a model without monetary sector. In Table 6a.8 'model'
switches to zero -indicating a vertical supply curve- as a result of a
(world-wide) labour tax reduction by 4%-points. A stationary situation is
reached in period 62. This also holds in Table 6a.9 where the same impulse
is complemented by an increase (also world-wide) in government expendi-
tures. But in 6a.9 the higher nominal expected output value given rigid
expected supply, causes higher expected output prices and capital costs,
and therefore lowers investments. Arguments can be raised here in favour
of models where the output price level is distinct from the buying price
of machines.
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*Appendix 6.1. Effects on the optimal capital stock (k) if no monetary
sector is included
If, both actually and expected, the supply curve runs upward (as opposed
to vertically), the following equations apply (disregarding ~O = 1).
e
e ['T~y k x ~ J. (6A.1)pe
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where, without monetary sector, pe = bpe.
k y *This set of equations leads to the following expression for k .









1. given ke, a rise in -I causes k to go up. In other words, if -I rises,pe pe
L L
the increase in expected sales (i.e., the move to a higher isoquant) in
*its effect on k more than offsets the negative substitution effect on
*k given by the denominator of (6A.3);
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2. given -I, a fall (rise) in the expected stock of capital, ke, leads tope
L *a proportionate fall (rise) in k .
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So, with a vertical supply curve and given t
mmax
we can conclude:
1. given ke, since the move to a higher "expected isoquant" is absent, a
pe *




2. given ~, a fall (rise) in the expected stock of capital, ke, causes a
~ *less than proportionate fall (rise) in k .
Moreover, if available labour supply rises, the optimal capital stock
rises but less than proportionately.
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2 J. Gould and R. Waud, "The Neoclassical Model of Investment Behavior:
Another View", International Economic Review. vol. 14. no. 1, Febr. 1973,
pp.33 - 48.
3 Since there is a one period installment lag of new capital goods and an
identical time lag between investment decisions and the actual investment
(see Chapter 4). all expectations discussed here refer to the expected
values for two years after the current decision to invest. unless
otherwise indicated. This also holds for the capital stock expected to
minimize production costs, k*. Technical coefficients. however. are
assumed constant over time. In the derivation here we leave out the word
'expected'. Moreover, in the equations below, for convenience we leave out
/36 ( =1 ).
4 Once k* is determined, the gap (between actual and production cost
minimizing stocks of capital) is known. It would be technically possible
to calculate for each coming year « t + 0) a new k*.
With non-stationary economies, however, this would result in 0 different
'gaps', as well. In line with literature at this pOint, we choose to let
the computer calculate one gap only, partly or completely to be filled by
net investments. The next period, on the basis of new information, a new
gap is determined invoking new decisions to invest or disinvest.
5 P~ is calculated as discussed in Chapter 2. If a value expected for the
next period is symbolized by the suffix "t+1" , pk
eis calculated ase e e e.Pk = r * P t+1 + 6 * P , as ~nterest charges are calculated over theexpected p~ice of theY machine concerned that applies on the day of
purchase, i.e., interest is calculated over the price expected for t + 1.
Note that re was assumed to equal r.
6 In the remainder. when we speak of 'the gap' we refer to this
definition.
7 In Claassen (ibid) this fraction is endogenous if the extra investment
demand pushes up the price of capital goods, reducing the profitability of
extra investments. This approach is not suited for the SIER model as we
assume perfect competition in product markets.
8 This observation remains valid if A > B: the
disinvestments.
case of net
9 Since rho is the 'net' rate of return, that is after allowing for fi-
nancing charges, the return on bonds does not provide an indication here.
10 F.Hartog, 'Hoofdlijnen van de Prijstheorie', Leiden, 1979, p.225.
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11 More capital involved means higher discomfort since more money is at
stake in an uncertain (risky) world.
12 C2 should be such that the factor in brackets is positive. Thecoef'f'Ecaent.sand parameters in (6.8) are set to produce "acceptable"
results (see Chapter 7, section 3B). As such, they are as arbitrary as an
exogenous rho, for example.
13 Actually, the computer splits OC up in 200 equal parts. Each of these
parts are regarded as successive marginal increases.
14 This illustrates the very limited role the 'gap' plays in determining
actual investment decisions in this version. Mainly it serves two
functions. Firstly, it prescribes whether there will be net investments or
disinvestments, depending on the sign of the 'gap'.
Secondly, it serves as the upper limit for net {dis)investment decisions.
Besides this, it determines the magnitude of ai. See below.
15 Equal to 0.005 x (k*-k). That is i = 1, 2, 3, ... 200. For convenience,
the description in the main text is restricted to ai> O. but the resultingformulas also apply to ai< O.
16 Since 1-1/~ < O. the expression in [ ] and thus the outcome of (6.9).
the reduction in labour costs, is positive for a > 0 and negative for a <
O. given P~, ye > o.
17 A policy raising the rate of interest, or rather the expected price of
capital. raises (6.10). Consequently. (6.11) drops, reducing total invest-
ments.
18 This is pleasant. since. as stated earlier. k* can fluctate quite
sharply. If a constant fraction of the resulting gap (or even a proportion
increasing with gap) were invested, this could lead to a disappointing
variability in investments.
19 As the starting position is stationary if no interventions occur. in
that starting position the actual and the production cost minimizing capi-
tal stock coincide.
20 In this and other tables assuming flexible rates of exchange that
follow. model 597 is used. With the model used when playing (592). the
computer was incapable of finding acceptable results for the number of
periods required here. Model 597 differs from 592 in the sense that the
prices of gold in countries 2 and 3 are not estimated by the computer, but
are set equal to the one in country 4. The latter was used as the
numeraire throughout. As a consequence, model 597 included ER2 = ER3 = ER4
= 1 where ER. indicates the price of gold in currency j. Model ,97 is
only used it only country 1 intervenes treating the other countries
undiscriminatively. It was not used in previous chapters. (See however
Chapter 4, Section 4c.)
21 In the outside world the interest rates seem to be unaffected. As OP2
in period t=3 rises if compared to the situation of no intervention. this
can only be caused by rounding.
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22 In Table 4c.10 it actually fell as a result of a smaller increase in
the government deficit. The latter, in turn, is due to the complementarity
assumption where in the short run unemployment does not change (as opposed
to the developments with substitutable factors of production where un-
employment rises immediately).
23 SlN would have been -1.38, KOBl would have been -0.04 and KAB1 would
have dropped to 0.38. These figures are not shown in the table.
24 See also Chapter 4, Table 4c.l0.
25 Expansionary open market policy was defined as substitution of
government bonds by money.
26 OVDll/Vl = 2%.





r1 > r2. Aftercurrency) r1 <
OVD12/Vl to OVD21/V2. The former exceeds the
subtraction of "RMERE12" (expected deprecia-
r2·
29 To be sure, period 200 does not resemble a long run equilibrium,
either.
30 It also holds if only one country acted in this respect.
31 If combined with other impulses, the rate of interest does not necessa-
rily equal its initial 10% level. In that case only approximately 50% of
wealth is invested in bonds and this conclusion does not hold exactly.
32 Caused by the same increased wealth in the home country.
33 Although model 597 was used here, the computer stops at round 162. With
an (absolutely) lower impulse, it can compute 'more rounds'.
34 This also holds if a monetary sector is included, when the impetus on
demand leads to a riSing interest rate, as will normally be the case with
extra bond financed government expenditures.
35 Net investments were zero in Chapter 4, if labour was expected to be
scarce.
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Chapter 7 The SIER Game as a framework for research
Introduction
In the present chapter it will be argued that the SIER Game cannot only be
used fruitfully for educational purposes, but also as a powerful framework
for research. In each of the three sections of this chapter, one type of
research will be illustrated. The examples that will follow are no more
than illustrations of what can be researched with the help of the SIER
framework and are not claimed to be fully completed research projects.
We will illustrate the following research possibilities:
1. Section 1 Leave the game as described in Chapters 2 to 6 and use it to
calculate and compare effects of policy interventions in alternative set-
tings. The SIER Game contains various types of policies (hiring extra
civil servants, import tariff policies, etc.). To illustrate this first
research possibility, we will summarize and compare some of the effects of
fiscal policy, wage policy, supply-side policy and monetary policy cal-
culated in the previous chapters.
We will draw some conclusions on the efficacy of these policies and com-
pare the conclusions on monetary and fiscal policy to standard textbook
predictions.
Moreover, we will give some preliminary indications on the possibilities
for international harmonization. cooperation and conflict connected with
the respective policies considered here.
2. Section 2 Leave the game behavioural assumptions in the model as they
were described in Chapters 2 to 6 and compare the effects of policy inter-
ventions to those found in more advanced literature based on models ap-
plying other (behavioural) assumptions. As an example we will compare the
predictions of the SIER framework to those of an article by Sachs.
3. Section 3 Change assumptions in the SIER framework to include alter-
native (behavioural) assumptions. If the latter are borrowed from existing
literature, it is possible to check whether or not the conclusions drawn
in the text considered also hold in the SIER framework. As an example. in
Section 3A we will include assumptions made in a recent contribution by
Van Wijnbergen to see if (some of) his major conclusions also hold in the
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adjusted model. Moreover, in Section 3B we will illustrate some effects of
the asymmetric investment behaviour discussed in Chapter 6 that, although
incorporated into the basic SIER Game, cannot be regarded to be a part of
standard economic theory. Those effects can be compared to the ones found
when applying the standard symmetric investment function used in the re-
mainder of Chapter 6.
Section 1 Effects of some policies in the SIER Game,
an overview and comparison with textbook predictions
If we want to draw some conclusions on the possibilities of international
cooperation vs. conflict in this context, we have to make an assumption on
the goals of economic policy of the respective governments. To simplify,
it is assumed here that governments strive for maximal (private) produc-
tion and employment.1 Alternatively, one could assume, for example, that
they strive for price stability or even for 'maximal welfare' as defined
in Chapter 1.2
Moreover, the terminology should be defined.
First of all, a unilaterally undertaken policy can be internationally
"sustaining", "neutral" or "conflicting". That is, a policy intervention
by country 1 while improving employment and production in the intervening
country can benefit production (and employment) in the other countries,
can leave it unaffected or can lower it, respectively.
Secondly, the outside countries will follow country one's policy (or will




i.e., world-wide equal policies without (necessary) international consul-
tations.4
Finally, "coordination of policies" will be found where a gain in produc-
tion and employment can only be reached if all countries act simultaneous-
ly, in other words, if without international consultations no (positive)
gain can be reached.
and employment in their countries will be larger if they join
one's action than if they just "consume" the spillover effects of
one's intervention. In that case, "harmonization of policies,,3
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Tables 7.1 to 7.45 provide an overview of the effects on private produc-
tion and employment of expansionary fiscal policy (7.1). wage policy
(7.2). supply-side policy (7.3) and monetary policy (7.4) in alternative
settings within the SIER framework.
Each table reports the effects of intervention under the assumptions of
Chapters 3. 4. 5 and 6. respectively. where per chapter (a) only a real
sector is included. (b) a monetary sector is also included but no inter-
national capital mobility or (c) both a monetary sector and international
mobility of capital are included. For reasons explained in those chapters.
the figures dealing with Chapters 3 and 5 relate to part (a) only . Each
table contains 3 columns:
column 1: all countries intervening simultaneously. also to be referred to
as a multilateral action;
column 2: an intervention in country 1 only. also to be referred to as a
unilateral action, assuming fixed rates of exchange;
column 3: an intervention in country 1 only. assuming flexible rates of
exchange.
The effects reported concern those in period 2 (t=2. the "immediate" ef-
fects). in period 4 (t=4. where "the short run" refers to period 2 and/or
4) and the long run. The latter is defined as the new equilibrium position
where real variables and the rate of interest no longer change. For
reasons given in Chapter 4. figures relating to part c do not concern that
long run position but relate to period 200 (unless otherwise indicated).
labelled "the longer run".
Below. we will simply list conclusions that can he directly drawn on the
basis of Tables 7.1 7.4. The explanations of the figures and trends
signaled are partly found in the chapter concerned. The remaining explana-
tions often require further research. The same holds for the comparisons
with standard literature. A more completed research project would compare
the conclusions with more advanced and more recent contributions. as well.
It is repeated that this section (as well as the other parts of this chap-
ter) is only meant as an illustration of what could be researched with the
SIER framework.
Unless otherwise indicated. the conclusions only hold for the reported
periods and not for the periods in between.
207
Finally, as before, we abbreviate international (portfolio) capital mo-
bility as ICM.
Conclusions pertaining to all four tables:
1. Without ICM, flexible exchange rates insulate the intervening country ..
If insulation applies, it holds both in the short and in the long run. It
implies that there is no incentive or disincentive for the home country
(country 1) to seek international coordination: its policy actions affect
its economy to the same extent as if the policy was carried out multi-
laterally.6 As the outside countries do not reap the benefits of such an
intervention, they are likely to join country 1: if the effects are posi-
tive, country 1 acts and the others will join; in other cases, country 1
will not act and neither will the other countries. If so, harmonization of
policies is the result.
In other words, without ICM and with flexible rates of exchange,
monization of policies is likely.
har-
2. If factors of production are complementary, possible reactions in out-
put and/or employment cannot occur until 2 periods after the impulse.
whereas with substitutable production factors, such reactions can occur
immediately.
3. If IeM is excluded and unemployment is positive, the long run outcomes
of impulses are not influenced by the shape of the production function
(complementarity vs. perfect substitution) or by the shape of the invest-
ment function. The differences are only found in the short (and intermedi-
ate) run. In other words, the new equilibrium as such is not affected by
the choice of the production function or by the choice of the investment
function, although the path towards that new equilibrium may be in-
fluenced.7
With regard to (expansionary) fiscal policy, the following conclusions can
be drawn from Table 7.1.
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1. If the action is world-wide, production is enhanced both in the short
run and in the long run. Employment also grows, unless labour was already
scarce (Chapter 5).
2. If only country 1 acts, without ICM, it can expect an increase in pro-
duction and employment both in the short and in the long run.
3. Although fiscal policy is traditionally assumed to be internationally
sustaining, this assumption is not necessarily valid, especially not if
consumers react slowly to changing relative prices (see column 2, Table
3a38) or if capital is mobile (same column, Table 4c2). In those cases
fiscal policy is conflicting in the short run. Neither does the assumption
hold if initially unemployment equals zero (Chapter 5), in which case the
policy is neutral.9
4. If exchange rates are fixed, the long run expansionary effects of fis-
cal policy are smaller if the country acts alone than if all countries act
alike (or if exchange rates float). On the short run, however, the former
(individual action) exceed the latter (concerted action) if factors of
production are complementary. The reverse holds if factors of production
are substitutable.
In other words, when embarking upon fiscal policy, a country faced with
complementarity between its factors of production would in the short run
be better off or equally well off without internationally harmonized poli-
cies. But in the long run, as well as if its production factors are
substitutable, it benefits if the other countries jOin.10
In the outside world, the spillover effects of country one's policy
without ICM (and with IeM on the short run) are smaller than the effects
they would perceive if they would indeed join. Hence, without ICM, inter-
national unification of policies is likely in those cases.
If capital is mobile and exchange rates are fixed, in the (true) long run
the outside world may be better off without their own action.11 If so, a
conflict arises within these countries: harmonization is better in the
short run, but not in the long run.
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5. On the impact of IeM on the effects of fiscal policy:
The efficacy of fiscal policy is unaffected in the impulse period if fac-
tors of production are complementary. If they are substitutable, the same
holds if exchange rates are fixed. But if exchange rates float, IeM tem-
pers the expansionary impact on the home country and establishes an influ-
ence on outside countries. In other words, with substitution, IeM breaks
the insulation immediately.
With fixed rates of exchange. IeM enhances the short run (t=4) impact of
fiscal policy on the home economy at the expense of its influence on out-
side economies. With flexible rates of exchange, the opposite can be
noted: reM mitigates the expansionary impact in the home country whereas
the impact on the other countries is enhanced.
In as far as period 200 is indicative for the long run, in the long run
capital mobility reduces the impact on the economy of the intervening
country and stimulates its impact abroad. both if exchange rates are fixed
and if they float.
6. On the short run (t=2 and t=4) the introduction of IeM and/or an alter-
native exchange rate system does not affect the impact of fiscal policy on
total world output or world employment, but only their distribution over
the respective economies.12 The same conclusion holds in the long run for
an alternative exchange rate system provided IeM is excluded. If capital
is mobile, introduction of flexible as opposed to fixed exchange rates
reduces the long run impact of a unilateral fiscal expansion on world
output and employment.
7. Without reM an expansionary fiscal policy causes the currency to depre-
ciate in the short as well as in the long run, where with possibilities of
substitution between production factors the exchange rate depreciates
earlier and sharper. An exception is the case of zero unemployment with
substitution (Chapter 5). where the exchange rate does not move at all.
If capital is mobile internationally, the fiscal policy causes the cur-
rency to appreciate.
In the periods and cases reported. the currency does not in the short run
overshoot or undershoot its long run value except for the case of Chapter
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6 (substitution between factors of production and investments directly
determined by the cost minimizing capital stock) if ICM is excluded.
Some of the above conclusions can be compared to the ones found in stan-
dard literature.
The SIER models as depicted in Chapters 2 to 6 can be classified as large
country models based on perfect national competition, but imperfect inter-
national competition (both in product and production factor markets, as
well as in bond markets, if included) and assuming sterilization of the
monetary consequences of imbalances on the trade account13 (but not of
those on the capital account or on the debt service account). This must be
borne in mind if its 'predictions' are compared to those of other models.
Without ICM
Mundell and Fleming claim that without ICM, fiscal policy would be inef-
fective if exchange rates are fixed, but more effective if exchange rates
float. That flexibility of exchange rates makes fiscal policy more ef-
ficient is by and large confirmed in our setting.14
If exchange rates are fixed and ICM is excluded, both Mundell-Fleming and
Frenkel and Mussa15 claim that fiscal policy is ineffective. The former
argue that a fiscal expansion causes a shortage on the balance of payments
and, consequently, a reduction of the money supply until the initial pro-
duction level is restored. Frenkel and Mussa argue that in small countries
and with capital immobile, following purchasing power parity, prices in
the home country are determined by the fixed prices in the outside world
and the exchange rate. As a consequence, output is not affected, either.
The inefficacy of fiscal policy if capital is immobile, as claimed by both
pairs of researchers. is not upheld in our model(s). The large country
assumption, the (internationally) imperfectly working product markets as
well as the accomodating monetary policy are crucial in explaining these
differences.
With ICM
Mundell-Fleming states that with capital mobile, fiscal policy would be
ineffective with flexible exchange rates, due to the invoked appreciation.
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Frenkel and Mussa add as an argument here that with flexible rates of
exchange, money demand is fixed as it equals the (fixed) money supply. So,
the determinants of money demand (nominal output) must be fixed as well.
In our model the latter assumption is abandoned. With capital (imperfect-
ly) mobile, fiscal policy is effective, although less effective than
without ICM and on the short run less effective than with fixed exchange
rates. In the longer run it is even more effective than with fixed ex-
change rates. A distinction between the short and long term efficacy, as
made by Caves and Jones16 (p.431) seems appropriate here, especially since
the service account grows in importance over time (see Chapters 4 and 6).
Moreover, as the short run impacts of fiscal policy appear to depend on
the macro-economic production function and the investment function, for
example, and as the long run effects may depend on the tax rate system,17
for example, the simple classifications "effective" or "ineffective" need
further qualification.
Table 7.2 on wage increasing policies18 leads to the following conclu-
sions.
1. A world-wide increase in wages has neither an immediate (t=2) nor a
long run impact on production and employment. On the short run (t=4),
however, employment and production rise if and only if a monetary sector
is included. This conclusion also holds if insulation applies (see above).
2. If wages rise in one country only and exchange rates are fixed, in the
short run19 its production and employment fall. In the long run these
targets deteriorate even further. Production and employment in the other
countries benefit.20
An exception to this rule is the situation where consumers react slowly to
changing relative prices, where in the short run the intervening country
benefits and the outside world is harmed. Also in this exceptional case,
however, home employment and production deteriorate in the long run,
whereas their counterparts in the outside world improve.
3. With fixed rates of exchange, the immediate effects (t=2) are not in-
fluenced by the shape of the investment function or by inclUSion of ICM.
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4. Inclusion of ICM worsens the long run production and employment effects
for the intervening country if it increases its wage rate. It benefits
long run production and employment in the outside countries.21
5· If consumers react immediately to changing relative prices, in none of
the reported periods is world output or world employment lowered by a wage
increasing policy in one or more countries.
World output and world employment grow in the short (t=4) and in the long
run if one country raises its wage rate under a system of fixed exchange
rates.
Crucial here is the assumption that all household incomes rise. If govern-
ment wages do not rise simultaneously, the present conclusion is invalida-
ted. See the figures taken from Table 5a14, for example.
6. Without ICM, a wage increasing policy leads to a depreciation of the
currency if exchange rates float. If capital is mobile, however, the same
policy leads to a depreciation in the short run (t=2 and t=4), but to an
appreciation in the long run.
In all cases where a monetary sector is included, the currency overshoots
its long(er) run value.
Table 7.3 deals with a 10% point reduction in the tax rate on profits and
interest receipts. As footnote 1 to this table indicates, for models ex-
cluding ICM a government expenditure increase of 10% is added to generate
profits and hence to make a tax reduction potentially effective.22 Thus,
parts a and b of Table 7.3 should be compared to their counterparts of
Table 7.1. This is not necessary in part c (ICM), as in that case the tax
reduction is the sole intervention.
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of Table 7.3:
1. If all countries act simultaneously, immediate as well as long run
effects of tax reduction are absent. In the short run (t=4), however,
production and employment grow, unless investments are determined by the
cost minimizing capital stock (Chapter 6), where short run output and
employment effects are also absent.
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2. For models excluding ICM, the following can be noted (with regard to
unilateral interventions).
In the long run a tax cut is ineffective.
If factors of production are complementary, output and employment in the
intervening country are improved in the short run (t=4). The extent to
which they are improved is independent of the exchange rate system.23
With complementarity the tax policy can be labelled "neutral" in all
reported periods.
With possibilities of substitution, the influence on the short run depends
on the investment function and the exchange rate system.
If investments are determined by the cost minimizing stock of capital, no
impact of the tax cut is found (like on the long run). Likewise in this
case the tax policy is "neutral". But if investments depend on lagged
profits (Chapter 5) and exchange rates are fixed, the immediate effects
(t=2) on output and employment in the home country are beneficial, whereas
they are disadvantageous for the other countries ("conflicting"). Two
periods later, however, production in the home country is still higher
than without tax reduction, but emploYment is lower and foreign output is
on balance unaffected while employment has even grown. As a consequence,
the tax reduction is on balance beneficial in that period for outside
countries, whereas the intervening country will experience advantages as
well as disadvantages. As previously indicated, in the long run all ef-
fects will have disappeared.
3. For models including capital mobility, Table 7.3 leads to the following
conclusions with regard to a unilateral intervention.
With fixed exchange rates the intervening country harms its short run
(t<5) output and employment levels by a tax reduction, but improves their
values in the long(er) run. The outside world benefits in both respects in
the short run,24 but is harmed in its output level in the longer run. Its
longer run employment worsens if factors of production are complementary,
but improves if these factors are substitutable.
With flexible rates of exchange, by and large the opposite effects can be
expected: it will be beneficial for the intervening country in the short
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run. but unbeneficial in the longer run; and for the outside world: un-
beneficial in the short run,25 but beneficial in the long run. (All ef-
fects: with regard to both output and employment.)
The answer to the harmonization question now becomes quite complicated.
If the outside countries are interested in reaping short term benefits.
they will decide to act multilaterally if exchange rates are flexible and
will refrain from doing so if exchange rates are fixed. If they have a
long(er) time horizon. with flexible exchange rates they will not join
country 1 in its tax reduction. but with fixed exchange rates and comple-
mentary factors of production they will cut their taxes. too. If a long
time horizon is combined with fixed exchange rates and substitutable fac-
tors of production, however, their answer depends on the priority they
give to production vs. employment.
In short. whether or not with IeM a tax cut is likely to be an internatio-
nally harmonized policy depends on the exchange rate system. on the time
horizon of policy makers and on the shape of the macro-economic production
function.
Table 7.4 dealing with a one time monetary expansion leads to the fol-
lowing conclusions.
1. Without reM the monetary expansion (unilateral or world-wide) is inef-
fective in the long run.
2. In the short run (t=4) it can be concluded
- that a monetary policy positively influences output and employment in
the intervening country/countries;
- that a world-wide action is as least as advantageous for an acting coun-
try as an unilateral intervention with fixed exchange rates or else
without IeM;
- that in the latter situation (fixed exchange rates or else no reM) non-
intervening countries are not harmed (the policy is either neutral or
sustaining). but are worse off than if they join country 1 in its expan-
sion;
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- that in that situation harmonization of the monetary policy is therefore
likely and not disadvantageous for any country (This conclusion does not
hold in the long run, however. See below).
3· If IeM is included and exchange rates are fixed,
- in the long(er) run an unilaterally intervening country gains more in
output and employment than with a multilateral intervention; the outside
countries, however, gain employment but lose output in that same period;
- in the latter sense the monetary policy is conflicting in the long run
although exchange rates are fixed;
- as a result the other countries will harmonize their policies if they
want to avoid the long run production loss (or want to gain more in the
short run, see conclusion 2), although the initiating country (country
1) will dislike this if its time horizon is long run (as opposed to
short run).
4. If IeM is included and exchange rates float,
the monetary policy is conflicting in the short run;
- outside countries gain in the long(er) run, whereas the initiating coun-
try loses in the same period, but gained in the short run;
- the latter gain in the short run is higher than with a concerted action;
- in the long run the outside world gains from an action by the home coun-
try (country 1);
- hence, if politicians have a short time horizon, harmonization will
result and those at home will dislike it; if they have a long time hori-
zon, harmonization will not result and home politicians will not like it
either.
5. If exchange rates float, the currency of the country expanding its
money supply overshoots its long run value in all cases reported.
6. If exchange rates are fixed, the introduction of IeM does not alter the
short run influence of the monetary policy on world output and employment.
But it alters the impact on these variables if exchange rates float.
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Standard literature claims that in a small country with fixed ex-
change rates monetary policy is ineffective, both with and without IeM
{international capital mobility, see above}. Frenkel and Mussa {ibid} add
that for a larger country the inefficacy might be alleviated: without reM
the exogenous character of prices {dictated by the world market} would be
questioned. To that extent monetary policy would gain efficacy and with
IeM, rates of interest would no longer be completely exogenous.
eaves and Jones {ibid, p.431} label monetary policy ineffective both
without reM as well as in the short run with ICM. Following Frenkel and
Mussa, they label it "less ineffective" in the longer run with IeM.
Table 7.4 illustrates that without IeM monetary policy is also ineffective
in the long run in the SIER framework.26 But it is not ineffective in the
short run. Moreover, in our model it is effective with IeM both in the
short and in the long run.
With flexible rates of exchange in general the above sources claim
monetary policy to be effective {depreciation}, both with and without reM,
although Frenkel and Mussa argue that in the longer run its efficacy will
be limited by an increased demand for imported products (caused by the
higher income).
Table 7.4 shows that also in our setting the home currency depreciates and
production and employment rise in the intervening country in the short
run. Without IeM, however, production and employment {and exchange rates}
are in the long run restored to their initial levels, leaving the (one
time) open market policy ineffective. And with IeM, in the longer run the
currency has on balance appreciated making the policy counterproductive
for the intervening country.
As with fiscal policy, the different conclusions can to a large extent be
explained by the differences in assumptions as summarized under the
heading 'fiscal policy'. But we must also conclude that in standard lite-
rature too little attention is paid to the role the service account can
play, especially in determining the long run efficacy of macro-economic
policy.
Table 7.1. Effects of fiscal policy. overview (notes: see end of table)
Multilateral (Gi = 10%) Unilateral (G1 = 10%)
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value value
Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
3a2 y=tm 100 100.084 100.590 3a31) Y1=tm1 100 100.143 100.568 3a5 Y1=tm1 100 100.084 100.590
Y2=tm2 100 99.98 100.007 Y2=tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1 1.00013 1.00094
3a42) Y1=tm1 100 100.084 100.568YZ=tm2 100 100 100.007
4a2 y=tm 100 100.084 100.590 4a3 y1=tm1 100 100.084 100.568 4a6' y1=tm1 100 100.084 100.590
y2=tmz 100 100 100.007 Yz=tmz 100 100 100
ER12 1 1.00013 1.00094
4bZ y=tm 100 100.Z32 101·799 4b3 Yldml 100 100.232 101.742
3) y1=tm1 100 100.232 101.799
Y2=tm2 100 100 100.019 y2=tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1 1.00037 1.00288
4c2 y1=tm1 100 100.234 99.990
4)5) 4c7 y1=tm1 100 100.218 101.553
4)5)
y2=tm2 100 99·999 100.667
4)6) y2=tm2 100 100.005 100.088
4)6)
Chapter 5all)
ER12 0.99434 0·99391 0.99190
5a2 Y 100.385 100.406 100·590 5a3 Y1 100.374 100.394 100.568 5a3' Y1 100.385 100.406 100.590
tm 100.482 100.504 100.590 tm1 100.468 100.498 100.568 lml 100.482 100.504 100.590
Y2 100.004 100.004 100.007 Y2 100 100 100
tmz 100.005 100.005 100.007 tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1.00077 1.00081 1.00094
Table 7.1. Effects of fiscal policy, overview (continued)
Multilateral (Oi = 10%) Unilateral (01 = 10%)
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value value
Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
12)Ch~Ter 5a 100.016 136.1758) 3)7)9) 100 100.016 136.1758) 3)7)9) 100 100.016 136.1755a9 y 100 Y1 Yl
.tm 100 100 100 .tm1 100 100 100 lIDl 100 100 100
Y2 100 100 100 Y2 100 100 100
lm2 100 100 100 lm2 100 100 100
ER12 1 1 1
6a2 Y 100·385 100.579 100.590 6a3 Y1 100.374 100.556 100.568 6a3' Y1 100.385 100.579 100.590
.tm 100.482 100.692 100·590 .tm1 100.468 100.664 100.568 .tm1 100.482 100.692 100.590
Y2 100.004 100.008 100.007 Y2 100 100 100
.tm2 100.005 100.009 100.007 .tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1.00077 1.00111 1.00094
6b2 Y 101.350 101.848 101·799 6b3 Y1 101.310 101.777 101.742 6b3' Y1 101.350 101.848 101.799
lm 101.691 102.221 101.799 .tm1 101.641 102.134 101.742 lml 101.691 102.221 101.799
Y2 100.013 100.024 100.019 Y2 100 100 100
lm2 100.017 100.029 100.019 .tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1.00271 1.00355 1.00288
Multilateral (Gi = 10%) Unilateral (G1 = 10%)
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value valueTable of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
6c1 Yl 101·310 101.784 98.5784)5) 6cl' Y1 101.299 101.748 101.6244)5)
lm1 101.641 102.143 100.8914)5) lml 101.627 102.099 101.6194)5)
Y2 100.013 100.021 101.3614) 6) Y2 100.017 100.033 100.0634)6)
1m2 100.017 100.026 100.4834)6) 1m2 100.021 100.041 100.0614) 6)
ER12 0.99924 0.99797 0.99394
Notes (Table 7.1):
1) Imports depending upon lagged prices
2) Imports depending upon current prices
3) Not included in previous tables, calculated separately
4) period 200
5) decreasing from t=200 to t=201
6) increasing from t=200 to t=20l
7) increase in G = 9.375%
8) value in t=lOOO, increasing from t=lOOO to t=lOOl
9) As labour income is constant and prices are constant abroad, imports by country one are constant and nothing leaks away. The trade
balance is zero with fixed exchange rates, implying that with floating exchange rates, these rates are constant and the two
alternative systems lead to identical results.
not included in a previous table; calculated separatelyl1) rising (not vertical) supply curve
vertical supply curve (zero unemployment)
10)
12)
Table 7.2. Effects of wage policy, overview (notes: see end of table)
Multilateral (PLi = 10%) Unilateral (PL1 = 10%)
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value value
Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
3a6 y=lm 100 100 100 3a71) Yl=lm1 100 100.448 97.959 3a9 Yl=lm1 100 100 100
Y2=lm2 100 99.847 100.749 Y2=lm2 100 100 100
ER12 1.1 1.1 1.1
3a82) Yl=lm1 100 99.687 97.959Y2=lm2 100 100.111 100.748
4a4 y=lm 100 100 100 4a5 Yl=.lm1 100 99.670 97.959 4a5' Yl=lm1 100 100 100
Y2=lm2 100 100.112 100.749 Y2=lm2 100 100 100
~ER12 1.13) 1.13) 1.13)
4b4 y=.lm 100 100.019 100 4b5 Yl=lm1 100 99.760 98.210 4b5' Yl=.lm1 100 100.019 100
Y2=lm2 100 100.089 100.656 y2=lm2 100 100 100
ER12 1.1 1.10003 1.1
4c4 Yl=.lm1 100 99.761 93.312
4) 4clO y1=.lm1 100 99.901 97.696
4)
y2=lm2 100 100.089 103.750
4) Y2=lm2 100 100.037 100.874
4)
ER12 1.00796 1.01756 0.913464)
5a4 Y 100 100 100 5a5 Y1 98.651 98.581 97.959 5a6 Y1 100 100 100
lm 100 100 100 lml 98.317 98.243 97.959 lml 100 100 100
Y2 100.493 100.519 100.749 Y2 100 100 100
.lm2 100.617 100.644 100.749 lm2 100 100 100
ER12 1.1 1.1 1.1
Multilateral (PLi = 10%) Unilateral (PL1 = 10%)
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value value
Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
5a135) y 100 100 100
,tm 100 100 100
5a146) y 98.666 98.594 97.963
,tm 98.335 98.259 97.963
6a4 y 100 100 100 6a5 Y1 98.651 97·995 97·959 6a6 Y1 100 100 100
,tm 100 100 100 ,tm1 98.317 97.614 97.959 ,tm1 100 100 100
Y2 100.493 100.731 100.749 Y2 100 100 100 I\)I\),tm2 100.617 100.872 100.749 .tro2 100 100 100 .-
ER12 1.1 1.1 1.1
6b4 Y 100 100.201 100 6b5 Y1 98.651 98.298 98.210 6b5' Y1 100 100.201 100
,tm 100 100.211 100 ,tm1 98.317 97.938 98.210 .tro1 100 100.211 100
Y2 100.493 100.691 100.656 Y2 100 100 100
,tm2 100.617 100.828 100.656 ,tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1.1 1.10034 1.1
Table 7.2. Effects of wage policy. overview (continued)
Multilateral (PLi = 10%) Unilateral (PL1 = 10%)
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value value
Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
6c2 Y1 98.651 98.338 92.6334) 6c2' Y1 98.775 98.858 95.198
lm1 98.317 97.982 97.2244) lm1 98.472 98.618 95.0714)
Y2 100.493 100.677 121.4434) Y2 100.444 100.474 102.1684)
lm2 100.617 100.812 103.7504) Mn2 100.555 100.563 102.2034)
ER12 1.00918 1.03296 0.826134)
Notes (Table 7.2):
1) imports depending on lagged prices
2) imports depending on current prices
3) not included in previous table. calculated separately
4) period 200
5) with vertical supply curve: all wages and unemployment benefits rise







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.3. Effects of a decrease in the tax rate on profits and interest proceeds of 10%-points.1) (continued)
Multilateral Unilateral
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value value
Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
Chapter 6a 2) 2)6a7 y 100.385 100.579 100.590 Yl 100.374 100.556 100.568 Y1 100·385 100.579 100.590
tm 100.482 100.692 100·590 tml 100.468 100.664 100.568 .tml 100.482 100.692 100.590
Y2 100.004 100.008 100.007 Y2 100 100 100
lm2 100.005 100.009 100.007 lm2 100 100 100
2~aPter 6b
101.350 101.848 101.799 6b8 Y1 101.310 101.777 101.742
2) Y1 101.350 101.848 101.799Y
.tm 101.691 102.221 101.799 lml 101.641 102.134 101.742 .tml 101.691 102.221 101.799
Y2 100.013 100.024 100.019 Y2 100 100 100
lm2 100.017 100.029 100.019 lm2 100 100 100
Chapter 6c 6c4 Y1 100 99.984 110.3604)5) 6c4' Y1 100.017 100.039 89.135
8)
.tml 100 99.982 103.7504) lm1 100.021 100.049 90.7738)
Y2 100 100.005 98.672
4)5) Y2 99.994 99.987 105.0489)
tm2 100 100.006 103.7504) .tm2 99.993 99.984 103.75010)
Notes: see next page.
Table 7.4. Effects of monetary policy, overview
Multilateral Unilateral
Fixed exchange rates Flexible exchange rates
value value value
Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run Table of t=2 t=4 long run
4b6 y=tm 100 100.079 100 4b7 Yl=lm1 100 100.079 100 4b7' Yl=tm1 100 100.079 100
Y2=tm2 100 100 100 Y2=tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1 1.00013 1
4c3 Yl=tm1 100 100.044 103.750
3) 2) Yl=tm1 100 100.392 96.670
3)4)
y2=lm2 100 100.012 100.0533)4) Y2=tm2 100 99.905 101.160
3)5)
ER12 1.12425 1.08116 0.893973)4)
6b6 Y 100 100.474 100 6b7 Y1 100 100.459 100 6b7' Y1 100 100.474 100
tm 100 100.506 100 tml 100 100.487 100 tml 100 100.506 100
Y2 100 100.005 100 Y2 100 100 100
tm2 100 100.006 100 tm2 100 100 100
ER12 1 1.00081 1
6c3 Y1 100 100.258 121.0523)4) 6c3' Y1 100.961 100.878 99.01483)4)
tml 100 100.275 103.7503) tml 101.203 100.955 99.4033)4)
Y2 100 100.071 99.978
3)4) Y2 99.698 99.849 100.2743)5)
tm2 100 100.076 100.0443)4 ) tm2 99.623 99.828 100.1883)5)
ER12 1.06503 1.04035 0.973313)4)
Notes (Table 7.~2:
1) increase in MP of 10% in Tables regarding Chapter 4, increase in MP
of 5% in Tables regarding Chapter 6, all in t=2
2) not included in a previous table, calculated separately
3) value in t=200
4) increasing from t=200 to t=201
5) decreasing from t=200 to t=201
1) For models assuming international immobility of capital (parts a and b), the effects are reported of a decrease in profit taxes
(TR) and an increase in material government expenditures of 10%, The latter is added to make profits emerge. As a result, to
detect the impact of the tax manipulation, the outcomes should be compared to those in Table 7.1. If capital is mobile
internationally (part c), the effects are a result of a fall in TR only and should be compared to the outcomes of "no
intervention" .
2} not included in previous table; calculated separately
3} Y2 = lmz rises in the medium term4} period ZOO
5} increasing from t=200 to t=201
6} decreasing from t=200 to t=ZOl
7} Y2 = lmz falls in the medium term8) value in t=161; value falling from t=161 to t=16z
9} value in t=16z; value rising from t=161 to t=16z
10) value in t=161 and t=162
11) immediate reaction of mlc to relative prices
12) rising (as opposed to vertical) supply curve
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Section 2 Monetary and fiscal policy under nominal vs. real wage-rigidity
Introduction
Following Branson and Rotemberg,27 Jeffrey Sachs28 studies the impact of
fiscal and monetary policy under nominal-wage and real-wage rigidity using
a Mundell-Fleming (M-F) framework. He concludes that the efficacy of fis-
cal and monetary policy crucially depends on the way wages are set.
In this section it will be demonstrated that a similar analysis can be
performed using the SIER framework.29 We will adapt that framework only
marginally and will show that the remaining differences between our model
and the one applied by Sachs are sufficient to reach different conclu-
sions. The efficacy of fiscal policy not only depends upon the wage as-
sumption, but also on the way it is financed (Sachs assumes tax finance).
'Ricardian debt equivalence' is not obtained.
Sachs' assumptions and conclusions
According to Sachs, the traditional M-F conclusions under IeM and flexible
exchange rates (monetary policy is effective since it leads to a deprecia-
tion, fiscal policy is less effective since it causes an appreciation)
only hold if real wages can be altered by exchange rate movements. If the
real wage is fixed, the M-F policy-ranking is reversed.
Sachs reaches this conclusion using a model assuming:
1. A small open economy with flexible rates of exchange, perfect capital
mobility, perfect foresight (rational expectations) and perfect com-
petition.
2. A neo-classical production function with substitutable factors of
production (capital and labour) and a fixed capital stock.
3. A Metzler savings function. Savings (i.e., the current account sur-
plus) are proportional to the gap between desired wealth and actual
wealth. Wealth consists of foreign bonds only (home bonds and high
powered money are ignored). Desired wealth is determi~ed by net dispo-
sable income.
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4. The government budget is balanced, extra government expenditures are
tax financed. Private and public sector marginal propensities to im-
port are equal.
5. Export and import demand are functions of output and the terms of
trade only and Marshall-Lerner conditions are satisfied.
6. The share of domestic goods in domestic expenditures is constant.
7. The share of labour income in the value of output is constant.3D
Four different assumptions on wage behaviour are made: fixed nominal
wages, fixed real wages, lagged indexation of wages and real wages respon-
ding slowly to the gap between labour input and the long run desired
labour supply (lagged Phillips mechanism).
These wage behaviours can be inserted into the the SIER model by choosing
the proper coefficients in equation (2.14), the wage equation.
Sachs' most important conclusions as far as the short run is concerned
(i.e., ignoring changes in wealth), are as follows.
1. Fiscal policy is effective with a fixed real wage and (as in M-F) inef-
fective when the nominal wage is fixed.
Fiscal policy causes an appreciation (in Sachs' model extra fiscal spen-
ding is financed by higher taxes, causing a lower disposable income, lower
desired wealth, lower demand for foreign bonds and thus a surplus on the
capital account). The appreciation forces consumer prices down.
With fixed nominal wages the appreciation (reducing exports) neutralizes
the impact of fiscal policy. But if the wage rate (PL) is lowered, too
(indexation), product wages (to be defined as PL/ Pyl fall and a downward
(outward) shift of the supply curve results.
If indexation occurs with a time lag, the fiscal multiplier is smaller in
the short run than in the steady state. The impact multipliers may even be
negative. 31
With a lagged Phillips mechanism the rise in output leads to an increased
demand for labour. As a result, real wages will begin to rise, which redu-
ces the fiscal multiplier.
2. Monetary policy is ineffective with a fixed real wage and (as in M-F)
effective if the nominal wage is fixed.
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Expansion of the money supply causes a depreciation, rising import prices
and thus inflation.
If the nominal wage adapts to this inflation (indexation), the rise in
product wages (and thus the upward shift of the supply curve) compensates
the extra demand.
If nominal wages are constant, output rises. If wages are indexed with a
one period lag, monetary policy will be effective in the short run (PL is
constant); later (indexation), output returns to its initial level.
Sachs does not analyse the effects of a monetary expansion under a lagged
Phillips mechanism.
As soon as the long-term wealth effects are taken into account, Sachs
concludes the following.
With a fixed nominal wage, the long run multipliers of monetary and fiscal
policy are both likely to be positive, unlike the M-F zero multiplier of
fiscal policy. With real wage rigidity, the money multiplier is again
zero, given the nominal-real dichotomy of the long run model.
The long run fiscal multiplier, however, is negative.
He explains this as follows. Under both wage assumptions, fiscal expansion
raises output and leads to a current account deficit on impact. Actual
bond wealth falls. This decline in wealth causes aggregate demand to fall.
If real wages are rigid, the initial output level is reached and the trade
account is again in balance. But the decline in wealth has moved the debt
service account into deficit, and the overall current account remains in
deficit. Output must decline still further in order to reduce imports thus
balancing the debt service account deficit with a trade balance surplus.
If nominal wages are fixed, the decline in wealth is eventually accom-
panied by a depreciation of the currency (negative debt service account).
Aggregate supply expands and competitiveness improves. Due to the latter,
the current account is balanced at a higher level of output.
Sachs remarks that the above obtained results are very sensitive to the
specification of the trade balance. As soon as the marginal propensity to
import in the public sector is lower than the marginal propensity to im-
port in the private sector, a balanced budget fiscal expansion will shift
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demand from foreign to home produced goods. In that case, a fiscal expan-
sion can increase output in the long run, even with rigid real wages.
Modifications of the SIER model
To facilitate impulses in the SIER model similar to those discussed by
Sachs, the former is slightly modified in the following respects:
1. The possibility of equal private and public sector marginal propen-
sities to import is created and used (unless otherwise indicated);32
2. To prevent calculation problems in case of immediate and full indexa-
tion, expenditures (on goods or on taxes) are assumed to depend on income
earned in the previous period;33
3. Capital is made fixed (in line with Sachs' assumption). With invest-
ments fixed, one of the two transmission mechanisms in the SIER model
(exchange rate and rate of interest) is skipped. In the Sachs model wealth
also plays a role here.
After these modifications, the SIER model differs from the Sachs model in
the following major respects:
1. Four countries of equal size instead of a small open economy.
2. Capital is not perfectly but imperfectly mobile.
3. Expectations are not 'rational', but are partially determined by the
past.
4. Consumer demand is a function of net household income, wealth does not
determine consumption.
5. The trade balance depends on labour income and relative prices.
6. Accomodated transactions demand for money.
When a monetary sector is included in the SIER model (which is appropriate
here), a continuously growing government deficit results. Half of this
"deficit according to trend" is financed by bonds, half is financed
through monetary means. With a fiscal policy, we assume the extra govern-





In the last case no extra government deficit arises. To achieve this, the
tax rate concerned changes each period as its basis, labour income, for
example, changes. Three alternatives are distinguished here: profit tax
financing, labour tax finanCing and a combination of profit and labour
tax financing.
With a monetary policy we assume (for convenience) that the complete defi-
cit is "half money, half bond" financed.
Simulations
In the full research project , the consequences of a unilateral monetary
and fiscal expansion under the first three above mentioned wage regimes
were analysed using the amended SIER model.35 Although more conclusions
were drawn, 36 for the sake of brevity we will at this point concentrate
on the effects of monetary and especially fiscal policy in the short and
in the longer run with nominal vs. real wage rigidity. With regard to
(expansionary) fiscal policy, we will focus on the following claims made
by Sachs :
1. In the short run (where wealth considerations do not yet play an impor-
tant role) with nominal wage rigidity the appreciation makes fiscal policy
ineffective, but (apart form direct impacts from wealth on demand, not
present in the SIER model), with real wage rigidity it makes fiscal policy
effective (through a price and wage decline);
2. In the long(er) run the depreciation caused by the shortage on the debt
service account makes fiscal policy effective with constant nominal wages
and ineffective (or even counterproductive) with constant real wages;
3. In the short run the efficacy of fiscal policy with nominal wage rigi-
dity is lower than with real wage rigidity; in the long run the opposite
holds.
Instead of inserting a new set of tables, the main lines of the results37
are summarized in graphs.38
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The first graph, Diagram 7.1, displays the effects of expansionary moneta-
ry policy. It shows that, in the short run, monetary policy will be
1.03
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Diagram 7.1
most effective with sticky nominal wages, due to a depreciation of the
currency (result of a deficit on the capital account) causing an increase
in exports.
In the case of immediate indexation of wages, the depreciation causes the
consumer price index to rise relative to the output price, forcing product
wages up and output down.39
When wages are indexed with a time lag,40 this is obtained one period
later.
The capital balance deficit, however, leads to a debt service account
surplus in the subsequent periods, leading to an appreciation of the ex-
change rate of country one.
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With sticky nominal wages, this causes output to go down (falling
exports). When wages are indexed immediately, output starts to grow, as a
result of a falling product wage and increased household earnings in the
impulse period. From period 7 onwards, output will even be higher than
with rigid nominal wages.
If wages are indexed with a one period lag, output declines as soon as
wages adjust to a consumer price increase. Due to the appreciation, output
increases slightly, but remains below its initial level.
In summary, Sachs' conclusions for the short run are confirmed in the
sense that monetary policy is expansionary with fixed nominal wages and
(after a few periods) the effect is minimal with fixed real wages. But the
continuous appreciations (caused by the service account surplus) indicate
that in the longer run the policy is counterproductive with nominal wage
rigidity and is more or less neutral with real wage rigidity.41
Whereas the latter is still in line with Sachs' findings, the former is
not.
Monetary policy, with the exception of the impulse period, is the least
effective in the case of lagged indexation of wages.
The true long run positions were not calculated, but considering the
direction in which the exchange rate moves immediately after the impulse
period, it is most likely that the exchange rate overshoots its long term
equilibrium value, both with sticky nominal wages and with immediate in-
dexation.42
The effects of an expansionary fiscal policy of 10% are summarized in
Diagram 7.2 where the extra deficit is bond financed.
In t=2, the interest rate in the intervening country rises causing the
home currency to appreciate and forCing exports down. Nevertheless, on
balance, output in country one rises, due to the increased demand for home
produced goods by the government. The output price rises. Notwithstanding
the appreciation, the consumer price level rises, too.
In Sachs' analysis (assuming tax finance), the consumer price index de-
clines due to the appreciation. This difference in average price develop-
ments is crucial in determining whether indexation of wages will make
fiscal policy more effective (as in Sachs' paper) or not.43 With indexa-
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tion, the price rise found in our model causes a rise in wages and conse-
quently a fall in output. In other words, we find that indexation makes
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Diagram 7.2
In the subsequent periods the extra government deficit, partly financed by
foreign portfolio investors, grows continuously (see Chapters 4 and 6). As
a result, the international interest rate differential grows over time
leading to growing capital inflows, followed by increasing shortages on
the service account. And the latter lead to a continuously depreCiating
home currency. This mechanism is stronger with indexation as a deprecia-
tion in that case is followed by wage increases also paid to civil ser-
vants enlarging the government deficit. Moreover, with indexation a wage-
price spiral develops causing a relatively large deficit on the trade
account which enlarges the depreciation. The depreciations enhance the
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efficacy of fiscal policy with rigid nominal wages, but hamper this ef-
ficacy with indexation.
Concluding, in the short run we find that bond financed fiscal policy is
not ineffective and that indexation makes it less effective (contrary to
Sachs). In the long(er) run indexation does make it less effective (in
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Diagram 7.3
Diagram 7.3 pertains to the case where the government(s) choose(s) to
finance extra deficits by increasing the money supply.
The fiscal policy stimulates output and output prices. The home currency
depreciates as a result of a deteriorating trade balance (extra import
demand -due to the impulse- stimulated by the higher prices of county
one's products). With indexation, wages rise immediately which mitigates
the output expansion. In the subsequent periods the depreciation con-
tinues: the increased employment increases spending (inclusive the demand
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for imports). With indexation the depreciation is much larger as a result
of the wage-price spiral mentioned above.
The above conclusion on bond financed fiscal policy is upheld with moneta-
ry f'Lnanc.Lng,
Moreover, comparison of the present diagram with the previous one shows
that with sticky nominal wages the exchange rate and output are lower in
the longer run than they are with bond finanCing (where the depreciation
between periods 30 and 31 is steeper). As a preliminary conclusion. bond
financing is more effective in the long run than money financing if nomi-
nal wages are fixed.44
The developments following an expansionary fiscal policy if the extra
deficit is financed by an increase in the tax rate on profits and interest
receipts are very similar to those found under bond financing. The former
implies a lower rate of growth in financial wealth (net interest receipts
-partially added to wealth- decline) and thus a smaller demand for bonds.
whereas the latter implies an increased supply of bonds. In both cases the
price of bonds falls (interest rate rises).
A difference is found in the short run (t=2). see Diagram 7.4. As only
about 50% of wealth is invested in bonds. a fall in wealth only goes for
about 50% at the expense of bond demand. As a result. the capital account
surplus is now lower and. given the shortage on the trade account, the
appreciation (found with bond financing) is replaced by a smaller appre-
ciation if wages are fixed in real terms and by a small depreciation if
they are fixed nominally.45 As with bond financing. the appreciation in
the former case cannot prevent the price index (and thus wages if they are
indexed) from rising.
In the longer run the currency depreciates as a result of a deficit on the
service account. If nominal wages are rigid. this depreciation is rela-
tively mild: as employment grows (with output), the increase in the profit
tax rate can be partly reversed during the adjustment process. But with
indexation of wages, the rise in (also indexed) transfer payments neces-
sitates further increases in that rate of taxation and thus. in the longer
run. higher deficits in the debt service account. The exchange rate even
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Diagram 7.4
If fiscal policy is financed by higher taxes on profits and interest pro-
ceeds, the conclusion drawn on the basis of bond financing also holds.
The exception to this rule is found if labour taxes are increased to fi-
nance the fiscal policy.
If Sachs' assumption that governments and households have equal marginal
propensities to import is still held here, in the SIER model an expan-
sionary fiscal policy will always be ineffective (see Diagram 7.5), as it
merely implies a switch between private and public consumption.
If we replace this assumption by the one originally applied in the SIER
model (governments do not import at all), Diagram 7.6 is obtained.46
The switch to home production creates a rise both in home output and in
home output prices. Moreover, a trade balance surplus results, causing the
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currency to appreciate. Notwithstanding this appreciation and the fall in
output prices in the outside world (lower demand for their products), the
overall price level in the home country rises (contrary to Sachs).
If wages are fixed nominally, the rise in private consumer spending in the
subsequent periods lowers the appreciations. The continuous appreciations
lower exports and in a certain period (period 7) output and thus employ-
ment and spending decline, giving rise to further appreciations, harming
output, etc. Although not resulting immediately, this is the mechanism
causing the inefficacy of fiscal policy in the basic M-F model.
With rigid real wages, the immediate rise in the overall price level (see
above) causes its wage level to rise. When compared to sticky wages, the
supply curve shifts to the left (upward), reducing output and employment.
Together with higher transfer payments, this increases the government
deficit, necessitating a steeper rise in taxes and thus a slightly higher
appreciation. Appreciations are found in all periods, although they are
gradually reduced by the price-wage spiral. In period 7 they force the
wage level below its initial value. Here the mechanism comes into effect,
on the basis of which Sachs concluded that indexation would make fiscal
policy more effective. But he expects it to work in the short run, whereas
in our model it operates in the intermediate run.
Conclusions
With regard to fiscal policy we can conclude that in our framework:
- the link 'appreciation-wage reduction' is only found if the fiscal poli-
cy is labour tax financed provided the government's marginal propensity
to import is lower than the one of the public;47 moreover, also in that
case it does not operate immediately, leaving fiscal policy more effec-
tive in the short run if indexation is absent.
- in none of the cases was the fiscal policy found ineffective.
- apart from labour tax financing, in all periods the efficacy of fiscal
policy was harmed by indexation.
- in the short run fiscal policy is not ineffective and indexation makes
it less effective (contrary to Sachs). Provided the fiscal expansion is
not labour tax financed, indexation does make it less effective in the
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long(er) run (in line with Sachs). but not ineffective or counterproduc-
tive (contrary to Sachs). If it is labour tax financed, in the long(er}
run indexation makes the policy more effective (contrary to Sachs).
(preliminary,) fiscal policy is more effective in the long run if it is
bond financed than if it is money financed, provided nominal wages are
fixed.
As stated. more conclusions were drawn in the project on which this sec-
tion is based, especially on effects on the outside world. Moreover. it
would be interesting to analyse the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy
with different assumptions on wage behaviour in the respective countries.
Attempts in this direction are found in Branson and Rotemberg (same refe-
rence) and Van der Ploeg 48 and are also possible using the SIER frame-
work.
Section 3 Assuming alternative behaviours
This section contains:
Section 3A on intertemporal substitution and the efficacy of commercial
policy. and
Section 3B illustrating some implications of the asymmetric investment
behaviour developed in Chapter 6.
Section 3A Intertemporal substitution and the efficacy of commercial
policy
Introduction
If my name were Sweder van Wijnbergen. I would have asked myself the fol-
lowing question: what are the implications of commercial policy (i.c.
import tariff policy) for output and employment and the current account
surplus if one starts from the idea that consumers shift expenditures
between today and tomorrow, buying products when they are cheap? Moreover.
having read the previous section, I would have analysed this problem under
alternative wage systems. assuming that the outcomes would depend on the
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way wages are set.49 The general notion would be straightforward: import
tariffs are likely to raise the consumer price level.50 and if wages are
indexed. the wage level will rise and the product wage can increase. redu-
cing output and employment.
This section (3A) illustrates that by inserting some of Van Wijnbergen's
assumptions into the SIER framework many of his more important conclu-
sions51 are obtained relatively eaSily.52 As a consequence, I would have
tried to answer this question by using that SIER framework.
Van Wijnbergen's major conclusions that we will focus upon can be sum-
marized as follows.
1. The effects of tariffs on the current account and employment (output)
depend on the assumptions regarding wage and savings behaviour.
2. As long as real wages clear the labour market and capital is fixed.53 a
permanent increase in tariffs leaves the current account unaffected. Van
Wijnbergen explains this as follows: since the income effects caused by
tariff induced terms of trade changes are equal over time. and "a tariff
changes relative prices within the period in which it is levied, but a
permanent tariff does that both today and tomorrow, leaving the relative
price of consumption today in terms of consumption tomorrow (.....) unaf-
fected, ... savings will not change, which explains the absence of a cur-
rent account impact" (p. 698).
A temporary tariff, however, leads to a current account surplus. Expendi-
tures are delayed to the next period due to the relative price increase of
consumption today in terms of consumption tomorrow. Moreover, in the im-
pulse period a stronger terms of trade income effect is observed than in
the future (only partially spent in the impulse period).
3. If wages are immediately indexed,54 an increase in tariffs leads to a
decrease in output and employment. The reason is straightforward. An in-
crease in tariffs induces the consumer price index and therefore nominal
wages to go up. The latter forces real product wages up, due to the fact
that product prices do not rise as much as consumer prices and therefore
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wages. This implies that an unanticipated tariff leads to initial un-
employment via the resulting upward pressure on the real domestic product
wage.
As a result, indexation may worsen the above impacts on the current ac-
count (lower exports). On the other hand, positive price movements may
reverse this negative impact.
4. With flexible investments and labour market clearing wages, a permanent
tariff leads to a decline in investments due to an increase in the costs
of capital goods. Initially, the decrease in investments leads to a cur-
rent account surplus. The cut in investments, however, reduces aggregate
supply in period two, which in turn leads to higher prices in that period,
forcing expenditures in period one up. The latter leads to a deterioration
of the current account, which may offset the initial positive impact on
this account.
Adjustments in the SIER model
The SIER model is changed in the following respects.
1. In 'iebtest' possibilities are created to introduce a temporary import
tariff (alternatively, the import duty is permanent) and/or fixed invest-
ments.
2. Tariff revenues are redistributed to consumers to make tariffs a purely
expenditure switching device. Private expenditures are no longer deter-
mined by tariff revenues.55
3. For the same reason as in the previous section, household income earned
in period t-l is disposable in period t.56
4. Intertemporal substitution is introduced in consumer spending/savings.
Dissavings, denoted DISSV, are determined by the expected rate of infla-
tion on the one hand, and net income on the other and equal
(7.1) DISSVt
Dissavings will go uP. if consumers expect inflation. The consumer price
index expected for one period ahead is determined as a weighted average of
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expected prices of home produced goods and tariff inclusive import prices.
If a tariff is known to be temporary, future tariffs are zero, and the
expected consumer price index will cet par. be lower than the present
consumer price index. In that case DISSV is negative.
We assume that dissavings in period t will lead to savings in t+l. If so,
the latter period will be characterized by lower expenditures relative to
trend and therefore lower prices due to lower aggregate nominal demand
(ceteris paribus). As described in Chapter 2, expected demand in period
t+l is calculated using an extrapolation of present demand. To extrapolate
on the basis of the correct level of expenditures, and thus to get the
correct expected product price for one period ahead, the actual aggregate
nominal demand in t is adjusted for (dis)savings due to intertemporal
substitution, resulting in YNETt. Expected demand for t+l equals a
weighted average of present and past ¥NET corrected for current dis-





We assume fixed exchange rates. substitution between factors of produc-
tion, and no monetary sector; if investments are flexible. they are as-
sumed to equal an exogenous part57 of the gap between the cost minimizing
and the 'actual' stock of capital (see Chapter 6). In that case Van Wijn-
bergen assumes that investments vary along with the value of future output
produced with capital over the costs of capital goods. He assumes that
import tariffs are also levied on imported investment goods. Consequently,
if investment goods are made more expensive via an import tariff ceteris
paribus investment falls initially.
Another important difference between our model and the one used by Van
Wijnbergen is that the latter assumes rational expectations. whereas in
the SIER model expectations are partly extrapolative. Moreover, whereas
Van Wijnbergen assumes wages in the second period (his last period) to be
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set at such a level that unemployment vanishes. we will start from the
assumption that wage behaviour is consistent in all periods.
In the complete research project four different assumptions on wage beha-
viour are made: rigid product wages (wages adapt to output prices)58.
immediate indexation of wages (wages adapt to consumer prices). lagged
indexation of wages and rigid nominal wages.59 All four alternative wage
equations are combined with fixed and with a variable capital stock.
60As Van Wijnbergen only distinguishes the first two options • below we
will focus on the conclusions derived with those two wage assumptions.
Conclusions
As in the previous section the results of the simulations are summarized
in diagrams. In principle. each diagram contains four lines. depicting
output and the trade balance with a permanent vs. a temporary tariff.
61respectively.
Comparison of Diagrams 7.7 to 7.9 immediately shows that Van Wijnbergen's
first conclusion holds: output and current account (here trade balance)
developments crucially depend on the nature of tariffs as well as on the
way wages are set.
Diagram 7.7 relates to tariff increases with rigid product wages and a
fixed stock of capital. As output is fixed. the lines depicting output
development under both regimes (temporary vs. permanent tariffs) coincide
and are at a zero level in all periods.
A tariff raises home output prices. If the tariff is permanent. a further
price rise is antiCipated, which leads to dissavings. But this effect is
overruled by the fact that the higher wages (caused by higher output
prices) are not spent before 62 So. real spendingthe next period. oppor-
tunities fall and a surplus on the current account results. As such. this
contradicts Van Wijnbergen, but the effect can be attributed to lagged
spending opportunities. More important, if the tariff is temporary. the
initial surplus is higher. due to increased savings: as people expect a
reduction in tariffs. they also anticipate a reduction in the price level
and decide to save today and spend extra tomorrow. This is in line with
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With a temporary tariff, the surplus is reduced faster. Of course, this is
due to the removal of the tariff as such, but also to the dissavings com-
pensating the initial savings.
Whereas the effect of a temporary tariff slowly "leaks away", the per-
manent import duty results in a long run decline in the import/consumption
ratio (with imports constant and home consumption higher). In both cases
the trade balance returns to zero.63
The developments in trade balance and production reproduced in Diagram 7.8
relate to the situation where real wages are fixed (i.e., if nominal wages
increase with the consumer price index) and capital does not fluctuate.
Clearly, in both cases output64 is harmed. Wages rise faster than output
prices which results in an increase in the product wage. This finding is
in compliance with Van Wijnbergen. If the tariff is temporary, in the long
run this effect vanishes.
In the short run the trade balance is positively influenced although real
exports fall, due to higher output prices and reduced imports. Although
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the wage rate is adjusted to the higher price level, spending out of this
increased (nominal) income is delayed (see above). A surplus on the cur-
rent account is the result. But whereas with a permanent tariff dissavings
due to intertemporal substitution mitigate this effect, with a temporary
tariff the expected tariff removal leads to extra savings, furthering the
initial trade balance improvement. Again, this is in line with Van Wijn-
bergen.
With indexation a temporary import duty results in a higher initial trade
balance surplus than if product wages are rigid. The fall in real output
observed here on the one hand increases present output price rises and on
the other hand attenuates the expected growth in nominal demand and thus
the expected inflation. As a result, the (positive) difference between
present prices and future prices is higher with indexation, furthering
present savings and thus the trade balance surplus.
In the subsequent period these savings are dissaved. Together with in-
creased household spending opportunities (previously grown wages are spent
now) and the reversal of the tariff (lowering the consumer price index and
thus wages), this explains the remarkable (but temporary) recovery in
output if the tariff was temporary. The recovery is only partial if the
tariff is permanent. Product wages have permanently increased there
because of the import tariff.65
If capital is flexible and product wages are rigid, the optimal capital
.e .e .e .e
stock does not deviate from its starting value: P L = Py and Pk = ~Py' so
the expected relative factor prices are constant; moreover, as with rigid
product wages output is fixed, the same holds for expected output, the
second determinant of the cost minimizing stock of capital. Hence, Diagram
7·7 also pertains to the case of flexible capital and rigid product wages.
If wages are indexed to the consumer price level and capital is flexible,
the results can be summarized as in Diagram 7.9.
Initially, the developments equal those in the previous diagram, as in the
impulse period only the decisions to (dis)invest are taken.
With a permanent tariff the expected consumer price index is relatively
high as are expected wages. This forces expected output down which leads
to divestments. Hence, if compared to the previous diagram, in period 3
demand for investment purposes declines (see Van Wijnbergen's conclusion
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considering a permanent tariff assuming rigid product wages).66 The capa-
city effect of these investments will after some time decrease supply and
cause an increase in output prices. A larger discrepancy between expected
labour costs and output prices results, reducing expected supply, etce-
tera. The system explodes after 26 periods.67 Output continuously falls,
the trade balance continuously grows (price effects).
If the tariff is temporary, however, expected future consumer prices are
lower (the tariff is expected to be removed), leading to a more modest
anticipated wage increase. Expected wages rise less than expected output
prices. An increase in output is foreseen, leading to an increase in the
optimal stock of capital. Investments rise initially. But after the tariff
removal, this is reversed. In the (true) long run all effects vanish.
We conclude that the above adjustments in the SIER model suffice to obtain
the major conclusions drawn by Van Wijnbergen relatively easily. Moreover,
although they were not discussed here, the same simulations reveal the
effects of the tariff policy on the outside world. Furthermore, with no
extra effort a monetary sector could be included (with or without inter-
national capital mobility), and an alternative wage behaviour, production
function, investment function and/or exchange rate system could be chosen.
The effects of retaliation (tariff war, customs union, etcetera) could be
studied easily. All of these factors would complicate a traditional analy-
sis (as the one by Van Wijnbergen) considerably.
As in the previous section, an important difficulty, however, still lies
in calculating the real long run outcomes if full and immediate indexation
of wages is assumed.
Section 3B Asymmetrical investment behaviour
Introduction
In Chapter 6, section 1, an alternative investment function was presented,
labelled 'the asymmetrical investment function'(equation 6.8). In the
present section we will discuss some of the consequences for the model's
behaviour if the game leader would choose this option.
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First, under the heading 'pattern of development' we will illustrate that
assumption of this investment behaviour leads to a continuous cyclical
development in endogenous key variables in the economy, as opposed to a
return to a (possibly new) trend value if the inv6stment function of Chap-
ter 668 is assumed. We will argue that this cyclical pattern is explained
by the fact that a smaller gap69 is now filled to a larger extent by net
investments.
Secondly, under the heading 'asymmetry' the asymmetric properties of this
investment behaviour will be illustrated as well as explained. Moreover,
in the same part consequences for some of the trend values, i.e., average
long run values, will be discussed.
To keep the discussion as simple as possible, throughout this subsection
we will assume a model without (explicit) monetary sector and discuss
(mainly world-wide) demand impulses only.
Pattern of development
Diagram 7.10 displays:
the development in country one's firm output after a 5% world-wide
government expenditure increase if the asymmetric investment function
applies (let us call this 'combination 1')
its counterpart following a 10% world-wide government expenditure in-
crease with Chapter six' symmetric investment behaviour (let us call
this 'combination 2,).70
Whereas in the latter situation the economy rather quickly returns to a
new stationary situation, the former investment behaviour leads to a cy-
clical development in all periods.
The difference between the two is explained by a feature embodied in equa-
tion (6.8): if the gap is small, a larger proportion of the gap is filled,
(and vice versa). The economic interpretation here is as follows. Compare
two situations, A and B with about equal initial stocks of capital. In A,
a 'gap' of 10 machines exists, in B a 'gap' of 5 machines. The purchase of
the 6th machine in case A causes more disutility than the purchase of the
third machine in B. Ceteris paribus. in B (with a small gap) a higher
proportion of the gap will be filled by planned investments than in A. In
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the extreme, if 'gap' approaches zero, iD approaches 1. This feature is
illustrated in Diagram 7.11, where for all periods between 200 and 750
(end of calculation period) the combinations of the ratio iD/gap and gap
are dePicted.71 In the symmetric investment function, iD move: propor-
tionately with gap by definition. In other words, as k follows k , and
*with a delay approaches k in both cases (see below), (6.8) implies that
when the gap narrows, the speed with which the remaining gap is filled
increases in relative terms, whereas in the symmetric case this speed is
constant.
This different behaviour implies that application of (6.8) leads to a
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ratio exceeds 1, k overshoots k ; if it is lower
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*In the periods immediately following the impulse, k rises, but k is still
unaffected in both cases.72 This results in initial undershooting. After a
*delay, k reacts and overshoots k in both cases. But combination 1 leads
to a larger overshooting than 2.
A higher degree of overshooting has as a consequence that the remaining
*gap is now more negative. k shrinks in order to adjust to the low k. By
*the same token, if investments follow (6.8), k undershoots k to a relati-
vely large extent, etc.
Where the gap between actual and cost minimizing capital stock vanishes
with the symmetric investment function, it continuously returns if (6.8)
applies. This feature is also displayed by Diagram 7.13 where the values
over the business cycle of 'gap' and iD are depicted, following a world-
wide 10% expansion of government expenditures assuming (6.8). This picture















Now we turn to the asymmetric properties of equation (6.8).73
Diagram 7.14 gives the ('scaled') values of capital stock, output prices,
profits and 'gap' over in the business cycle following a world-wide in-
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Diagram 7.14
If the capital stock is large. supply of products is relatively high. and
output prices are low. With rigid nominal wages. the latter implies that
losses are incurred. Hence, a large capital stock coincides with losses.
By the same token. a small capital stock coincides with profits. At the
same time (see above). if k is high, as a rule 'gap' is negative (also
displayed in the same diagram).
Equation (6.8) implies that entrepreneurs are more eager to get a cost
reduction if losses (cq. modest profits) are incurred than if profits are
high.
254
As a high value of k coincides with losses and a negative gap (see above),
this gap will be filled (with disinvestments) relatively fast. But if k is
small (i.e., profits are relatively high), the positive gap (calling for
net investments) will be filled relatively slowly: entrepreneurs are less
anxious for a cost reduction.
As a result, a high k is reduced more quickly than a low k is raised. On
balance, therefore, the average value of the capital stock will shrink
relative to the one of production. And given the shape of the production
function, the opposite holds for employment.
Examples are found in Table 7.5 where under different assumptions the
trend values (i.e., the average values obtained as soon as a 'steady
cycle' is reached) for some key variables are shown following a government
expenditure increase of 10%.74
In the first column, as a point of reference, the long run values are
reproduced that were found in Chapter 6 where the symmetric investment
function was applied. In the other columns, equation (6.8) is assumed.
The second column shows that in trend values
the capital stock is lower than the one that would result in minimiza-
* *tion of production costs (k < k ); (in Chapter 6: k = k
- the capital intensity of the production process is lower than its ini-
tial level, the labour intensity is higher; (in Chapter 6: both return
to 1)
-(whereas they returned to 1 in Chapter 6,) output prices rise (as a
result of a relatively low stock of capital) to such an extent that the
initial income distribution is restored (as in Chapter 6)
As the explanations for the conclusions given above are independent of the
direction of the impulse, the same conclusions are found if governments
contract their expenditures (column 3). With an expansionary impulse,
employment grows faster than output (with a contractionary impulse, it
falls less), but output is lower than found in Chapter 6. This is caused
by the less than proportionate increase (resp. more than proportionate
fall) in the capital stock.
If only country 1 expands (column 4), in the home country similar effects
are found. The more interesting effects are, however, found abroad.
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Foreign countries experience two impulses: a positive influence (positive
demand impulse, see exports), and a negative one caused by the existence
of a business cycle which reduces the average stock of capital and as such
reduces supply (negative supply impulse). On balance, output falls, the
capital stock falls more (facilitating a rise in employment), and (both
output and consumer) prices rise. As these results are the outcome of two
opposite forces, their on balance effect might as well be positive. We
conclude, however, that under these circumstances a fiscal expansion can-
not simply be labelled 'sustaining' anymore.
In the previous chapters, a temporary increase in demand would have had no
long run effects. But with the asymmetric investment equation such a poli-
cy does influence the trend values. The wave produced by the impulses
functions as a negative supply shock: the average stock of capital falls
and output and employment fall with it. See columns 5 and 6, both repor-
ting the trend values following a 10% increase in government expenditures
in period 2 and an opposite impulse in period 3. In column 5 all countries
act in this respect, in column 6 only country 1 intervenes. Apart from
some rounding errors, the average long run results in all countries are
equal as the demand effect of the impulse is cancelled out. The supply
effect -a shrinking capital stock as a result of the created business
cycle- remains.
The simulations studied so far lead us to the preliminary conclusion that
if an asymmetric investment function applies and a government wants to
avoid negative supply shocks, it should not function as a 'shock-maker'
but as a 'shock-breaker'.
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NOTES (Chapter 7)
1 That is, a country will act and only act if the intervention is
beneficial to its employment and production. If these two aims conflict,
see below.
2 We simplify matters further here by excluding the possibility of
"hypothetical international compensation", by considering only one type of
policy at the same time, as opposed to (possibly internationally
differing) combinations of policies and by treating "the other countries"
as one entity: they either act in common or they do not act at all.
Moreover, all interventions are based on the internationally equal
starting posittons described in the preceeding chapters, These
simplifications as Nell as the assumption of a simple production and
employment-goal, reflect the fact that this section serves only as an
example for the research possibilities of the game. Of course, the
conclusions below only hold given the validity of the assumptions.
3 In the present context, assuming equal






4 If the international spillover effects are higher and a unilateral
action leads to a positive gain for the intervening country itself, an
interesting problem results: which country is going to act 'first'?
5 These tables are not included in the separate 'table bundle', but are
found at the end of this section.
6 In the remainder of this section we will not repeat that under these
circumstances the effects of a unilateral action under flexible exchange
rates are identical for the home country to the ones with a multilateral
action, and are zero for the outside world.
7 Although not tested for all four tables, an analogous conclusion is
probably valid for lagged vs. non-lagged reaction of consumers to changes
in relative international prices.
8 In Table 7.1 and the ones to follow in this section, the names of the
original tables of Chapters 3 to 6 are given from which the figures
concerned are taken. This way we can refer to a section in the present
overview by giving the name of that (original) table. If the figures in
Table 7.1 are calculated separately, such is indicated.
9 Of course, it is also neutral in cases where insulation applies
(flexible exchange rates, no ICM).
10 An exception here is the case of a vertical supply curve with
SUbstitution (Chapter 5), indicating the absence of unemployment, where in
all cases the fiscal policy is equally {in)effective.
11 Remember that with ICM the table only gives values for period 200. The
true long run position is not clear.
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12 This conclusion can be verified by summation of the growth in
production cq. employment in all countries in the period concerned,
bearing in mind that countries 3 and 4 experience the same developments as
country 2.
13 Or rather, accomodation of the transaction demand for money.
14 Although it may depend on the speed of consumer reaction and the time
horizon (see Table 3a.3).
15 J. Frenkel and M. Mussa, 'Monetary and Fiscal Policies in an Open
Economy', American Economic Review, 71, May 1981, pp. 253-258.
16 R. Caves and R. Jones, 'World Trade and Payments', Little, Brown and
Co., Boston, 1985.
17 See the 'medicine' suggested in Chapter 4 to cure the long run
instability if ICM is included.
18 With a wage rise we refer to an increase in all household incomes
(inclusive non-private wages). If only private wages rise, in general, the
impact on production and employment is worse.
19 That is, with substitutable production factors in t=2 and in t=4, with
complementary factors of production in t=4.
20 If this conclusion could be reversed (in the sense that lower wages in
one country would benefit its own performance and harm the outside world),
wage policy could be labelled 'conflicting'. Since a world-wide wage
decrease would then probably lead to zero .effects (roughly speaking),
international harmonization would be the likely result. Since Table 7.2
does not report on such a wage decline, these conclusions are premature.
In general, a unilateral wage increase under fixed exchange rates harms
a country's own economy, so it is unwise to pursue this policy in the
first place. As a result, no country will increase its wage rate, and
harmonization (of 'no intervention') is likely.
21 Both statements are valid under the condition that period 200 is
indicative for the long run outcomes.
22 As noted in Chapter 4, if a monetary sector is included but no ICM, a
tax reduction on interest proceeds is ineffective as the extra demand for
bonds (higher wealth) equals the extra supply (higher government deficit).
23 Note that direct comparisons between columns are prohibited in parts a
and b of Table 7.3 because in all columns 2 different impulses are carried
out. As a consequence one cannot tell here whether a multilateral tax
reduction would be preferable to a unilateral action or not. Questions on
harmonization cannot be answered here.
24 If, with complementarity, account is taken of footnote 3 to the table.
25 If footnote 7 to the table is taken into account.
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26 It will be remembered from Chapter 4 that different conclusions were
drawn for a continuous monetary expansion.
27 W.Branson and J.Rotemberg, "International Adjustment with Wage Rigidi-
ty", European Economic Review, 13 (1980), 309-332.
28 Sachs, J., "Wages, Flexible Exchange Rates and Macroeconomic Policy",
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, June 1980, 731-747.
29 This section as well as section 3A below is based largely on a previous
jOint research project with G.Frankena (presently Dutch Central Bank).
30 This assumption can conflict with the assumed fixed stock of capital:
if capital is fixed (short run assumption), the distribution of income is
not necessarily fixed. The assumption concerned is important in deriving
the output function. Moreover, the short run assumption seems to conflict
with Sachs' analysis of the long run impact of policies carried out on the
basis of the same model (except for changes in wealth).
31 If the long run appreciation exceeds the one in the short run, with
rational expectations money market equilibrium must imply a lower interest
rate in the intervening country. With a given money supply, this
equilibrium is achieved by a decrease in output.
32 Although in the above mentioned research project both alternative
assumptions were applied in all cases, here we will only discuss the
results obtained with Sachs' assumption, as the other results did not
differ qualitatively unless otherwise indicated.
33 The necessary adjustments were made in the equations of F and P. The
latter equation was changed to keep it the price level of final private
absorption. BL remains defined as current labour tax receipts.
34 We restrict ourselves to the situation here, where all countries act
similarly in this respect.
35 The report on the full research project is available on request at
cost price.
36 On the effects on the outside world, for example. Moreover, in future
research the impact of capital accumulation will be investigated.
37 Since a few impulses regarding immediate and full indexation could not
(yet) be calculated for over 31 periods, to get comparable results all
impulses concerned were only computed for this limited number of periods.
This implies that conclusions concerning the long run are provisional.
38 In each graph the dotted and the full line relate to fixed nominal
wages and represent ER12 and Y1/100, respectively. The dashed lines relate
to fixed real wages where the one consisting of small dashes indicates
Y1/100 and the one composed of larger dashes refers to ER12.
39 The depreciation is not as large here as with fixed nominal wages as a
consequence of the larger government deficit: with rising wages, salaries
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of civil servants rise proportionately, leading to a higher rate of
interest and thus a smaller deficit on the capital account.
40 Results of lagged indexation are not included in the graphs.
41 For the outside countries the opposite effects hold (not included in
the graph).
42 One of the extra conclusions drawn in the full research project is that
in the modified SIER model, with the exchange rate as the sole
transmission mechanism, monetary policy becomes an expenditure switching
policy. The specification of the wage equation determines the direction of
the switch.
43 Therefore, in several ways an attempt was made to achieve a price drop
as found by Sachs. The economy was made "small" by fixing import prices in
the consumer price equation of the home country, the weights in the price
equation were fixed, and perfect (as opposed to imperfect) capital
mobility was introduced into the model. Neither way did prices fall
following a bond financed fiscal expansion.
44 With indexation a conclusion in this respect is more dangerous if drawn
on the basis of the figures presented here. In period 30 the exchange rate
is higher than with bond financing, but in the latter case the currency
appreciates initially and the rise in the exchange rate is steeper between
periods 10 and 31 (as a result of the debt service account deficit). In
other words, period 30 seems a worse indicator of the long run outcomes.
45 If wages are indexed, the government deficit rises faster due to higher
transfer payments. Therefore, the necessary tax rate increase is higher in
that case leading to a higher capital account surplus.
46 The scale of the vertical axis deviates substantially from the ones in
the previous five diagrams.
47 The link was not found if the fiscal policy was half profit tax, half
labour tax financed.
48 F. van der Ploeg, "International Interdependence




49 See S. Van Wijnbergen: "Tariffs, Employment and the Current Account:
Real Wage Resistance and the Macroeconomics of Protectionism".
International Economic Review, vol. 28, no. 3, October 1987, pp. 691-706.
50 Because Van Wijnbergen assumes that the Metzler paradox does not
obtain.
51 We will not concern ourselves here with Van Wijnbergen's conclusions
regarding the small country-case, the non-specialization-case, and the
possibility of using tariff revenues as wage subsidies.
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52 As Section 2, Section 3A draws heavily on a research project carried
out with G.Frankena. The full research report, her master's thesis, is
available on request at cost price.
53 Obviously, output and employment are unaffected in this case.
54 And capital is still fixed.
55 The equation representing the budget deficit of the government, F, is
adjusted correspondingly.
56 BL is defined as TLt_1 * (YLt_1+TRFt_1 ).
57 Here equal to 1/3.
58 Van Wijnbergen calls this 'labour market clearing wages'.
59 In the first three wage assumptions, expected cq. actual wages adapt to
expected and actal prices, respectively.
60 Moreover, if capital varies, he only analyses the impact of a permanent
import tariff.
61 For a permanent tariff the full line depicts (y1 - 100) and the dotted
line refers to Sl N. For a temporary tariff (y1 - 100) is described by the
line consisting of large dashes, whereas the line of smaller dashes
relates to Sl N.
62 When spent, it reduces the surplus.
63 This way, Van Wijnbergen's conclusion that with rigid real product
wages the current account does not change if a permanent tariff is
introduced is reached here in the long run.
64 With capital fixed, developments in employment are fully determined by
those in output.
65 Long run output also falls in the outside world because of an increase
in 'real' product wages. Again this is caused by an increased consumer
price level. But now, the latter stems from higher priced products
imported out of 'our' country.
66 As investment goods are not imported in the SIER model, the effect on
the trade balance is minimal and indirect. Although nominal exports
increase (lower ouput price, higher volume), the trade balance in fact
worsens when compared to Diagram 7.8 as a result of more imports due to
expected price increases (caused by the anticipated decrease in the
capital stock).
67 In Diagram 7.9 the 'longer run' effects of a permanent tariff relate to
periods 25 and 26, whereas those of a temporary tariff concern periods 50
and 51.
68 With 'the investment function of Chapter 6' we refer to the symmetric
function 'in = 0.25xgap' applied in the simulations of that chapter.
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69 In absolute terms. 'Gap' was defined in Chapter 6 as the difference
between the stock of capital that is expected to minimize production cost
2 years from now, and the stock of capital that will be obtained in that
period if present net investment decisions are zero.
70 Applying the parameters chosen in equation (6.8). with equal impulses a
certain rise in 'k*' leads to more planned investments. On the one hand,
this causes a higher demand effect of investments and consequently a
steeper rise in 'k*' (when compared to the symmetric investment equation).
On the other hand. higher planned investments in t=2 lead to a higher
expected capital stock in t=3 (expected for t=5). and thus to a higher
'k*', also. To get comparable developments in 'k*' (see below). the
impulse percentages differ.
71 For very small values of gap, the ratio iD/gap may exceed 1 due to
rounding.
72 Due to the decision lag and the installation lag.
73 Application of (6.8) led to the cyclical pattern described above, as
well as to a modest asymmetry. To get more pronounced asymmetric effects
with modest impulses, (6.8) was slightly modified. Instead of measuring
the utility of cost reductions directly, they were first related to
current profits (plus C2).For a given cost reduction this ratio falls ifcurrent profits are higher. The values for the parameters in (6.8) are
C1= 1000. C2= 2, C3= 0.5Tne asymmetry grew if 'conservatism' fell (i.e.• if C was lower), since
the term producing the asymmetry (the first ter~) is relatively more
important then. Asymmetry was more pronounced if impulses were larger.
Other coefficients in (6.8) produced qualitatively the same results.







a world-wide change in government
that government expenditures change in
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Concluding Remarks
This dissertation presented a game first of all meant for didactic pur-
poses. Several variants were discussed. As a check and to make the disser-
tation a guide for future game-leaders, several policies were simulated.
The framework presented can also be used for future research purposes. The
final chapter gave some illustrations in this respect.
As indicated in Chapter I, however, the SIER Game is by no means finished.
The models presented can and should be improved in various respects. The
strict distinction between labour/consumers on the one hand and wealth
owners plus entrepreneurs/(portfolio) investors on the other hand, the
structure of the labour market (especially labour supply and the fact that
governments can determine both the price of labour and the number of civil
servants), the neutralization of the monetary consequences of trade balan-
ce disequilibria and the assumption of only one sector per country are a
few examples of areas for improvement.
Moreover, the method used could be improved. The distinction between im-
pulses and decision rules of economic subjects could be relieved, other
expectation strutures could be assumed.
In all of these areas improvements and refinements could be made. The
primary goal of the model should not be forgotten, however. Increasing the




(most symbols are listed under several headings)
general
Unless indicated otherwise, all symbols used indicate absolute magnitudes
and refer to country i where i = 1,...,4 and to the present period. t.
Dashes on top of symbols refer to exogenuity. They are predetermined by
the game leader. just as coefficients in the model, or can be fixed by
players. Dotted variables symbolize relative changes. The subscripts 't-1'
or '-1' indicate a time lag of one period. Upper case symbols indicate
values, lower case indicate real terms (volumes).
labour market
ts total supply of labour
IT exogenous rate of growth in total labour supply
tm number of people working in the private sector (including number of
employers)
tg number of people working in the government sector
tu number of unemployed
td total demand for labour
u unemployed as a percentage of total labour supply
PL wage in the market sector
~l'~2 degree to which the private wage rate rises immediately resp. lagged
with inflation
~l·~2 degree to which the private wage rate rises immediately resp. lagged
with labour productivity
Al'A2 0-1 parameter indicating the existence of an immediate resp.lagged
influence of unemployment on the private wage rate
b1,b2 degree to which the private wage rate rises immediately resp. lagged
if u > Q
autonomous relative change in the private wage rate defined as a
percentage of the wage rate of the last period (policy instrument)
price of final private absorption (consumer price level)
salary per civil servant
autonomous relative change in the income of civil servants (policy
instrument)
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PLU income per unemployed
PLU autonomous relative change in the income of unemployed (policy
instrument)
YL total labour income earned in the private sector
Consumer spending
TRF ='transfers' = total payments to civil servants and unemployed
YL total labour income earned in the private sector
BL labour tax revenue
TL tax rate on labour income
D nominal net household income
wB net real consumer income
C private consumption of goods produced in the home market
M value of (total) imports before tariffs
~ij value of imports in i out of country j before import tariffs
tij import tariff levied in i on imports out of j
BTi import tariff revenue for country i
£ ratio between the amount of money spent on home produced goods and
the amount spent on imports out of j
Pm.. price of imports in i out of j in currency i after tariffs
lJ









life span of machines and period of reference for expectations
percentage of depreciation per period
stock of physical capital available
stock of capital actually in use
that stock of capital that results in a stationary situation
*k optimal stock of capital, i.e., the stock of capital that is





difference between k* and the stock of capital that would result
if no net investments were planned (Chapter 6)
a marginal unit of investment (Chapter 6)
price of capital = (r+6)Py
Ymax maximum production capacity
volume of gross investments (in fixed capital)
iD net investment decisions
NP
e net present value of expected gains (in money terms) from an
expansion of the stock of capital by one unit
q coefficient indicating the degree to which expected profits lead




0p interest paid by firms
B interest received by firms









salary per civil servant
number of civil servants
autonomous relative increase in tg (policy instrument)
income per unemployed
number of unemployed
= 'transfers' = total payments to civil servants and unemployed
g material government expenditures in real terms
g autonomous relative increase in g (policy instrument)
~ coefficient indicating the amount of extra material government
consumption (g) per extra civil servant
F balance on the government account
0g government interest payments
BR revenue of taxes on profits and interest earnings
BL labour tax revenue
BT import tariff revenue
t. . import tariff levied in i on imports out of
1J
TL tax rate on labour income
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TR tax rate on profits and interest proceeds
x volume of exports
Product market
P price level of a product produced in i in currency i
Yi
Y nominal demand for goods produced by firms in i
y volume of firm output
supply or supply curve (in Chapters 5. 6
ample)
if labour supply is
cap Ymax maximum production capacity
Yd demand or demand curve
MC marginal cost
AC average cost
model 1 if output is below maximum given the stock of capital("demand
model")
o if output is maximal given the stock of capital ("supply model")model
Bonds Market
OVD ..
~J stock of bonds issued in country j desired by citizens (non-firms)
in country i in currency
~ii parameter determining the dependency of OVDii from ri
~ij parameter determining the dependency of OVDii from foreign
interest rates and expected depreciations
Vi financial wealth (non-firm) in country i in currency i (portfolio)
TT holdings of bonds by firms
ri interest rate (nominal)
O. total stock of bonds issued in i~
O. . number of bonds issued in j held in i
~J
OOR interest earnings of entrepreneurs
aOe interest earnings of wealth holders
00 total private (non-firm) interest earnings
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government interest payments
interest paid by firms
interest revenues on firm holdings of bonds
de~reciation charges
percentage of the current government deficit financed through
monetary means (policy instrument)
MP expansion of the money supply due to open market operations
MP percentage of last period's number of bonds bought by the central
bank (policy instrument)






price level of a product produced in i in currency i
price of imports in i out of j in currency i after tariffs
average import price level (after tariffs)
price of final private absorption (consumer price level)
price of one unit of gold in currency i (ER4 is the numerary of
the system)
percentage increase in the price of gold in terms of currency i.
exchange rate between currencies i and j : number of currency i
per unit of currency j
expected rate of depreciation of currency i in terms of currency
price of a canso1 issued in country i
wage in the market sector
Balance of Payments
BB balance of payments measured in gold
SN balance on trade account in home currency
ROB balance on the service account in home currency
RAB balance on the capital account in home currency
SIN' balance on trade account (of country 1) that would have been
obtained if exchange rates from the previous period would have
applied
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balance on debt service account (of country 1) that would have
been obtained if exchange rates from the previous period would
have applied
balance on capital account (of country 1) that would have been




coefficients (in brackets: standard value)
C1 fixed amount of labour per unit of output ( 1 )
K fixed amount of capital per unit of output ( 1 )
b rate of depreciation of fixed capital (without mon.sector 0.2,else 0.1)
e life span of a machine (without mono sector 5, else 10)
~O scale factor in production function ( 1 )
€ ratio of nominal imports over nominal home consumption
trade flow )
Q critical value for unemployment to exert no influence on wages if a
0.08889 per
Philips mechanism is assumed ( 2.982107355 )
~ coefficient indicating the amount of extra
consumption per extra civil servant
IT rate of growth in labour force ( 0 )
A1' A2' bl, b2 zer%ne coefficients, see "labour market"
q degree to which expected profits lead to net (dis) investments
coefficient c536 of equation 4.2 ( 30 )
material government









value of variable concerned expected for period t+2
unless subscript indicates that the expectation regards
period t+l
block countries











present value in t of the expected price of a machine
bought one period ahead
weighted rate of growth in real final demand during
periods t -e....•t
difference between k* and the stock of capital that
would result if no net investments were planned (Chapter
6)
utility (Chapter 6)
international capital mobility (Chapter 7)

































welfare of country 1
kind of model (where 0.0000 indicates a supply model)
volume of sales
volume private consumption of home produced goods
volume of (gross) investments
volume of exports
import volume
nominal labour income earned in private sector
nominal value of gross profits
price of labour in private sector
disposable real income per labourer in private sector
price level of (total) consumption
price of home produced goods
volume of physical capital
number of workers in private sector
unemployment rate (in %)
optimal volume of physical capital
(in view of expected prices of factors of production)
net investment decision
government budget surplus
interest rate on capital market
balance on trade account in home currency, in nominal terms
surplus on balance of payments (in gold). in nominal terms
exchange rate: amount of currency 1 per unit of currency 2
volume of imports in country lout of country 2
price of home produced goods expected for two years ahead
price of capital expected for two years ahead
price of labour expected for two years ahead
maximum output of the actual stock of capital if labour is fully
absorbed
supply of products if labour supply is ample
production expected for two years ahead
revenue of profit tax














tax rate on profits
interest rate on capital market
number of (irredeemable) bonds issued in country 1
stock of bonds demanded by households in country 1
issued in country 1 in value. in currency 1
stock of bonds demanded by households in country 2
issued in country 1 in value. in currency 1
interest earnings accruing to households in country 1
in currency 1
interest payments by firms in country 1
interest payments by government in country 1
wealth
surplus on service account of country 1
surplus on capital account in country 1
surplus on balance of payments (in gold). in nominal terms















change (in %-points) in labour tax rate
change (in %-points) in profit tax rate
tariff on imports out of country 2
tariff on imports out of country 3
tariff on imports out of country 4
additional government purchases
additional civil servants
autonomous increase in private wages
increase in income per civil servant relative to private wages
increase in income per unemployed relative to private wages
monetary financing of government deficit




SIER A Macro-Economic Computer Game on Cooperation and Conflict in Inter-
national Economics
This dissertation presents the 'SIER' Game (Simulation of International
Economic Relations), a four country computer game developed with strong
programming support of the Computer Department (DRC) of Tiburg University.
The game was primarily designed as an aid for teachers of standard
international macro-economics. The game should show players how hard it is
to reach certain goals of economic policy in an interrelated world
economy. In addition to its educational purposes, the Game can also serve
as a research tool.
The SIER Game consists of a series of games ranging from relatively simple
to rather complex. Ideally students play games incorporating several
successive levels of complexity. All levels have a large number of
behavioural and technical relationships in common and their formal
structure (i.e., the method of playing) is identical. (It is not necessary
to know anything about computers to play any of the versions.)
The versions differ mainly in the production function (complementary vs.
perfectly substitutable factors of production ), the investment function,
the import equation, the possible inclusion of a monetary block (with or
without international mobility of capital) and the possible option (for
players) to choose between fixed but adjustable and flexible rates of ex-
change.
The game leader chooses the appropriate version. His choice also
determines the instruments available to players (see below). Moreover, the
game leader has the option to change the coefficients of the model. He can
change 'details' of the model in the same way. He may, for example,
include an immediate or lagged influence of consumer prices, labour
productivity and/or the rate of unemployment on the nominal wage rate.
Chapter 1 describes the way the Game is played.
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Four player groups are formed, each representing the government of a coun-
try. The choice of four countries is not completely arbitrary. It facili-
tates trade blocks, for example, and, although the computer uses a symme-
tric four-country model, if two or three countries cooperate, the 'world',
in fact, becomes asymmetric.
Each group is assigned to maximize 'welfare' in its country by the end of
the Game through proper manipulation of its macro-economic instruments
over a number of periods. The group with the highest welfare has won the
game.
'Welfare' is a figure based on the five goals of economic policy accepted
in many western economies. It is determined by the real private absorption
of goods and services, the rate of unemployment, price changes, the sur-
plus on the balance of payments and, alternatively, the rate of interest
or the government deficit.
The policy instruments per player group are the level of material govern-
ment expenditures, the number of civil servants, the tax rate on labour
income, the tax rate on profits and interest proceeps, 3 (possibly
different) import tariffs. wage policy, the salary of civil servants, the
income per unemployed, exchange rate policy or (alternatively) a system of
flexible exchange rates. If a monetary sector is included, open market
policy and the extent to which the government deficit is financed through
bonds are additional instruments.
During the decision making process, players can use the information on
their terminal screen that is either shown automatically or available on
request (including lists of symbols).
This information is not only available for the current period and for
their own country, but also for all previous periods and for any other
country.
A game is closed by an evaluation based on a computer printout of all in-
terventions and the developments in the main economic variables during the
game. This printout is available to every player immediately after the
computer session.
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Chapter 2 describes the relationships common to all of the versions of the
SIER Game. These common features are combined with one of two available
investment equations and one of two available production functions. The
resulting combinations can be classified as dynamic non-linear symmetric
systems with four large countries and imperfect international competition
in both product and financial assets markets.
The respective combinations are discussed in Chapters 3 to 6. They are
illustrated by a description over time of the impact of unilateral or
world-wide fiscal policy. supply-side policy. wage policy and. if
applicable. monetary policy. under alternative initializing assumptions.
Chapters 1 to 6 can be regarded as a guide for future game leaders.
Chapter 7 summarizes the impacts of those policies and compares the con-
cluSions regarding fiscal and monetary policy to those drawn in standard
economic literature. Moreover. it discusses the merits of the SIER Game as





SIER Een Macro-Economisch Computerspel over Samenwerking en Conflict in de
Internationale Economie
De dissertatie behandelt het 'SIER Spel' ('Simulation of International
Economic Relations'), een computerspel voor vier landen. De ontwikkeling
van de programmatuur is in belangrijke mate ondersteund door de Dienst
RekenCentrum van de Katholieke Universiteit Brabant. Het spel is aller-
eerst bedoeld als hulpmiddel bij het onderwijs in de internationale macro-
economie. Het moet aan de spelers tonen hoe moeilijk het is om bepaalde
doeleinden van economische politiek te bereiken in een gelntegreerd we-
reldbestel. Niet alleen voor onderwijs, maar ook voor onderzoek kan het
spel een dienstig hulpmiddel vormen.
Het SIER Spel bestaat uit een serie spelen, vari~rend van makkelijk tot
moeilijk. Idealiter spelen studenten versies van een opeenvolgende moei-
lijkheidsgraad. AIle spelniveau's hebben een aantal technische en gedrags-
relaties gemeen en bovendien is de spelformule steeds dezelfde. In geen
der varianten hoeven de spelers voorkennis van computers te bezitten.
De varianten verschillen in hoofdzaak voor wat betreft de produktiefunctie
(complementaire dan weI perfect substitueerbare produktiefactoren), de
investeringsfunctie, de invoerfunctie, de eventuele opname van een mone-
taire sector (al dan niet met internationale kapitaal-mobiliteit) en het
weI of niet bestaan van de mogelijkheid (voor spelers) om te kiezen tussen
vaste maar aanpasbare en flexibele wisselkoersen.
De spelleider kiest de meest geschikte versie. Daarmee bepaalt hij dan
tevens de instrumenten van economische politiek die de spelers zullen
kunnen hanteren (zie onder). Bovendien kan de spelleider de co~fficienten
van het model wijzigen, waardoor hij de spelvariant op 'detailpunten' kan
wijzigen. Op die manier kan hij bijvoorbeeld een onmiddellijke of ver-
traagde invloed bewerkstelligen van inflatie, arbeidsproduktiviteit en/of
werkloosheid op de lonen.
In Hoofdstuk 1 wordt de manier beschreven waarop het spel wordt gespeeld.
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Er worden vier spelersgroepen gevormd, waarbij elke groep geacht wordt de
regering van een land te vertegenwoordigen. De keuze van vier landen is
niet volledig arbitrair. Zo opent dit de mogelijkheid van handelsblokken
en als twee of drie landen samenwerken ontstaat er een asymmetrische 'we-
reId' hoewel de computer gebruik maakt van symmetrisch model.
Elke groep moet er voor zorgen dat op het einde van het spel de 'welvaart'
in zijn land het hoogst is, te bereiken door het voeren van een geeigend
macro-economisch beleid in de successievelijke perioden. Het land met de
hoogste welvaart heeft gewonnen.
Hierbij wordt 'welvaart' gemeten aan de hand van de vijf in vele westerse
landen algemeen aanvaarde doelstellingen van economisch beleid. Zij hangt
af van de reele private absorptie van goederen en diensten, het werkloos-
heidspercentage, de mate van prijsstabiliteit, het betalingsbalanssaldo,
en ofwel de rentestand ofweI het overheidstekort.
Elke spelersgoep heeft de volgende instrumenten tot zijn beschikking: het
niveau van de materiele overheidsconsumptie, het aantal ambtenaren, de
belastingvoet op arbeidsinkomen, die op winstinkomen en renteinkomen, 3
(mogelijk verschillende) importtarieven, loonpolitiek, het niveau van de
ambtenarensalarissen, het niveau van de uitkeringen, en de hoogte van de
wisselkoers dan weI de overgang naar flexibele wisselkoersen. Indien een
spel gespeeld wordt met monetaire sector, wordt daar aan toegevoegd open-
marktpolitiek en de mate waarin het overheidstekort via obligatie-uitgifte
wordt gefinancierd.
Gedurende hun besluitvormingsproces kunnen spelers gebruik maken van de
informatie die hetzij automatisch, hetzij op hun eigen verzoek op hun
terminalscherm getoond wordt. (Tot deze laatste vorm van informatie beho-
ren ook de symbolenlijsten.) AIle informatie is zowel voor de lopende
periode voor het eigen land beschikbaar, als voor andere perioden en/of
andere spelersgroepen.
Een spel wordt afgesloten door middel van een evaluatie aan de hand van
een computer-uitdraai met betrekking tot alle beleidsinterventies en de
ontwikkelingen in de belangrijkste economische grootheden in de loop van
het spel.
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In Hoofdstuk 2 worden de economische relaties beschreven die alle spelver-
sies gemeen hebben. Die relaties worden in het SIER Spel gecombineerd met
een van de twee beschikbare produktiefuncties en met een van de twee be-
schikbare investeringsfuncties. De dan resulterende combinaties kunnen
geclassificeerd worden als niet-lineaire dynamische symmetrische systemen
met vier grote landen en internationaal imperfecte concurrentie zowel op
de goederen-markten als op de markten voor financi~le activa.
Genoemde combinaties worden beschreven in de Hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 6.
Zij worden geYllustreerd via een beschrijving in de tijd van de gevolgen
van (eenzijdige dan weI wereldwijde) begrotings-politiek ("fiscal
policy"), aanbod-politiek ("supply side policy"), loonpolitiek en, indien
van toepassing, monetaire politiek. Dit alles onder alternatieve vooron-
derstellingen.
De Hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 6 kunnen beschouwd worden als leidraad v~~r
toekomstige spelleiders.
In Hoofdstuk 7 worden de effecten van deze vormen van beleid samengevat en
worden de conclusies m.b.t. begrotings- en monetaire politiek vergeleken
met die welke in de standaardliteratuur worden getrokken. Bovendien worden
in dat hoofdstuk andere mogelijkheden van het SIER Spel voor het verrich-
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